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Chapter 7 The Caribbean region
1. Introduction
As demonstrated in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the European Union (EU) provides 
better market access to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through 
the Cotonou Agreement than to other developing countries (DCs) under the 
Generalised System of Preferences scheme (GSP) or the Euro-Med Agreements. In 
the context of the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), ACP 
countries have been divided into several sub-regional groupings.1 The decision to 
establish regional agreements was, according to the EU, essential to “ensure 
flexibility and would allow [...] tailoring [of] the EPAs to the economic realities 
and needs of the different regions.”2 This Chapter will particularly focus on the 
Caribbean region of the ACP Group, which was selected as the case study for this 
thesis.
The EU has particularly strong historic ties with Caribbean countries. The 
colonisation of the Caribbean region, particularly by the British, French, Spanish 
and the Dutch empires, dates back to the 17th Century.3 While most colonised 
Caribbean countries obtained independence from their European colonial powers in 
the 1960s,4 the EU continued to maintain special economic and post-colonial
1 Negotiations of EPAs trough ACP regional groupings are in line with Articles 35(2) and 37(5) of 
the Cotonou Agreement as well as Article 7 of Annex IV  attached to the 2000/483/EC: Partnership 
agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 
23 June 2000- protocols-Final Act, Declarations, OJ L  317, 15.12.2000.
2 ACP Secretariat-European Commission, “Joint Report on ACP -  EU negotiations on Economic 
Partnership Agreements: 2nd all-ACP-EU Ambassadorial level meeting at ACP House, Brussels, 9 
December 2002,” Brussels, 12 February 2003, ACP-EC/NG/MN/16, p 17.
3 European Commission, “An EU-Caribbean partnership for growth, stability and development”, 
Brussels, COM (2006) 86 final, 2.3.2006, p 14.
4 Ibid., p 14.
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relations with Caribbean countries. The European countries gave the newly 
independent countries preferential access for their commodities through 
preferential trade arrangements, thereby increasing their trade opportunities to the 
protected EU agricultural market.5 Such an involvement of the western powers in 
the economic life of the Caribbean region has allowed them to maintain “ indirect 
control” over the former colonies.6 Even today, the relationship between the EU 
Member States (MS) and the region is close, mainly via the French Departements 
d ’ Outre-Mer (DOMs),7 and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) of the 
United Kingdom (UK)8 and the Netherlands.9 Accordingly, the EU remains “very 
present” in the Caribbean.10
This increase in Caribbean’s trade opportunities is today mediated through the 
EPA, concluded between the EU and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States 
(CARIFORUM) (hereafter the “EU-CARIFORUM EPA”), pursuant to the 
Cotonou Agreement. The CARIFORUM comprises the members of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic.11 Cuba is also a member 
of the CARIFORUM since 2001, but has remained outside the EPA negotiations, 
as it did not sign the Cotonou Agreement.
5 Ibid., p 14.
6 Childs, P. and Williams, P. “An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory”, Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1997, p 5.
7 “French overseas department”. As explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis, France has three DOMs in 
the Caribbean, namely Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Martinique which form an integral part of 
France and thus of the EU.
8 Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands.
9 Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles.
10 Op. cit. footnote no 3, p 14.
11 Montserrat is a member of CARICOM but it did not sign the EPA as it is not independent. It is a 
British overseas Territory.
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This chapter focuses on the agreed EU-CARIFORUM EPA, and aims to provide 
an analysis of the issues surrounding the agreement. This is a matter that merits 
examination, given that the EU-CARIFORUM EPA has been designed as a free 
trade Agreement. The trade and development provisions of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA were negotiated in order to be in lull conformity with the WTO regulatory 
framework.12 With this aim, they introduced for the first time the principle of 
reciprocity within the Caribbean-EU trade agreements,13 leading to the elimination 
of customs duties on goods exported by all partners.14 Caribbean countries are 
therefore now required to eliminate tariffs on imports from the EU.15
2. The Caribbean region: Contextualisation
2.1 Overview of the Caribbean region
When reference is made to the “Caribbean”, it is generally understood as to refer to 
the sea.16 However, the term is also commonly used to refer to the group of islands. 
In such a case, the Caribbean extends also to some countries situated on the 
mainland of South and Central America, ranging from Guyana in South America to 
Belize.17 Given the number of independent entities, it is believed that the 
Caribbean region possibly has “the largest conglomeration of small states in the 
world.” 18 Most of them share the same history: their “colonial past of slavery.” 19
12 The rationale for negotiations and signature of EPAs was examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis
13 The principle of non-reciprocity in EU-ACP trade was previously established under Article 7 of 
ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, OJ L  25, 30.1.1976.
14 Article 14 of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L  289, 30.10.2008
15 Ibid., at Article 16.
16 Menon, P.K., “Regional integration: A Case Study of the Caribbean Community [CARICOM],” 
K orean  J. Comp. L., 1996, 24, pp. 197-258, p 201.
17 Axline, W.A., “Integration and development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: the politics of 
regional negotiations”, In ternational O rganization , 1978, 32(4), pp. 953-973, p 955.
18 Op. cit. footnote no 16, p 201.
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Among them, 12 countries are part of the “Commonwealth Caribbean,” which 
refers to the independent English-speaking States in the region sharing the same 
fundamental political values. Consequently this term does not solely refer to a 
“merely geographical notion.”19 202 23
The Caribbean region has a small population. The most populous countries are 
Haiti and Dominican Republic with over 10 million inhabitants each. These are 
followed by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago which have a population estimated 
at over 1 and 2 million people respectively. The other countries have a population 
ranging from 762,498 (Guyana) to 49,593 (St Kitts and Nevis). The Caribbean 
region’s economy is also small, underdeveloped, and varies widely among the 
countries. Caribbean countries have a relatively small GDP. Within the 
CARIFORUM, the Dominican Republic has the largest GDP with USD 46.8 
billion in 2009. It is followed by Trinidad and Tobago with a GDP of USD 21 
billion and Jamaica (GDP USD 13 billion). In contrast, Dominica has the smallest 
economy of the CARIFORUM countries (GDP USD 378 million).24 In addition, 
the region has also on average a declining economic growth. For instance, between 
2006 and 2010, the annual GDP growth for Antigua and Barbuda has decreased
90
19 Meijers, H., “New International Persons in the Caribbean” N eth erlan ds In ternation al L aw  
R eview , 1977, 24(1-2), pp 160-188, p 163.
20 Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. See the 
Commonwealth website, available from:
http://vvww.thecommonwealth.0rg/Intemal/l 91086/142227/members/ (Accessed 21/7/2011).
21 The core criteria for Commonwealth Membership are provided by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government in “The Kampala Communique”, Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting, 
Uganda, 23-25 November 2007, Commonwealth Secretariat, para. 87.
22 Op. cit. footnote no 16, p 201.
23 Haiti is considered “the poorest country in Latin American and Caribbean and among the poorest 
in the world.” See World Bank, “Accelerating Trade and Integration in the Caribbean: Policy 
Options for sustained growth, Growth, and Poverty Reduction.”, Herndon, VA, USA: World Bank, 
2009, p 4.
24 World Bank Data, available from: http://data.worldbank.org/countrv (Accessed 26/07/2011).
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from 13.3 to -8.5 percent. GDP growth for Dominican Republic fell from 10.5 to
3.5 percent and for Jamaica from 2.7 to -3.0 percent.25
Because of the limited range of resources, the Caribbean countries’ economic 
activity is undiversified and is mainly based on exports, which are a major source 
of foreign exchange, employment opportunities and income growth.26 27It must be 
noted that the export of services is the main source of income in the Caribbean 
region. They account for 61 percent of GDP for Barbados and 49 percent for St 
Lucia.28 However, agriculture also remains an important sector in the Caribbean 
region. Agricultural commodities are essentially concentrated on traditional crops 
such as sugar, bananas and rice,29 30which are generally exported to a limited export
i n
market. Furthermore, because these products are constantly subject to global 
competition and WTO rules on trade liberalisation, they export also non-traditional 
products such as tropical fruits.31 The rural population in most Caribbean countries 
is very important and can represent more than half of the total population. For 
example, in 2009, the mral population represented 70 percent of the total 
population in Antigua and Barbuda, 60 percent in Barbados, 69 percent in 
Grenada, 72 percent in Guyana, 52 percent in Haiti and 86 percent in Trinidad and
25 World Bank Data, available from:
http://data.worldbank.ora/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGfAccessed 26/07/2011).
26 Deep Ford., J.R. and Rawlins, G., Trade policy, trade andfood security in the Caribbean in Deep 
ford, J.R., dell’Aquila, C. and Conforti, P., “Agricultural trade policy and food security in the 
Caribbean-structural issues, multilateral negotiations and competitiveness” FAO, Rome, 2007, p 15.
27 Op. cit. footnote no 23, p 8.
28 World Bank Data, available from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries (Accessed 26/07/2011).
29 Paul, C.L., The reorganization of Public Agricultural research in the Caribbean under the Pressures of Globalization and Privatization, in Bigman, D., “Globalization and the Developing 
Countries: emerging Strategies for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation” Wallingford,
Oxon, GBR: CABI Publishing, 2002, p 295.
30 Caribbean countries export mainly to the European Union, the USA and within the Caribbean 
region itself. See Deep Ford., J.R. and Khaira, H., Caribbean countries as small and vulnerable economies in the WTO in op. cit.footnote no 26, p 48.
31 Op. cit. footnote no 26, p 15.
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Tobago.32 Although there is a decreasing population engaged in agricultural work, 
the sector remains an important employment provider in the economies of some 
countries. For instance, employment in agriculture represents 14.5 percent of total 
employment for Dominican Republic and 18.2 percent for Jamaica.33
For some countries, import tariffs on agricultural commodities represent a 
significant share of total revenue and thus contribute significantly to their 
economic development. For instance, agricultural imports represented in 2009, 20 
percent of GDP for Dominica and 21 percent of GDP for Guyana, while 
representing 6 percent of GDP for Jamaica, Grenada and Dominican Republic.34 
However, agricultural export earnings have also slightly decreased for many 
countries.35 367This certainly reflects the effects of trade liberalisation, international 
competition and the erosion of preferential tariffs regimes. In addition, it must also 
be noted that because of the limited diversity in agricultural production, Caribbean 
countries are also highly reliant on food imports, which help maintain its food 
security. Cereals are the main product which is imported into the region, and 
represent one-fourth of food imports. Such a degree of trade concentration 
associated with the Caribbean countries’ infrastructure deficiencies and 
“inadequate levels of [a] narrow range of trained human resource skills,” affect 
their economic growth and development.
32 World Bank Data available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS 
(Accessed 25/07/2011).
33 World Bank Data available from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS/countries (Accessed 1/08/2011).
34 See World Bank Data available from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS/countries (Accessed 25/07/2011).
35 Agriculture accounted for 15 percent of GDP in 2006 for 12 percent of GDP in 2008 for Belize. It 
accounted for 8 percent of GDP in 2006 and 7 percent of GDP in 2009 for St Vincent and the 
Grenadine. See Ibid.
36 Op. cit. footnote no 30, p 47.
37 Op. cit. footnote no 16, p 201.
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Another challenge for Caribbean countries’ economies is their geographical 
location. The Caribbean Sea has an extremely fragile ecosystem which makes the 
countries subject to natural disasters such hurricane, floods, earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions. Given the very small size of the countries, these natural 
disasters tend to damage the countries as a whole (infrastructure, agricultural 
production and utilities) leading to significant economic losses. For example, 
following the severe Hurricane ‘Gilbert’ which hit Jamaica in 1988, the island 
suffered from severe devastation which amounted to approximately 33 percent of 
GDP. Another example is the damage of Hurricanes ‘Luis’ and ‘Marilyn’ of 1995 
on Antigua and Barbuda’s infrastructure. The island suffered from critical 
economic losses amounting to about 66 percent of GDP.38 In light of their 
economic size, high reliance on external trade and dependence on food imports, 
concentrated export orientation and export market concentration, as well as their 
“susceptibility to natural disasters”, Caribbean countries are considered to be 
“especially small and vulnerable economies.”39
The EU market is the Caribbean region’s second largest agricultural export 
destination, after the United States.40 In 2006, the EU accounted for some 19 
percent of their total exports.41 The Caribbean region, as a member of the ACP 
group, has a long history of trading with the EU.42 The current EU agricultural 
trade relations with Caribbean countries are governed by the EU-CARIFORUM
38 Bernard, R.L., “Globalization: Everything but Alms- the EPA and Economic Development”, the 
GraceKennedy Foundation, 2008, p 34.
39 Op. cit. footnote no 30, p 41.
40 European Community -  Caribbean region, “Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative 
Programme, 2008-2013”, Strasbourg, 15 November 2008, p 12.
41 Ibid., p 12.
42 This was discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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EPA,43 negotiated and signed under the umbrella of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Exports of Caribbean countries to the EU are not diversified, and substantially 
emanate from traditional agricultural products including cane sugar, rice and 
bananas. Income from trade in goods with the EU is important for the Caribbean. It 
represented EUR 4.1 billion in 2007.44 The EU’s biggest trading partner in the 
region is the Dominican Republic. Its other major partners are the Bahamas, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.45 The EU is also “the largest source”46 of 
development aid to Caribbean countries, which is mainly provided via the 
European Development Fund (EDF) programme.47 48 The EDF is the main 
instrument providing for the EU’s financial support for development cooperation 
with ACP countries and OCTs. Each EDF is managed by the Commission and is 
usually of five years duration.49 The global amount of the EDF is agreed by the 
Council, and obtained from EU M S’ financial contributions rather than the EU 
budget.50 Accordingly, contributions have to be negotiated. In light of the difficult 
negotiations on EDF contributions, the European Commission has repeatedly 
proposed to include the EDF within the EU budget, the so-called “budgetisation” 
of the EDF.51 The integration of the EDF into the EU budget is planned for 2020, 
after the end of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework.52
43 Op. cit. footnote no 14.
44 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 12
45 Ibid., p 12.
46 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 8.
47 ACP countries also receive EU financial support from the EU budget through other developments 
instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument or the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights. These instruments complement funding from the EDF.
48 European Commission, “Towards the full integration of co-operation with ACP countries in the 
EU budget” , Brussels, COM (2003) 590 final, 8.10.2003, not published in the Official Journal, p 3.
49 The tenth EDF cycle covers the period from 2008 to 2013.
50 Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge, 1999, 
p 113.
51 Op. cit. footnote no 48, p 9.
52 European Commission, “Preparation of the multiannual financial framework regarding the 
financing of EU cooperation for African, Caribbean and Pacific States and Overseas Countries and
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2.2 The Caribbean regional economic communities
The Caribbean region is made up of three different stages of economic integration 
processes: the CARICOM, the CARIFORUM and the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States.53 These are mainly the result of the “Treaty Establishing the 
Caribbean Community,” also referred to as the Chaguaramas Treaty.54 It was 
signed in Trinidad on 4 July 1973 by the Government of Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and came into force on 1st August 1973 for 
these independent, developing, English-speaking states.55 Given the economics of 
the developing Caribbean countries, it is believed that the main aim of regional 
economic integration in the region is to contribute to “economic development.”56 
Indeed, while integration among “industrialized countries” aims to intensify their 
“economic patterns,” through the reduction of trade barriers, the less advanced 
countries adopt regional policies in order to restructure their “economic patterns.”57 
Although, it is not the aim of this chapter to provide an analysis of the history of 
the Caribbean regional integration process, it is still necessary to provide an 
overview of the different forms of regional cooperation within the region.
2.2.1 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
The CARICOM is “the pillar around which economic integration activities in the
region revolve.”58 It is a regional organisation, established in 1973 by the
Chaguaramas Treaty, with the aim of enhancing the economic integration of the
Territories for the 2014-2020 period (11th European Development Fund)”, Brussels, 7.12.2011 
COM (2011)837 final.
53 All countries of the Caribbean region are also members of the Association of Caribbean States 
(ACS). See Association of Caribbean States website, available from: http://www.acs-aec.oru/ 
(Accessed 21/7/2011).
54 Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community, Chaguaramas, 4th July 1973.
55 Ibid at Articles 24 and 33.
56 Op. cit. footnote no 17, p 953.
57 Ibid., p 954.
58 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 24.
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member states of the CARICOM through the establishment of a single market.59 
As provided by the “Georgetown Accord”,60 the Caribbean region had to move 
from a free trade area to a customs union. Accordingly, the CARICOM replaced 
the previous Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).61 The CARIFTA was 
established by the “Dickenson Bay” Agreement signed by the Governments of 
Antigua, Barbados and British Guiana in December 1966. It aimed to accelerate 
the economic development of Caribbean countries through the elimination of 
barriers to trade between its member states.62 63 Consequently the agreement 
provided for “the immediate establishment of a Free Trade Economic Community 
for all the countries who so desire.” The Agreement gave the possibility to any 
territory in the region to participate in the Agreement subject to the terms and 
conditions determined by the Council of the Territory.64 Thus, Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad 
and Tobago also became members in 1968, followed by Belize in 1971.
In accordance with Article 31 of the Chaguaramas Treaty, the members of the 
CARICOM agreed to adopt a Common External Tariff (CET) “in respect of all 
commodities imported from third countries.” However, due to implementation 
issues, the CET did not take effect until 1991.65 The original Chaguaramas Treaty 
was revised in 2001 in order to strengthen the regional economic integration
59 Op. cit. footnote no 54 at Article 4.
60 Signed in April 1973 in Guyana.
61 See Article 2(1) of the Georgetown Agreement on the Organization of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States, 1975 as amended by Decision No. l/LXXVIII/03 of the 78th Session of the 
Council of Ministers, Brussels, 27 and 28 November 2003. ACP/27/005/00 Rev. 16 [Final Version].
62 Preamble (3) of the Dickenson Bay Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association, 10th December 1966.
63 Ibid at Preamble (4).
64 Op. cit. footnote no 62 at Article 32.
65 Op. cit. footnote no 16, p 239.
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through the creation of a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).66 In 
contrast to the earlier CARIFTA, the CSME provides for the free movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital within the Community, as well as, inter alia, 
an “economic policy co-ordination and financial and monetary integration of 
Member States” through a single economy. This would lead to the establishment of 
a Caribbean Monetary Union.67 68Given these “ambitious objectives”, it is believed
/TO
that the CSME provides for “much wider and deeper forms of integration.” The 
CSME was inaugurated in 2006 and currently provides for free movement of 
labour, services and goods provisions within thirteen participating members of 
CARICOM.69 701This process is due to be completed in 2015 with the harmonisation 
of economic and monetary policies and measures as well as the implementation of 
a Monetary Union.
Membership of the Community was firstly open to the member states of the earlier
10CARIFTA and the Bahamas. However, given the principal objectives of the 
CARICOM established under the original Chaguaramas Treaty, it was pointed 
out that the Caribbean Community was “clearly designed to attract the attention, 
and the eventual participation, of non-[UK] Commonwealth countries in the 
region.”72 Accordingly, membership of CARICOM is now also open to any
66 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Nassau, 5th July 2001.
67 Ibid at Article 14(2).
68 Girvan, N., “Whither CSME?,” Journal o f  C aribbean  International R ela tion s, 2005, 1(1), pp. 13- 
32.
69 The Bahamas and Haiti are currently remaining outside the CSME process. See 
http://www.csmeonline.org/ (Accessed 20/7/2011).
70 Op. cit. footnote no 54 at Article 2(a).
71 Ibid at Article 4. The objectives of the CARICOM as provided in Article 6 of the Revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas include the coordination of foreign economic policies, the enhancement of 
economic development and deeper trade and economic relations with third States.
72 Simmon, K.R., “The Caribbean Economic Community: A new Venture in Regional Integration”, 
ICLQ, 1974, 23(2), pp. 453-458, p 454.
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Caribbean States or Territories, independent or not, “that is in the opinion of the 
Conference able and willing to exercise the rights and assume the obligations of 
membership in accordance with Article 29 of [the] [Chaguaramas] Treaty.” The 
“Secretariat of the Community” is the principal administration of the CARICOM 
and is responsible for monitoring the “development and implementation of 
proposals for the achievement of Community objectives.”73 4
The CARICOM currently comprises 15 members, namely Antigua and Barbuda, 
the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.75 With the exception of Belize and Guyana, 
all of these are islands states. The members are classified within the Chaguaramas 
Treaty according to whether they are More Developed Countries or Less 
Developed Countries.76 The Treaty does not provide a specific definition of these 
two terms. However the definition of a Less Developed Country within the 
Chaguaramas Treaty does not totally follow the definition of a Least Developed 
Country provided by the United Nations (UN). In contrast to the UN, the 
Chaguaramas Treaty classifies some countries with a population exceeding 75 
million as less developed.77 The Less Developed Countries within the 
Chaguaramas Treaty are considered to be “disadvantaged countries” in terms of
73 Op. cit. footnote no 54 at Article 2(b).
74 Op. cit. footnote no 66 at Article 23.
75 There are also five CARICOM associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda. British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are 
considered as associate members of the organisation while the other countries are full members. 
(Op. cit. footnote no 66 at Article 3).
76 Op. cit. footnote no 66 at Article 4. The Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and 
Trinidad and Tobago are classified as More Developed Countries. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines are considered as Less Developed Countries.
77 The UN criteria for the identification of the LDCs are available from: http://www.un.org/special- 
rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (Accessed 20/7/2011).
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“the size, structure and vulnerability of their economies.”78 Menon argues that this 
terminology is “unfortunate” because “all the countries in the Community are 
under developed and dependant economies.”79 However, he is also of the view that 
this classification is necessary since it “facilitates the allocation of preferences for 
the benefits of the [Less Developed Countries].”80
2.2.2 The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
Within the CARICOM, nine countries are also members of the sub-regional 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).81 It was established under the 
Treaty of Basseterre of 1981 in order to inter alia “promote co-operation” between 
the parties to the Treaty.82 Due to limited human and financial resources of 
Caribbean states, there was a need for the independent Caribbean countries to be 
able to cooperate on external affairs representation.83 Article 4.1 of the Treaty of 
Basseterre provides that the OECS should inter alia promote co-operation among 
the OECS members, and assist them in fulfilling their international obligations and 
responsibilities.84 The Treaty provides also that the OECS should establish a single 
economic area though the ‘Economic Union’ and ensure the successful 
development of its members.85 Given the successful establishment of common
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78 Op. cit. footnote no 66 at Preamble (19).
79 Op. cit. footnote no 16, p 222.
80 Ibid, p 222.
81 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.
82 Article 3(l)(a) of the Treaty of Basseterre establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States Economic Union, 18th June 1981. The Treaty was revised in 2010.
83 See OECS, “The Treaty of Basseterre and OECS Economic Union” (2009) Paper No. 
OECS/AUT/03/38/17, OECS Secretariat, p 1 [Online] Available from: http://www.oecs.org/doc- 
lib/economic-union (Accessed 20/7/2011).
84 Article 4(1 )(a) and (c) of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre establishing the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States Economic Union, 18th June 2010.
85 Ibid at Article 4(l)(e) and (f).
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institutions, it was pointed out that the OECS helped Caribbean members to “ [...]
O/T
collectively pool resources and work in the interest of citizens on several fronts.”
2.2.3 The Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM)
The CARIFORUM86 7 comprises the Caribbean countries which signed the Cotonou 
Agreement and Cuba. The OCTs of the UK and the Netherlands as well as the 
French DOMs have observer status at CARIFORUM.88 The forum was established 
in October 1992 as a political group, following accession of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti to the 1990 Lome Convention (“Lome IV”).89 It aimed to 
facilitate accession of these countries to the EPA negotiations between the 
Caribbean region and the EU, as well as allocating resources from the EDF to the 
region.90 The CARIFORUM is responsible for managing and coordinating policy 
dialogue between the EU and the Caribbean region. It aims also to “promote 
integration and cooperation in the Caribbean and to coordinate the allocation of 
resources” under the EDFs.91 Finally the CARIFORUM is charged with the 
management of the implementation of the Caribbean Regional Indicative 
Programmes funded through the EDF and regional programmes financed by the
86 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines” WT/TPR/G/190/VCT, 
1/10/2007.
87 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. See: Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
Secretariat, available from:
http://www.caricom.org/isn/communitv organs/cariforum/cariforum main page.isp?menu=cob 
(Accessed 21/7/2011).
88 Ibid.
89 See Commission of the European Communities, “Lome IV (1990-2000) Background, 
innovations, improvements” Brussels, 1990. Haiti became a member of CARICOM in 2002, but not 
the Dominican Republic which signed a free trade agreement with CARICOM on 22nd August 1998 
(the CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement).
90 Wellington, S., Singh, A., and Page, R., “Caribbean economic expansion, trade and investment: 
an innovative process for exploiting opportunities arising from the economic partnership 
agreement: implications for CARIFORUM member states” sm a ll s ta te s  digest, 2010, issue 1, pp 
13-18, p. 13
91 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 21.
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EU MS and any other source.92 93Accordingly, the CARIFORUM provides a “useful
Q 'i
platform for strategic political dialogue,” and is considered to be the 
Commission’s “principal interlocutor for all matters related to regional cooperation 
in the Caribbean.”94
3. The EU-CARIFORUM EPA
3.1 Schedule of negotiations and their objectives
The negotiations on the EPAs were divided into two phases. They started first at an 
“all-ACP-EC level,” which sought to determine and clarify “horizontal issues of 
interest to all parties.”95 This design was established in order to ensure transparency 
before the start of negotiations at the level of ACP regions under the second phase 
negotiations, which aimed to address “specific commitments” to be undertaken 
between the parties to the agreement.96 97The EU and the Caribbean region started 
formal negotiations for an EPA, in Kingston, Jamaica, on 16 April 2004. This has 
led to the adoption of a “joint Plan and Schedule for CARIFORUM-EC EPA 
negotiation” process.98 This indicative template provided for four negotiating 
phases taking place at three levels,99 with clear objectives and deadlines.
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92 Ibid., p 21.
93 Op. cit. footnote no 3, p 14.
94 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 19.
95 ACP Secretariat-European Commission, “ACP-EC EPA negotiations: Joint Report on the all- 
ACP -  EC phase of EPA negotiations,” ACP-EC/NG/NP/43, Brussels, 2 October 2003, p 1.
96 Ibid., p 1.
97 The Caribbean was then the fourth region to launch EPA negotiations with the EU. West and 
Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa started the negotiations in October 2003 and 
February 2004 respectively.
98 European Commission, “Plan and Schedule for CARIFORUM-EC Negotiations of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement”, Brussels, 22 April 2004.
99 Ministerial, Principal Negotiators and subject-specific negotiators.
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The negotiation process took place alternatively in the CARIFORUM region and 
Brussels. The CARIFORUM negotiations with the EU were carried out by the 
director of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)100 who was 
appointed as the “CARIFORUM Principal Negotiator.”101 A Regional Preparatory 
Task Force (RPTF) was also established by both the EU and CARIFORUM in 
order to “cement the strategic link between EPA negotiations and development 
cooperation.” 102
The initial negotiation phase was planned to take place between April 2004 and 
September 2004 in order to establish the priorities of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
negotiations. The objective of this phase was to “establish an understanding of the 
fundamental concerns and interests of EPA negotiations for both CARIFORUM 
and the [EU].” 103 Following this first phase, the CARIFORUM and the EU were to 
focus on the CARIFORUM regional integration process. In this aim they had to set 
up a “common understanding” on the priorities for the Caribbean regional 
integration between September 2004 and September 2005.
The third phase was scheduled to take place from September 2005 to December 
2006. This was the most importance phase of negotiations since its objective was 
to consolidate and structure the negotiations into a draft agreement. It was 
launched at the Second CARIFORUM-[EU] Ministerial EPA meeting in St Lucia.
100 The CRNM was established in 1997 to “develop, coordinate and execute an overall negotiating 
strategy for various external negotiations in which the Region was involved.” See Office of Trade 
Negotiations of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, available from: 
http://www.crnm.om/index.php7option~com content&view=artic1e&idr=45&Itemid=68 (Accessed 
28/07/2011). The CRNM is now referred to as the Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN).
101 Op. cit. footnote no 98, p 3.
102 Ibid., p 4.
103 Op. cit. footnote no 98, p 4.
285
The EU and the CARIFORUM had to focus on trade liberalisation as well as on 
the identification and treatment of sensitive products, such as sugar and bananas, 
for CARIFORUM countries. This phase also aimed to reinforce “the trading 
relations as well as overall co-operation between CARIFORUM Member States 
and DOMs/OCTs located in the Caribbean.” 104
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Finally, the fourth phase, between January 2007 and December 2007, had to lead 
to the finalisation of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA negotiations. The CARIFORUM 
and the EU had to agree on “the institutional framework and structures of 
implementing the EPA along with designing a review process.” 105 An agreement 
had to be signed by the end of December 2007 by both parties.
3.2 The agreed EU-CARIFORUM EPA
After four phases of negotiations, a comprehensive or “full” EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA was initialled on 16 December 2007 and signed on 15th October 2008 at 
Barbados.106 It applies provisionally as from 29 December 2008.107 It was signed 
by the then European Commission Vice-President Siim Kallas who believed that it 
“ [would] renew the historic partnership” with the EU.108 The EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA is based on the fundamental principles of the Cotonou Agreement, being 
sustainable development, the reduction and eradication of poverty, and the regional
104
105
Ibid., p 7. 
Ibid., p 7.
106 Guyana signed on 20 October 2008. Haiti which signed the Agreement in 2009 but has not yet 
ratified it.
107 Notice concerning the provisions application of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership 
Agreement, OJ L 352/62, 31.12.2008.
108 EU Commission Vice-President Siim Kallas, “EU-CARIFORUM EPA signature,” Barbados, 15 
October 2008, [Online] Available from:
http://www.delbrb.ec.europa.eu/en/epa/epa signing docs/Carib EPA Speech Kallas FINAL.pdf 
(Accessed 25/01/2010).
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integration of Caribbean countries into the global economy.109 It therefore goes 
beyond trade and is more oriented towards development objectives. It also intends 
to improve these countries’ capacity in trade policy and trade related issues.110 The 
agreement provides that these objectives must be achieved through “the 
establishment of a trade partnership,” 111 which must be “true, strengthened and 
strategic.” 112
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA ensures the perpetuity of the EU-Caribbean 
preferential trade relationship since it was concluded for an indefinite period of 
time.113 The Caribbean countries are generally positive about the benefits of the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA on their economic growth. For instance, Ramesh 
Dookooh, the President of the Guyana Manufacturing and Services Association 
pointed out that the agreed EU-CARIFORUM EPA is “a very useful tool that 
allows manufactures to expand their markets” but that the full potential of the 
agreement “has yet to be seen.” 114
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA is a “full” free trade agreement and therefore covers 
goods, services, investment, innovation and intellectual property, public 
procurement, competition and development cooperation. While it focuses primarily 
on trade liberalisation for goods and services, it also covers trade-related matters 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, food security, environment and social
109 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article l(a)(b)(c).
110 Ibid at Article fid).
111 Ibid at Article 1(a).
112 Op. cit. footnote no 1 at Article 34 (2).
113 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 244(1).
114 Ramesh Dookooh, “Our EPA was signed in 2008, but its full potential has yet to be seen,” 
30.3.2010 [Online] Available from:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/stories/fu11 stories.cfm?ID=l 51 &langldr=EN&sortt::::previous 
(Accessed 27/07/2011).
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issues. In the area of agriculture, the agreement includes a full chapter on 
agriculture and fisheries,115 and sets out a clear objective; the increase of the 
competitiveness of production, processing and trade in agricultural products, in 
both traditional and non-traditional sectors, between the parties.116 This must be 
achieved through the progressive removal of trade barriers117 and other 
commitments undertaken by the EU and the Caribbean region.
3.3 The CARIFORUM’s “raison d’etre” for an EPA
Although it is certain that the granting of tariff-free access to imports from the EU 
implies a serious loss of revenue for Caribbean countries, it is noteworthy that the 
CARIFORUM was the first ACP region to sign an EPA. Errol Humphrey, 
Ambassador of Barbados and Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM, gave eight reasons 
underpinning this decision.118 Besides the fact that ACP countries had to conclude 
an EPA before the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement waiver, as Humphrey pointed 
out, a key issue affecting the Caribbean regions was that following a careful review 
of the possible alternatives “a development-oriented EPA was clearly the best 
option for all CARIFORUM member states.” 119
In light of the new EU trade regime with ACP countries, Article 37(6) of the 
Cotonou Agreement offered ACP countries which refused to sign an EPA, an 
alternative relationship with the EU “equivalent to their existing situation and in
115 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Chapter 5 ofTitle I of Part II.
116 Ibid at Article 37.
117 Ibid at Article 38.
118 See: Humphrey, E. Ambassador of Barbados & Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM College of 
EPA Negotiators, “CARIFORUM EPA Negotiations: Initial Reflections on the Outcome”, 
Presentation  to  a  D G  T rade-organ ised  w orkshop on the CA RIF OR U M -EC EPA, Brussels, 2008.
119 Ibid.
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conformity with WTO rules.”120 The other alternative given by the EU was the 
GSP scheme, which was examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis.121 Non-Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) of the ACP group were offered trade preferences via 
the standard GSP scheme or the GSP+, and LDCs of the ACP group were offered 
similar preferences under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) arrangement. In 
contrast to the other ACP regions, the CARIFORUM is the only region which is 
largely composed of DCs, with Haiti being the only LDC, using the UN definition. 
Haiti would have thus been the only possible beneficiary of the EBA arrangement.
As examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis, in the context of non-LDCs of the ACP 
group, the EU GSP scheme is less generous than the Cotonou Agreement, and 
consequently the EPAs, in terms of product coverage and tariffs reduction.122 
Given the limited options, Caribbean countries were left with no choice but to 
negotiate a reciprocal EPA. Opting for the EU GSP scheme would have adversely 
affected the Caribbean region, and reduced access for Caribbean commodities, 
which enjoyed preferential access to the EU. The need to secure their existing 
preferences was therefore the main CARIFORUM’s reason for signing an EPA.123
In addition, it must also be noted that the Caribbean is the only region which 
signed a “full” EPA, covering not only trade liberalisation of goods but also free 
trade for services and investment. The signature of an “interim” partnership, which 
is limited to industrial and agricultural goods only, would have been in conformity
120 Op. cit. footnote no 1 at Article 37(6).
121 See European Commission, “Economic Partnership Agreements”, Brussels, 23 October 2007, 
COM (2007) 635 final.
122 This was covered in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
123 See CRNM Note on CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, “EPAs: The Way 
Forward for the ACP”, COMSEC-sponsored High Level Technical Meeting, Cape Town, 7-8 April 
2008.
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with the WTO legal requirements. The WTO rules on FTAs provides only for the 
elimination of customs duties on goods. The signature of a “full” EPA was 
therefore not required by the WTO rules. However, while the president of Guyana 
called for the conclusion of a goods only EPA,124 the decision to sign a ‘full’ 
agreement was justified by the Caribbean negotiators. They considered the EPA to 
be a partnership going beyond market access for goods, and included 
“Development Cooperation, Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and Trade related 
issues ([Sanitary and Phytosanitary] etc)” .125 1267In their view, due to the issue of 
preference erosion and decline in agricultural prices, there was a need for the 
region to “diversify its export base,” and improve the region’s access to the EU 
market for non-traditional sectors. The Caribbean is the only “net supplier of 
services” among ACP countries, with the service sector being an important 
contributor to most CARIFORUM countries. Therefore ensuring privileged 
access to the EU services market was considered to be “a prime requirement to 
drive increased growth of Caribbean economies.”128 It is believed that the 
conclusion of an interim partnership “would have entailed the adjustment cost of 
liberalization without gamering the gains from the inclusion of services, 
investment and development-boosting measures.”129 The conclusion of such a 
partnership seemed therefore to be necessary for the Caribbean region. Ensuring 
privileged access for the Caribbean countries’ non-traditional products to the EU
124 “Guyana wants goods only from EPA”, nationnews.com, Barbados’ leading newspaper,
9.7.2008 [online] Available from: http://barpublish.bits.baseview.com/30938700Q746131 .php 
(Accessed 28/7/2011).
125 Op. cit. footnote no 118.
126 CRNM Note on CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, “What Europe is Offering 
Africa: the Pros and Cons of EPAs”, London, 2 April 2008.
127 Caribbean Policy Research Institute, “The Long-Term Impact of EPA in the Caribbean: Jamaica 
and St. Lucia”, A working Paper, CaPRI, 2009, p 11.
128 All CARIFORUM states, except Guyana and Suriname, have a service sector that is the most 
significant contributor to GDP. See Op. cit. footnote no 126.
129 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p. 22
290
Chapter 7 -  The Caribbean region
market will therefore improve their economic diversification, and allow them to be 
less dependent on agri-food exports which currently suffer from preference 
erosion.
4. EU and Caribbean’s legal commitments in agriculture and agricultural 
trade matters
4.1 Market access for agricultural products
As was discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the EU has adopted Regulation (EC) 
No 1528/2007 which provides for the new arrangements for products imported 
from the ACP Group of States.130 In accordance with Article 3 of this regulation, 
ACP Caribbean countries, as well as all other ACP regions, have received duty and 
quota free access to the EU market for their agricultural commodities since January 
2008 with a transitional period for sugar examined further below.131 However, in 
line with Article 37 of the Cotonou Agreement, ACP Caribbean countries were 
granted a flexible transition period and were given in some cases up to twenty-five 
years to open their domestic market to EU products in order to protect sensitive 
sectors.132 This option would thus allow “firms and governments to adjust 
gradually in keeping with their capacities” in order to be more competitive.133
In addition, pursuant to Article 37(4) of the Cotonou Agreement and in line with 
Article XXIV GATT 1947, the elimination of customs duties on Caribbean
130 Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the 
arrangements for products originating in certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the 
establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements, OJ L 348/1 31.12.2007.
131 A transitional period applied also to rice import. See Op. cit. footnote no 30 at Article 6 and 8.
132 See Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Appendix 1 of Annex III which provides for the schedule of tariff 
liberalisation of CARIFORUM States.
133 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 65.
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countries’ exports does not apply to products indicated in Annex II of the 
agreement.134 In order to protect local producers, the Caribbean countries were 
given the possibility to exclude about 20 percent of EU imports from the scope of 
GATT liberalisation.135 13678Products excluded comprise for instance meat, dairy and 
certain fruits and vegetables. Sugar and bananas, as key tropical food commodities 
for the Caribbean region, have also been excluded from the process. This 
possibility would thus limit the impact of liberalisation on the Caribbean’s 
economy.
There is no doubt that free market access for EU products will impact on the small 
economic size of Caribbean countries. As a result, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
authorises countries to apply safeguard measures of limited duration to products 
which are imported in “such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause” disturbances into the markets of the importing country. The 
latter will have the possibility to introduce tariff quotas, or apply a customs duty 
to the products concerned.139 The safeguard clause would therefore be of particular 
benefit to CARIFORUM countries.
In addition to the liberalisation of trade in goods, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA also 
protects local agricultural producers from the EU export subsidies. The EU has 
committed itself to remove all existing export subsidies on the exportation of
134 As explained in Chapter 5 of this thesis, GATT Article XXIV requires liberalisation on only 
“substantially all the trade” on goods.
135 Meyn, M., “Economic Partnership Agreements: A ‘Historic Step’ Towards a ‘Partnership of 
Equals’?,” D evelopm en t P o licy  R eview , 2008, 26(5), pp. 515-528, p 524.
136 See Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Appendix 1 of Annex III for products excluded from the 
liberalisation process.
137 Ibid at Article 25(2).
138 Quantitative restrictions are normally prohibited by the EPA under its Article 26.
139 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 25(3).
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agricultural products to the Caribbean region, for which the latter has agreed to the 
elimination of customs duties.140 In contrast, given the importance of subsidies for 
the economic development of DCs, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA confirms the 
WTO special and differential treatment provisions,141 and does not require 
Caribbean countries to eliminate export subsidies which comply with the WTO 
rules.142 The agreement further provides that both Caribbean countries and the EU 
must not increase any agricultural export subsidies nor introduce any agricultural 
export subsidies programme.143
4.2 Information sharing and consultation
Under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the Caribbean region and the EU have 
committed themselves to consult with each other on any issues relating to the 
removal of barriers for agricultural producers in the Caribbean.144 Such a 
consultation process is wide, with parties agreeing to exchange experiences, 
information and ideas on agriculture production, consumption and trade, the 
respective market developments for agricultural products, rural development 
policies, laws and regulations.145 The EU and the CARIFORUM must also discuss 
policy and institutional changes required to “underpin the transformation of the 
agricultural [...] sector as well as the formulation and implementation of regional 
policies on agriculture, food, rural development [...] in the pursuit of regional 
integration.”146 In addition to this, the EU has also committed itself to consult with
140 Ibid at Article 28(2).
141 Article 9(4) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Article 27 of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing.
142 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 28(4).
143 Ibid at Article 28(1).
144 Ibid at Article 40(1).
145 Ibid at Article 41(a) and (c).
146 Ibid at Article 41(d).
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the Caribbean region before engaging in trade policy developments and 
arrangements with third countries.147 This is because potential developments and 
arrangements with other countries could impact on the competitive positions of the 
Caribbean countries’ traditional agricultural products in the EU market. This would 
include consultations on bananas, rum, rice and sugar exports.148
4.3 Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards issues
As discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
requirements imposed by the WTO members can serve as barriers for agricultural 
product market access. The EU in particular imposes strict and high food safety 
standards, both on domestic and on imported products.149 The EU has always 
acknowledged the necessity to maintain and increase the protection of plant, 
animal and human health, so no special treatment in EU SPS measures has been 
granted to Caribbean countries under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Instead, it 
promises to facilitate the access of Caribbean countries’ products by preventing 
and minimising unintended trade barriers as the result of SPS measures.150 The EU 
has made a commitment to assist Caribbean countries to comply with the EU SPS 
standards, by developing the capacity of CARIFORUM enterprises,151 152and by 
sharing expertise. This would improve market access conditions for Caribbean 
countries’ agricultural food products. The EU has also promised to ensure a 
harmonisation of SPS measures within its market, and to notify CARIFORUM
147 Ibid at Article 42(1) and 200.
148 Ibid at Article 42 (1) and 200.
149 This issue was covered in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
150 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 53(a) and (b).
151 Ibid at Article 53 (d) and Article 59(2)(c).
152 Ibid at Article 56(2).
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on any SPS issues that may affect trade.153 When such problems arise, the 
‘Competent Authorities’ of the EU and the CARIFORUM must undertake 
consultations with each other in order to reach a “mutually agreed solution.” 154
5. The implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA
5.1 Institutional arrangements
The commitments undertaken by the CARIFORUM and the EU are reinforced by 
four joint consultative and decision-making institutions which have been 
established in order to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. The joint 
CARIFORUM-EU Council is the most important of these.155 It is composed of 
members of the Council of the EU, members of the European Commission and 
representatives of the governments of the Caribbean countries.156 The joint Council 
has been set up to supervise the implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and 
to monitor the fulfilment of its objectives. It is therefore necessary for the joint 
Council to meet regularly, at least every two years. It is responsible for examining 
proposals and recommendations addressed by the EU and the CARIFORUM for 
the review of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.157 Final decisions with regard to all 
matters covered by the EU-CARIFORUM EPA rest with the joint Council, whose 
decisions must be observed by all the EPA participants.158
153 Ibid at Article 58(1).
154 Ibid at Article 58(2).
155 The first meeting of the Joint Council was held on 17th March 2010.
156 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 228. The Joint council is chaired in turn by a representative of 
the EU party and by a CARIFORUM representative.
157 Ibid at Article 227(3).
158 Ibid at Article 229 (1) and (2).
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The joint Council is assisted by a joint Trade and Development Committee, which 
is the second most important institutions of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Its 
members are representatives of the EU and the CARIFORUM at senior official 
level who can meet whenever needed.159 The Committee must nevertheless meet at 
least once a year for an overall review of the implementation of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA.160 The Committee performs the administrative tasks of the 
agreement. It is particularly responsible for monitoring and controlling the 
implementation of the agreement in the areas of trade and development, in addition 
to resolve any disputes that may arise.161
In addition, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA provides for the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Committee to allow members of the EP and of the Caribbean states’ 
parliaments to meet at regular intervals and exchange views.162 163The joint Council 
must therefore communicate its decisions and recommendations to this Committee 
and provide it with additional information if requested. The Parliamentary 
Committee can also make recommendations to both Joint Council and Trade and 
Development Committee.164 Finally, a Consultative Committee has been set up in 
order to “promote dialogue and cooperation” with organisations of civil society, 
including the academic community, and social and economic partners.165 The 
Consultative Committee fulfils its activities on the basis of consultation by the
159 Ibid at Article 230(4)(b).
160 Ibid at Article 230(5).
161 The functions of the Trade and Development Committee are set up in Article 230(3) of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA.
162 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 231(1).
163 Ibid at Article 231(5) and (6).
164 Ibid at Article 231(7).
165 Ibid at Article 232(1).
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Joint Council, or on its own initiative. It can also make recommendations to both 
Joint Council and Trade and Development Committee.166 167
These joint EU-CARIFORUM EPA bodies, as well as the domestic institutions, 
have been given a crucial role in the implementation process of the agreement. 
They must “ensure that the objectives of the Agreement are realised, the 
Agreement is properly implemented and the benefits for men, women, young 
people and children deriving from their Partnership are maximised.” Given the 
permanent nature of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, it is also believed that the 
institutional arrangements under the agreement will help meeting the needs of the 
EU and CARIFORUM which will certainly evolve over time.168
5.2 EU development support provisions
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA is more than a free trade agreement and is also 
accompanied by development support measures. This is in line with the decision 
taken by both ACP countries and the EU during the negotiations process, to 
integrate “appropriate development support measures,” which must be 
“complementary and mutually supportive.” 169 170These measures were necessary to
170help ACP countries and regions “maximise the benefits deriving from EPAs.”
While, providing development aid to the Caribbean region is not the primary 
purpose of the agreement, development cooperation is considered to be a “crucial
166 Ibid at Article 232(3) and (5).
167 Ibid at Article 5.
168 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 88.
169 Op. cit. footnote no 95, p 7
170 Ibid., p 7.
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element” of the partnership.171 Given the capacity limits of Caribbean countries, it 
is expected that the EU-CARIFORUM EPA will lead to major implementation 
costs. The agreement is thus taking into account the level the CARIFORUM 
economies growth and has identified eight priority areas. This includes, providing 
technical assistance to build human, legal and institutional capacity in the 
CARIFORUM States, support for institutional reforms, new investment and the 
development of new sectors, enhancing the technological and research capabilities, 
the development of technological capacity, and support measures to promote 
private sector and enterprise development.172 Development aid given to Caribbean 
countries under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA has two dimensions. It is given as a 
“compensatory scheme” 173 in order to help countries comply with implementing 
the provisions of the agreement and in meeting the costs of adjustment. Moreover, 
countries also receive aid in order to enhance market access opportunities for the 
export of goods and services.174 Consequently, aid under the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA is also designed as a “promotion scheme.”175 The development cooperation 
clause of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA addresses the vulnerability of Caribbean 
countries and seeks to increase the participation of the Caribbean within the 
international trade competition. It is therefore believed that this assistance “ [could] 
have a positive impact on [economic] growth.”176
171 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 7.
172 Ibid at Article 8.
173 Moreira, E.P., “Aid for Trade, Infrastructure, and the Growth Effects of trade Reform: Issues 
and Implications for Caribbean Countries”, Policy research Working Paper 5265, the World Bank,
2010, p 6.
174 Op. cit. footnote no 127, p 13.
175 Op. cit. footnote no 173, p 11
176 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 8.
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A joint declaration on development cooperation, attached to the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA has identified the EDF and the MS contributions to the EU Aid for Trade 
Strategy program, as the main financial instruments providing financial support to 
help Caribbean countries implement the EPA. The 10 EDF has an overall budget 
of EUR 22 682 million for the period 2008-2013 and has allocated EUR 21 966 
million to ACP countries. The Caribbean region has been allocated EUR 165 
million for financing the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP).17 78 
Between 85-90 percent of this amount is allocated to support the regional 
economic integration and the CARIFORUM-EU EPA development cooperation 
priority areas. The rest of the fund serves to address vulnerabilities and social 
issues.179 It must also be noted that the EDF allocations also provide support to the 
national indicative programmes (NIP)180 of each Caribbean country which are 
geared to implementing the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. This is of particular 
importance given the differences among Caribbean countries’ economies and 
needs. For instance, under the 10th EDF NIP, Guyana and Jamaica have been 
allocated EUR 51 million and EUR 110 million.181 The 10th EDF will be followed 
by a financial protocol covering the period 2014-2020.182 This will ensure the
177 Council regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th 
European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, OJ L 152, 13.6.2007. 
Most funds of the 10th EDF are programmed in Decision No 1/2006 of the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers of 2 June 2006 specifying the multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 
2013 and modifying the revised ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, OJ L 247, 9.9.2006.
178 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 40.
179 Ibid., p 40.
180 The NIPs are agreed in consultations between the European Commission and each ACP country. 
See Dearden, S., “The EU Banana Protocol” in Dearden, S. Ed. The E uropean Union a n d  the  
Com m onw ealth  C aribbean , Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2002, p 27.
181 See Jamaica-European Community, “Country strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 
for the period 2008-2013”, signed by both the EU and Jamaica in November 2008, p 2 and Co­
operation between the European Commission and the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, “Country 
strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013”, signed by both the 
EU and Guyana in December 2008, p 30.
These Country Strategy Papers are available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/wbere/acp/overview/csp/csp 10th edf en.htm (Accessed 20/7/2011).
182 Op. cit. footnote no 52.
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continuity of funds to ACP countries until the end of the Cotonou Agreement 
scheduled for 2020.
The EU Aid for Trade Strategy works towards “generating growth, employment 
and income.” It provides that the EU, through the European Commission, and its 
MS is committed to provide EUR 1 billion each year by 2010 in order to support 
DCs and LDCs’ “efforts to reform and to adjust to the world trading system, in the 
wider context of sustainable development.” 183 84 The Council decided to make 50 
percent of the total amount available to ACP countries needs.185 This is confirmed 
by the EU-CARIFORUM EPA under which the EU MS have committed to ensure 
that Caribbean countries will benefit form “an equitable share” of their Aid for 
Trade obligations.186 The EU-CARIFORUM EPA is thus going beyond the EDF 
which is the main source of EU aid funding for ACP countries.
6. The treatment of bananas within the EU-CARIFORUM EPA
6.1 Duty and quota free access to the EU banana market
In the context of the EPAs the Cotonou Agreement provided that the EU and the 
ACP countries agreed to review the commodity protocols attached to the Cotonou 
agreement, “in particular as regards their compatibility with WTO rules, with a 
view to safeguarding the benefits derived therefrom [,..].” 187 Consequently, all 
ACP signatories of the EPAs were granted duty- and quota-free access to the EU
183 European Commission, “Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy -  The Commission’s 
contribution”, Brussels, 4.4.2007, COM (2007) 163 final, p 2.
184 Ibid., p 2 and 4.
185 The Council of the European Union, “EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: Enhancing EU support for 
trade-related needs in developing countries- Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States meeting the Council”, Brussels, 29 October 2007, p 12.
186 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at “Joint Declaration on Development Cooperation.”
187 Op. cit. footnote no 1 at Article 36(4).
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i oo
banana market from January 2008. With regard to ACP Caribbean countries, 
such a treatment was not made reciprocal. As was discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, Article XXIV GATT provides a degree of flexibility with regard to the 
liberalisation of goods in free trade areas. Accordingly, bananas have been 
identified as sensitive products for Caribbean producers, and they were excluded 
indefinitely from the scope of GATT liberalisation.
In addition, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA contains a joint declaration on bananas 
which clearly recognizes the importance of bananas to the social, political and 
economic development of a number of Caribbean countries. The EU and 
CARIFORUM countries also fully acknowledge that the substantial tariff 
preferences granted in the past have been of particular benefit to Caribbean banana 
exports, hence “the maintenance of such preference for as long as possible would 
increase the benefits resulting from the [EU-CARIFORUM EPA].”18 89 The joint 
declaration also commits the EU to provide funding to “help the CARIFORUM 
banana industry” to adjust to the challenges arising from the new EU banana 
import regime.190 Finally, as previously mentioned, Article 42 of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA, dealing with traditional agricultural products, commits the 
EU to undertake “prior consultations” with the CARIFORUM on trade policy 
issues that may impact on the competitive position of Caribbean bananas.191 
Accordingly, this provision should give Caribbean banana producers some 
assurance with regard to any tariff changes to be made by the EU in light of the 
need to be in compliance with the WTO rules, or under other agreements between
188 Op. cit. footnote no 130 at Article 3(1).
189 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at “Joint Declaration on Bananas.”
190 Ibid.
191 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 42(1).
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the EU and DCs. Echoing the provisions of the Joint declaration on bananas 
attached to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Article 42 of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
further requires the EU to “endeavour to maintain significant preferential access 
within the multilateral trading system” for Caribbean’s bananas “for as long as it is 
feasible and to ensure that any unavoidable reduction in preference is phased in
1Q9over as long a period as possible.”
6.2 The Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM)
In March 2010, the EU Commission acknowledged the socio-economic importance
of banana exports to the EU market for some ACP countries, and therefore the
need to address the reduction in their tariff preferences that they will face due to
1 0 2the new MFN tariffs. Consequently, the Commission proposed the Banana 
Accompanying Measures (BAM) programme, which was designed to assist ACP 
countries to cope with the new market conditions. The BAM builds on previous 
support programmes, the Special System of Assistance (SSA) provided from 1994 
to 1999,192 394 and the Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) which was in place 
from 1999 to 2008.195 These programmes were established in the past in order to 
assist traditional ACP suppliers adversely affected by the changes in the EU 
Common Market Organisation for Bananas (CMOB), which will be analysed in 
Chapter 9 of this thesis. It must be noted that although the SFA scheme expired in
192 Ibid at Article 42(2).
193 European Commission, “Banana Accompanying Measures: Supporting the Sustainable 
Adjustment of the Main ACP Banana-Exporting Countries to New Trade Realities,” Brussels,
17.3.2010, COM (2010) 101 final.
194 Council Regulation (EC) No 2686/94 of 31 October 1994 establishing a special system of 
assistance to traditional ACP suppliers of bananas, OJ L 286, 5.11.1994.
195 Council Regulation (EC) No 856/1999 of 22 April 1999 establishing a special framework of 
assistance for traditional ACP suppliers of bananas, OJ L 108, 27.4.1999 and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1609/1999 of 22 July 1999 laying down the detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) no 856/1999 establishing a special framework of 
assistance to tradition ACP suppliers of bananas, OJ L 190, 23.7.1999.
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December 2008, disbursement of all on-going programmes will continue until the 
end of 2012.196 The BAM programme is proposed to be temporary, and would last 
for a maximum of four years, starting from 2010. The Commission has proposed a 
budget of EUR 190 million for the implementation of the BAM. However, the 
BAM programme is not offered to all ACP countries and the Commission has 
identified ten main ACP banana-supplying countries that would benefit from the 
BAM on the basis of the quantity exported to the EU. Accordingly, the BAM will 
provide financial support to seven ACP Caribbean countries, and to three ACP 
African countries, as they have exported more than 10,000 tonnes of bananas on 
average over the last ten years.197 According to the Commission, the BAM will 
take into account “the countries’ own policies and adaptation strategies.” This 
should help them adapt to new international trade environment and “guide the 
delivery of EU assistance,” thereby ensuring that the BAM measures are “relevant 
and effective.” 198 Consequently, the BAM will support banana exporters “to 
become more competitive,” support economic diversification and help tackle 
social, environmental and economics impacts, in ACP countries, where this is an 
important and feasible strategy.199 Support will be allocated on the basis of a 
National Adaption Strategy provided by each ACP country. Consequently, 
depending on the importance of the banana industry in their economy, it is crucial 
for each ACP country to clearly identify the key issues in their banana sector that 
need to be addressed and that require EU intervention. The Commission proposed 
the BAM to be included within the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument,
196 European Commission, “Biennial Report of the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional 
ACP suppliers of Bananas,” Brussels, 17.3.2010, COM (2010) 103 final.
197 Belize, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.
198 Op. cit. footnote no 193, p 6.
199 Ibid., p 6.
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which is currently governed by Council Regulation (EC) 1905/2006. Therefore, 
support will additionally be provided under the BAM, as well as under the 
European Development Fund.
7. The treatment of sugar within the EU- CARIFORUM EPA
7.1 Transitional periods
7.1.2 From 1st January 2008 to 30 September 2009
In light of the new legal framework for trade with ACP countries and, also in the 
context of the reformed EU sugar market, which will be examined in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis, the EU has decided to terminate the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol (SP), 
effective 1st October 2009. The SP, which was provided in conjunction with the 
provisions of the wider Cotonou Agreement,200 201offered to the beneficiaries ACP 
countries preferential access for sugar to the EU market. The trade preference 
programme for ACP sugar will be discussed further in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
During the first phase, the SP continued until the 30 September 2009 and thus 
maintained guaranteed prices for specific quantities of sugar imported from SP 
countries for an additional year. During this phase, and until the complete 
elimination of EU customs duties, ACP regions that initialled interim or 
comprehensive EPAs gained further market access to the EU through additional 
quantities of sugar at zero duty. The quantities were set over and above the 
quantities given under the SP. The CARIFORUM region received an additional 
quantity of 60 000 tonnes, with half of this amount reserved for the Dominican
200 Protocol 3 on ACP sugar attached to Annex V of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.
201 Op. cit. footnote no 130 at Article 7(2).
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Republic.202 It must be remember that the island is not a member of CARICOM 
and was not a signatory of the SP.203 In light o f this, it was pointed out that giving 
the most important share of the additional quota to a country that was not exporting 
sugar to the EU market under the SP could be seen as a “d e  f a c to  reduction of 
access for traditional Caribbean sugar suppliers based on historical levels of 
preferential access granted.”204 205However it is also recognised that this decision was 
in line with the fact that the island is among the “more competitive Caribbean raw- 
sugar suppliers” and is the “best placed to expand sugar exports.” Therefore, 
with the Dominican Republic included in the CARIFORUM EPA, it is possible to 
argue that sugar exports from the Caribbean region to the EU could be significant. 
During this period, the EU also reallocated any undelivered agreed quantities of 
sugar from the SP signatories, among other CARIFORUM members exporting 
sugar under the SP.206
7.1.3 From 1st October 2009 to 30th September 2015
Following the termination of the SP, the second phase provides for duty- and quota 
free access to the EU sugar market from October 2009 for all ACP countries 
exporting cane sugar.207 Up to 30th September 2012, EU importers can purchase 
sugar at a minimum price of no lower than 90 percent of the EU reference price, as
202 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Annex 11(4).
203 See Annex to Protocol 3 on ACP sugar “Exchange o f  letters between the Dominican Republic 
and the Community concerning the protocol on ACP sugar”, under which Dominican Republic 
notified the Community its intention not to accede “neither now nor in the future” to the sugar 
protocol.
204 Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU (CTA), “News and analysis o f  
events affecting ACP agricultural trade,” Sugar: Executive brief, 2009, p 9.
205 Ibid., p 9.
206 Op. cit. footnote no 14, “Joint declaration on reallocation o f  undelivered quantities under the 
Sugar Protocol.”
207 Op. cit. footnote no 130 at Article 7(1).
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established in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 318/2006.208 In such a case, 
preferential import license must be granted to the EU importer.209 210Between 1st 
October 2009 and 30 September 2015, the quantities imported are subject to a 
transitional volume-safeguard mechanism, which applies when sugar imports from 
ACP countries “cause or threaten to cause disturbances in the economic situation 
of one or several of the [EUj’s outermost regions.” Accordingly, the EU may 
decide to apply MFN tariffs on sugar imported from CARIFORUM countries 
when the total imports from all ACP countries exceeds 3.5 million tonnes in a 
marketing year, and when imports from non-LDCs of the ACP group exceed the 
quantities of sugar set in Annex II of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.211 However, this 
measure does not affect Haiti, which is the only country in the region recognised 
by the UN as LDC.212
Lastly, from the 1st October 2015, the regular safeguard measures, 13 as provided in 
Article 25 of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA will apply if  during a period of twelve 
consecutive months, the price of white sugar within the EU market falls below 80 
percent of the internal price for white sugar “prevailing during the previous 
marketing year.”214
8 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Annex 11(6).
209 Ibid.
210 Op. cit. footnote no 130 at Article 12(2).
211 1.38 million tonnes during the 2009/2010 year, 1.45 million tonnes in 2010/2011 and 1.6 million 
tonnes per marketing year during the 2011/12-2014/15 periods. See Op. cit. footnote no 14 at 
Annex 11(5).
212 Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Annex II (5b).
213 The safeguard measures include for instance an increase in the customs duty and the 
introduction o f  tariff quotas. See Op. cit. footnote no 14 at Article 25(3).
214 Ibid at Annex 11(6).
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7.2 The Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries (AMS)
Given the socioeconomic importance of the sugar sector for ACP countries, its 
multifunctional role as well as the degree of reliance on the EU market, the 
Commission is committed to provide support to SP countries in their adjustments 
to the new market conditions. While EU farmers receive direct compensation for 
their income loss, some “accompanying measures” have been established for SP 
countries affected by the sugar reform. This assistance was granted in addition to 
other development assistance instruments in place and included financial as well 
technical assistance, including budget support.215 617 An overall amount o f EUR 40 
millions was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in order to 
finance these measures.218 2190Each SP country was allocated a share of this financial
9 1 Qenvelope, fixed by the Commission and based on the needs of each country. 
Accordingly, assistance was provided on the basis of each country’s accompanying 
“comprehensive, multiannual adaptation strategy” that would pursue specific 
objectives. These objectives include enhancing the competitiveness of ACP 
sugar cane sector, promoting alternative economic activities such as the production 
of bio-ethanol, and addressing the broader social, employment and environmental 
impacts generated by the reforms.221 Although the AMS scheme was provided 
until 31 December 2006, SP countries continue to receive further long-term 
support under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The DCI is guided 
by the Millennium Development Goals and provides DCs with financial assistance
215 European Commission, “Action Plan on accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries 
affected by the reform o f the EU sugar regime”, Brussels, SEC (2005) 61, 17.1.2005.
216 Regulation (EC) No 266/2006 o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council o f  15 February 
2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform o f  
the EU Sugar Regime, OJ L 50, 21.2.2006.
217 Ibid at Article 1 and 11(2).
218 Ibid at Article 8.
219 Ibid at Article 9.
220 Ibid at Article 3(4).
221 Ibid at Article 4.
307
Chapter 7 -  The Caribbean region
for the period 2007-2013.222 Under this broader financial framework, ACP SP 
countries have been allocated EUR 1 244 billion by the EU.223 24
8. Conclusion
The CARIFORUM-EU EPA, which was concluded in 2008 between the Caribbean 
region and the EU, continues to provide Caribbean countries preferential access to 
the EU agricultural market. With all Caribbean countries’ agricultural food 
products entering the EU market duty and quota free, the Caribbean region is 
ensured a permanent preferential access to the EU market that is compliant with 
WTO rules. However, the agreement has also changed the crucial aspect of the 
traditional non-reciprocal trade regime between the EU and Caribbean countries. 
The reciprocal trade preferences have been implemented between two regions 
which do not enjoy the same economic power. In contrast to the EU, the Caribbean 
region has a ‘fragile’ economy and ‘structural environment.’ So, there is no 
doubt that the shift towards reciprocity will involve significant consequences for 
Caribbean countries. Although it is too early to assess the real socio-economic 
impact, there is no doubt that, while the government of the Caribbean countries 
will lose important revenue due to the elimination of tariffs on EU imported 
products, they will also have to face important EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
implementation costs. This latter issue remains probably the greatest challenges for 
Caribbean countries. Therefore, while the principle of reciprocity is in line with the 
WTO requirements, it is obvious that it has also reduced the value of the WTO 
special and differential treatment principle.
222 Article 2 (1) o f  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council o f  
18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ L 378/41, 
27.12.2006
223 Ibid at Annex IV.
224 Op. cit. footnote no 23, p 25.
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In addition, while the EU-CARIFORUM EPA was well received among the 
signatories, it has particularly left a “bitter taste” for the president of Guyana, 
Bharrat Jagdeo, who claims that the concluded EU-CARIFORUM EPA was a 
“well thought-out ploy by Europe to dismantle the solidarity of the ACP [...] 
countries by effectively dividing the ACP into six negotiating theatres -  that is six 
EPAs -  and playing one off against the other which they did very effectively.” He 
believes that the Caribbean region “did not win anything whatsoever.”225 However, 
everything is not lost for the Caribbean region. It is worth recalling that Caribbean 
countries’ trade liberalisation towards EU agricultural food products has been 
treated as an exception. Most agricultural food products which Caribbean countries 
would look to export have been either excluded from the liberalisation process or 
subject to longer implementation phases. Given these exceptions, the Agreement is 
therefore not a fully reciprocal agreement. Moreover, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
takes into account the Caribbean countries’ level of development, and has therefore 
put a “development cooperation” clause at the centre of the agreement. This clause 
commits the EU to provide financial assistance to Caribbean countries to help them 
with capacity building and structural changes. It is important for Caribbean 
countries to clearly identify their needs and assess whether the funds allocated to 
them will help them to cope effectively with the changes caused by the 
implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM. At last, if  necessary, the Caribbean 
region will have the possibility to seek amendments of the provisions of the 
agreement, following the mandatory review of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, which
225 “The Caribbean lost in the negotiations with Europe” Starbroek News, 6th January 2008, 
[Online] Available from: http:/Avww.stabroeknews.cotn/2008/news/stories/01/06/the-caribbean- 
lost-in-the-negotiations-with-europe-iagdeo/ (Accessed 28/07/2011).
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must take place every five years following its conclusion. The aim of this review 
is to “determine the impact of the Agreement, including the costs and 
consequences of implementation” and to revise the provisions of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA as well as adjusting their application if  needed.25 *27 This will, 
for example, give Caribbean countries the opportunity to extend their liberalisation 
schedule.
Furthermore, as examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Lisbon Treaty has given 
the European Parliament and the EU MS important leverage in EU agricultural 
policy making. However, in light of the provisions of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, 
there is little doubt that these internal changes would affect the EU’s external trade 
relations with Caribbean countries in agricultural commodities. The EU and the 
Caribbean region are bound by a partnership agreement providing firm 
commitments on agriculture and trade related areas, which must be undertaken by 
each party. The agreement further requires that any policy changes, particularly if  
they are likely to impact on Caribbean countries’ exports capacity, must be 
discussed and agreed on by all partners within the established joint institutions. 
Membership of these joint institutions comprises both members of the EU and 
CARIFORUM, which must mutually agree on decisions taken. The EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA has thus preserved the autonomy of Caribbean countries and 
the Caribbean regional economic communities. Consequently, it is important for 
Caribbean countries to maintain a constant dialogue with the EU on important 
issues, in order to ensure that their interests are effectively taken into account.
225 Op. cit. footnote no 14, “Joint Declaration on the signing o f the Economic Partnership
Agreement.”
227 Ibid.
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1. Introduction
The commodities of sugar and bananas, specifically those produced by the 
Caribbean region of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, have been 
selected to function as case studies for this thesis. In order to further the 
understanding of the context and operation of the legal framework for the 
European Union-destined trade in these commodities, it is important to examine 
both the internal and external dimension of the European Union (EU) regime for 
sugar and bananas. This chapter focuses on the various provisions of the EU sugar 
regime which have an impact on the trade into and out of the EU in sugar, while 
the following chapter examines the EU banana regime.
The EU policy regime for sugar, referred to as the common organisation of the 
market (CMO) in sugar, was first set up in July 1968 by Regulation (EEC) No. 
1009/67, making sugar fully part of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).1 23The 
CMO in sugar covers raw and white sugar, as well as isuglucose and insulin syrup, 
which are two liquid substitutes for sugar. It was implemented in order to 
guarantee “a fair income” to the producers, and ensure supplies to the market from 
internal production. Cane sugar is the only agricultural commodity produced in 
developing countries (DCs) which competes directly with beet sugar produced in
Chapter 8 -  The EU sugar import regime
Chapter 8 The EU sugar import regime
1 Regulation No 1009/67/EEC o f the Council o f  18 December 1967 on the common organisation o f  
the market in sugar, OJ 308, 18.12.1967.
2 Article 1(1) and Preamble 1 o f  Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 o f  19 June 2001 on the 
common organisation o f  the markets in the sugar sector, OJ L 178, 30.6.2001. The Regulation 
carried forward the CMO in sugar o f  1968.
3 Commission Staff Working Paper, “Reforming the European Union’s sugar policy-summary o f  
impact assessment work”, Brussels, SEC (2003), 23.9.2003, p 8.
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developed countries.4 The EU was thus implementing a complex system of 
instruments in order to secure domestic sugar beet producers’ incomes and protect 
them from world competition. The market management tools used included export 
refunds, guaranteed prices for producers, production quotas and high import 
quotas, as well as high duties in order to control sugar imports. As a result, sugar 
soon became one of the most “heavily protected sectors” in EU agriculture.5 
Nevertheless, the CMO in sugar has maintained EU post - colonial ties with ACP 
countries, and has also offered preferential access to all least-developed countries 
(LDCs), using the United Nations definition, and India.6 Import of raw sugar from 
ACP countries was regulated by two specific agreements, the Agreement on 
Special Preferential Sugar and the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol (SP), with the latter 
being the most important for its beneficiaries. The SP appeared in the first Lome 
Convention of 19757 8and ACP country signatories of the SP, such as Caribbean 
countries, had exported raw cane sugar to the EU at guaranteed prices on a duty­
free basis from then until 1st October 2009. Consequently, sugar has been 
considered to be “a key example of the EU’s preferential trade relations with
odeveloping countries.”
However, after escaping substantial changes under the 1992, 2000 and 2003 CAP 
reforms which were examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the sugar policy 
underwent its first major reform in 2006, with a focus on cutting subsidies to
4 Dickson, A. and Ndhlovu, T., “The Sugar Protocol” in Dearden, S. Ed., The E uropean Union a n d  
the C om m onwealth C aribbean , Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2002, p 114.
5 Gibb, R., “developing countries and market access: the bitter-sweet taste o f  the European Union’s 
sugar policy in Southern Africa”, J. o f  M odern A frican  Studies, 2004, 42(4), pp. 563-588 p 569.
6 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 35.
7 ACP-EEC Convention o f  Lome, OJ L 25, 30.1.1976.
8 European Commission, “Agriculture and Preferential Trade Relations with Developing Countries: 
The Case o f ACP countries,” Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development,
Brussels, 2008.
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farmers. This has led to direct impacts on both EU sugar producers and the ACP 
countries benefitting from contractual trade agreements with the EU. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide an analysis of the EU’s sugar regime pre- and post- the 
2006 reforms, with a particular focus on sugar trade between ACP countries and 
the EU. Special attention will be given to the two non-LDCs of the ACP Caribbean 
islands, Guyana and Jamaica, selected as case studies, as they are important sugar 
producers in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) region.9
As was discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Guyana and Jamaica both rely on 
cane sugar exports to the EU, and also have long benefited from preferential access 
under the SP.10 As was discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, “sugar” for the 
purpose of this thesis, refers to raw sugar extracted from sugar beet and sugar cane, 
with “raw sugar” being defined as sugar “not flavoured or coloured or containing 
any other added substances.”11 Accordingly, trade in more highly processed sugars 
such as fructose or glucose, together with the growing trade in biofuel refined from 
sugar beet and sugarcane, will be excluded as they are not covered by the WTO 
definition of agriculture provided by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex I, 
as used in this thesis.
9 McDonald, I., “The sugar industry o f  the Caribbean community (CARICOM): An overview,” International Sugar Journal, 2004, 106(1266), pp. 324-328, p 325.
10 Protocol 3 on ACP sugar attached to Annex V to the 2000/483/EC: Partnership agreement 
between the members o f the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group o f  States o f the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, o f  the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000- 
protocols-Final Act, Declarations, OJ L 317, 15.12.2000.
11 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1719/2005 o f 27 October 2005 amending Annex I to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common 
Customs Tariff, OJ L 286, 28.10.2005.
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2.1 The arrangements within the EU internal market
2.1.2 The production quotas arrangements
Before the first reform of the EU sugar policy in 2006, the CMO in sugar was 
regulated by Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001,12 13also referred to as the ‘basic 
Regulation.’ This regulation controlled the EU sugar market, and provided for the 
rules applicable for the marketing years 2001/2002 up until 2005/2006.14 In order 
to grant price support within the EU, the CMO in sugar established two types of 
production quotas. These were the so-called ‘A’ and ‘B’ sugar quotas. The ‘A ’ 
quota referred to the domestic production for consumption within the internal 
market. The ‘B’ sugar quotas related to production allowed beyond the basic ‘A ’ 
quota limit, but which remained within the total ‘A’ and ‘B’ quantities.15 This 
additional quantity which was established according to the market conditions, gave 
the most competitive EU factories the possibility to further expand their production 
without penalties.16 17The ‘A’ and ‘B’ quotas were split between the EU Member 
State (MS) each marketing year in accordance with the criteria established by 
Article 10(4) of the ‘basic Regulation.’ Then, the EU MS allocated an ‘A ’ and ‘B ’ 
quota to its sugar factories on the basis of “their actual production during a 
particular reference period.” Sugar produced within the quota limits was 
guaranteed to receive the EU prices.18 Following the enlargement of the EU in
Chapter 8 -  The EU sugar import regime
2. The pre-2006 Common Market Organisation for sugar
12 Op. cit. footnote no 2.
13 European Commission, “A Description o f  the Common Organisation o f  the Market in Sugar”, 
Brussels, AGRI/63362/2004, September 2004, p. 4
14 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 2.
15 Ibid, at Article 1(2).
16 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 10.
17 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 11 and Preamble (11).
18 Ibid at Article 10(3).
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2004, the EU-25 quota was fixed at 17.4 million tonnes.19 The Commission 
declared that “the decision to impose sugar quotas was a political choice, made to 
ensure a spread of production over the entire [EU], rather than to encourage 
economic specialisation in the most competitive regions of the EU.”20 
Accordingly, the quota classification helped control the production of sugar beet 
and ensured each EU MS “a certain share o f the EU sugar market”, thereby 
providing clarification within the internal market.21
Although, ‘A ’ and ‘B’ quotas together constituted the maximum quota, the CMO 
in sugar did not prevent the MS from exceeding their allocated quotas. Sugar 
produced over and above the ‘A’ and ‘B’ quantity was referred to as ‘C’ sugar.22 23
This excess sugar production was not subject to a quota limit, but it would not 
benefit from domestic support prices, and it could not be disposed on the internal 
market. Consequently, the MS had the possibility to carry it forward to the next 
marketing year, so that it could be treated as ‘A ’ sugar production, thereby helping 
to reduce the amount of ‘C’ production.24 According to Article 14(2) of the ‘basic 
Regulation’, sugar carried forward had to be “stored” for a period of 12 
consecutive months.25 All ‘C’ sugar produced that had not been carried forward 
had to be exported on the international market. The sugar factories, however, are 
not entitled to receive an export refund on this sugar.26 If the producer had not
19 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 10.
20 European Commission, “Accomplishing a sustainable agricultural model for Europe through the 
reformed CAP- the tobacco, olive oil, cotton and sugar sectors”, Brussels, COM (2003) 554 final, 
29.3.2003, p 19.
21 Serrano, K. A., “Sweet like sugar: Does the EU's new sugar regime become Fiji's bitter reality or 
welcome opportunity?” Journal of South Pacific Law, 2007,11(2), pp. 169-193, p 171.
22 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 10(5).
23 Ibid at Article 13(1).
24 Ibid at Article 14(1).
25 Ibid at Article 14(2).
26 Ibid at Article 13(1).
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proven the total export of excess ‘C’ sugar within the required time limits, it was 
subjected to an export levy. Given the financial penalties, producers were clearly 
encouraged to export ‘C’ sugar to the international market.27 8 29
While the system of quotas was a crucial benchmark for allocating internal prices, 
the difference between the ‘A ’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ types of sugar was only applicable 
within the internal market. It is important to note that there is only “one world 
price for sugar,” hence once exported onto the international market each 
classification of sugar simply became ‘sugar’. Therefore, in light of the quota 
system, it is pointed out that the EU was treating the world sugar market “as a 
residual market.”30 31
2.1.3 The EU internal sugar support prices
2.1.3.1 Intervention price
In order to provide support to EU producers, and secure their income support, the 
CMO in sugar established minimum and intervention prices for sugar. The 
intervention price, considered as a “safety net”, was the price at which the 
designated intervention agencies of the sugar-producing MS were required to “buy 
in any white and raw sugar produced under quota offered to [them]” which has
■i 1been manufactured within the EU market. The intervention price for white sugar
27 Ibid at Article 13(3).
28 Hoekman, B. and Howse, R., “Case Comment: EC-Sugar”, World T.R., 2008, 7(1), pp. 149-178, 
p 153.
29 Ibid at p 150.
30 Clough, M., “Sugar, agricultural subsidies and the WTO dispute”, Int.T.L.R., 2003, 9(5), pp. 126- 
132, p 128.
31 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 7(1).
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was set at EUR 63.19 per 100kg and at EUR 52.37 per 100kg for raw sugar.32 In 
addition, in order to take into account sugar beet grown and produced in deficit 
areas, the Commission also established each year a “derived” intervention price.33 
A sugar area was recognised as suffering from a “deficit” when production 
shortages were expected to occur in the forthcoming marketing year.34 
Accordingly, during the 2005/2006 marketing year, Spain, Portugal, Finland, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) were recognised as deficit areas. The 
‘derived’ intervention prices were fixed according to the regional variations in the 
price of sugar.35 For instance, Ireland and the UK, considered a “common deficit 
area”,36 were allocated EUR 646.50 per tonne.37 38
2.1.3.2 Minimum prices
The EU established a minimum price to be paid by sugar companies buying beet 
from producers for the production of quota sugar. This price aimed to guarantee “a 
fair income to the grower and a proper balance in the distribution of income from 
sugar between growers and factories.” The price was fixed according to the type 
of sugar quota. The minimum price given to the ‘A ’ sugar was superior to the ‘B’ 
sugar. It was set at EUR 46.72 per tonne for ‘A ’ beet intended for producing ‘A ’ 
sugar, and EUR 32.42 per tonne for ‘B’ beet intended for processing into ‘B’
32 Ibid at Article 2.
33 Ibid at Article 2(1 )(b).
34 Preamble (3) o f Commission Regulation (EC) No 1005/2005 o f  30 June 2005 fixing the derived 
intervention prices for white sugar for the 2005/2006 marketing year, OJ L 170, 1.7.2005.
35 Ibid at Preamble (2).
36 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 7.
37 Op. cit. footnote no 34 at Article 1(b).
38 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 7.
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sugar. These prices were derived from the ‘basic price’ for beet, which was fixed 
at EUR 47.67 per tonne.39 40
2.1.3.3 Additional Aid
In addition to the above, Italy, Portugal and Spain were also allowed to grant 
adjustment aid for the production of sugar within the ‘A ’ and ‘B’ quota limits.41 
However, this amount of aid was subject to restrictions. In Italy, aid could not 
exceed EUR 5.43 per 100kg and limited to specific regions. Adjustment aid was 
limited to EUR 3.11 and EUR 7.25 per 100kg, in Portugal and Spain 
respectively.42 In addition, in light of the particular geographical location of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, both French D e p a r te m e n ts  d '  O u tr e -M e r  (DOMs), 
cane sugar produced in these departments was subject to appropriate measures.43 
Article 7 of the ‘basic Regulation’ provided for the grant of a disposal aid for sugar 
transported from these departments and for the refining of this sugar inside the 
European regions.44
2.2 The EU’s external sugar trading provisions
The EU domestic prices were supported by other market tools that regulated the 
amount of sugar imported within the internal market. These included high import 
tariffs, the export refunds system, and preferential trade agreements with third 
countries.
39 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 4(1).
40 Ibid, at Article 3.
41 Ibid, at Article 46.
42 Ibid, at Article 46.
43 Ibid, at Preamble (4).
44 Ibid, at Article 7(4).
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2.2.1 Import duties
Sugar imported into the EU market was highly restricted through the imposition of 
import duties. These duties were very high, and aimed to “ensure that the price of 
imported sugar [did] not fall below the EU sugar price and that sugar imports from 
certain countries receive[d] preferential status.”45 The import duties comprised a 
fixed and an additional duty. The EU import duties were fixed at EUR 419 per 
tonne for white sugar and EUR 339 per tonne for raw beet and cane sugar.46 
Additional special safeguard duties were also imposed in order to prevent 
disturbances within the internal market arising from imported sugar,47 the 
application of which is in line with the special safeguard provisions o f the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).48
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2.2.2 Preferential Sugar Import Arrangements
2.2.2.1 The ACP/EU Sugar Protocol
As was discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the Cotonou Agreement offers better 
market access to ACP countries to the protected EU agricultural market. Hence, in 
order to maintain the ACP countries’ position in the EU sugar market, 20 ACP 
sugar-producing countries49 were also signatories to the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol 
(SP) provided in conjunction with the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement.50 In 
accordance with Article 1 of SP, the EU promised, for an indefinite period, to
45 Elbehri, A., Umstaetter, J. and Kelch, D., “The EU Sugar Policy Regime and Implications o f  
Reform”, ERR-59.U.S. Dept, o f  Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., 2008, p 12.
46 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1789/2003 o f  11 September 2003 amending Annex I to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical and nomenclature and on the Common 
customs tariff, OJ L 281, 30.10.2003.
47 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 24.
48 Article 5(1 )(b) WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
49 Barbados, Belize, Republic o f Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
50 Op. cit. footnote no 10.
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purchase and import specified quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, at guaranteed 
prices, on a duty-free basis from ACP countries, which in turn undertook to supply 
these quantities.51 The SP was the result of the UK’s accession to the EU in 1973 
and its “desire to bring its special trade preferences for bananas and sugar under 
the [EU] umbrella.”52 The protocol, which repeated the main terms of the 1951 UK 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement,53 54entered into force with the adoption of the 
Lome Convention in 1975, and has been since then an integral part of the EU sugar
54regime.
Under the SP, the EU had committed itself on a contractual basis to import from 
the SP countries a total of 1.3 million tons of sugar, which has remained 
unchanged since 1995. As the SP was a “legally binding intergovernmental 
agreement” between the EU and the ACP countries,55 this quantity could “not be 
reduced without the consent of the individual states concerned.”56 The EU 
extended this access for sugar by purchasing and importing the agreed national 
quota quantities at “guaranteed prices,”57 which were “generally...almost double 
the world price.”58 Article 5(4) of the SP stated that these prices were negotiated, 
on an annual basis, between the EU and SP countries “within the price range 
obtaining in the [Union], taking into account all relevant economic factors.”59 The
51 Ibid, at Article 1.
52 Rena, R. “Developing Countries and Their Participation in the WTO in Making Trade Policy-An 
Analysis,” Indian Journal o f  Socia l D evelopm en t, 2006, 6(2), pp. 143-156, p 149.
53 In 1951, the United Kingdom, the Queensland Sugar Board and sugar industry associations in 
British West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius and South Africa signed the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
54 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 173.
55 African Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Group website, “The ACP/EU Sugar Protocol,” (Online) 
Available from: http://www.acpsugar.org/Sugar%20Protocol.html (Accessed 31/08/2009).
56 Op. cit. footnote no 10 at Article 3(2).
57 Article 13 o f Annex V o f the Cotonou Agreement and Article 1 o f the Sugar Protocol.
58 Bartels, L., “The trade and development policy o f  the European Union,” E uropean Journal o f  
International Law , 2007, 18(4), pp.715-756, p 735.
59 Op. cit. footnote no 10 at Article 5(4).
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importance of the guaranteed price has been emphasized by the ACP countries 
which believed that without it, the SP would become an “empty shell.”60 
Therefore, it was possible to say that guaranteed prices, as a benefit for ACP 
countries, were the cornerstone of the SP. However, the SP was limited to 20 
countries within the ACP group, and Serrano argues that such a limitation was not 
compatible with the “goals of the current WTO trading system.”61 62She is of the view 
that the SP clearly discriminated against other ACP sugar producing countries 
which were not eligible to accede to this sugar partnership. Along with non-ACP
fOsugar producing countries, these countries were left outside the SP.
Despite the Cotonou Agreement being implemented in 2000 for a period of twenty 
years, the SP attached to it was not to expire, having been included for an 
“indefinite duration.”63 It is believed that this has happened in order “to give a 
precise legal guarantee to ACP sugar supplying states, reflecting the guarantees 
which had preceded the Protocol in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and the 
obligations of the [EU] in the Treaties.”64 However, following the 2006 Sugar 
reform, the SP was terminated in 2009. This did not, however, affect the EU’s 
commitment under Article 1 of the SP to purchase sugar from ACP countries for 
an indefinite period of time. In the context of the EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, which were discussed in Chapters 5 and 
7 of this thesis, the EU continues to purchase ACP sugar under the terms of each 
respective EPA signed with each ACP region.
60 Op. cit. footnote no 55.
61 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 174.
62 Ibid., p 174.
63 Op. cit. footnote no 10 at Article 1.
64 Op. cit. footnote no 55.
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2.2.2.2 The Special Preferential Sugar
The EU also imported raw cane sugar from ACP countries benefitting from the SP 
under the Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (ASPS).65 The ASPS 
Agreement was signed on 1 June 1995,66 and gave further market access to ACP 
sugar suppliers in order to “ensure adequate supplies to [Union] refineries.”67 68
However, since quotas provided under the other preferential import arrangements, 
and imports from the French DOMs, allowed meeting the maximum supply the EU 
needed, it is pointed out that the ASPS Agreement quota has only had “a residual 
function.” The ASPS Agreement provided for a temporary import allocation of 
sugar, and the quantities varied yearly, according to EU import needs.69 The agreed 
quantities of sugar benefited from a reduced rate of duty.70 From 1995 to 2001 the 
reduced rate was fixed at ECU 6.9 per kilos.71 723From 2002 to 2006, the reduced rate 
was set at zero. The ASPS Agreement thus created additional income transfer for 
ACP SP countries. However, in contrast to the SP, the ASPS Agreement was of
n 'lfixed duration.
65 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 39(1). India was also benefitting from the ASPS Agreement
66 Agreement in the form o f an exchange o f letters between the European Community and 
Barbados, Belize, the republic o f the Congo, Fiji, the Cooperative Republic o f  Guyana, the 
Republic o f  Cote d’Ivoire, Jamaica, the Republic o f  Kenya, the Republic o f  Madagascar, the 
Republic o f  Malawi, the Republic o f  Mauritius, the Republic o f  Suriname, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
the Kingdom o f  Swaziland, the United Republic o f  Tanzania, the republic o f Trinidad and Tobago, 
the Republic o f  Uganda, the Republic o f  Zambia and the Republic o f  Zimbabwe on the supply o f  
raw cane sugar to be refined, OJ L 181/24, 1.08.1995.
67 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 39(1).
68 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 175.
69 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 39(3).
70 Ibid, at Article 39(1).
71 Op. cit. footnote no 66 at Paragraph (5).
72 Article 16 o f  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1159/2003 o f 30 June 2003 laying down detailed 
rules o f application for the 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06 marketing years for the import o f  cane 
sugar under certain tariff quotas and preferential agreements and amending Regulations (EC) No  
1464/95 and (EC) No 779/96, OJ L 162, 1.7.2003.
73 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 39(1).
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2.2.3 Export subsidies
As previously mentioned, sugar was primarily produced by the EU for domestic 
consumption. Each MS and their factories were given 4A’ and ‘B’ production 
quotas higher than domestic consumption.74 756In addition, the EU’s preferential 
sugar import commitments in respect of ACP countries have led to an increased 
amount of sugar on the EU internal market. In light of supply exceeding demand, 
the extra sugar production was sold back to countries outwith the EU. Sugar 
exported from the EU therefore consisted of domestic production not sold within 
the EU market, as well as sugar imported under preferential arrangements. In 
light of the EU’s self-sufficiency in sugar, it is pointed out that all ACP-originating 
sugar was in effect re-exported on the world market.77 In order to dispose of 
surplus sugar production, the EU was providing direct export subsidies to sugar 
exporters. This system of “export refunds” aimed to cover the difference between 
the world and the internal market prices for sugar.78 This system therefore allowed 
excess sugar to be sold on the global market, and compensated EU producers when 
world market prices were lower than domestic prices. Refunds were fixed at 
regular intervals, or by a tendering procedure.79 80The amount of the refund was 
fixed at a high price. It was at EUR 443 per tonne for the 2001/2002 marketing 
year, and EUR 485 per tonne and EUR 512 per tonne for the 2002/2003 and
o n2003/2004 periods respectively. It is pointed out that these prices corresponded to 
“the amount by which the [EU] internal market prices [exceeded] the world market
74 Op. cit. footnote no 30, p 128.
75 This comprises the ‘B ’ and ‘C’ sugar.
76 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 27(12).
77 Op. cit. footnote no 28, p 151.
78 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 27(1).
79 Ibid, at Article 27(5).
80 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 22.
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price.”81 In light of the amount of export refunds, it was argued that EU farmers 
could “sell quota sugar profitably, regardless of how low the world price for sugar 
drops.”82 83
The cost of export subsidies were partly financed through a production levy 
charged on ‘A ’ and ‘B ’ sugar quotas, and collected by the MS in order to cover the 
‘overall loss’ for the marketing year. Each type of quota was charged a maximum 
of 2 percent of the intervention price for white sugar.84 85*The ‘B’ sugar could be 
charged an additional levy which could not exceed 37. 5 percent of the intervention 
price for this type of sugar, if  the permitted levies did not fully cover the overall
Q C  tloss. These levies were part of the “self-financing scheme” of the EU sugar
o/rregime.
3. Issues with the EU sugar regime
The high level of support and the market management instruments have helped the 
EU to protect its sugar market effectively, at the expense of countries, mostly 
developing, which have a comparative advantage on the world market. The 
imposition of both fixed and additional import tariffs have maintained high prices 
within the EU market, which amounted to three times the world price.87 
Accordingly, these practices have made the import of sugar from countries outside
81 Powell, S J . and Schmitz, A., “The cotton and sugar subsidies decisions: WTO’s dispute 
settlement system rebalances the agreement on agriculture,” Drake J. Agric. L., 10(2), 2005, pp. 
287-330, p 315.
82 Op. cit. footnote no 5 at p 573.
83 Op. cit. footnote no 2 at Article 15(3) and (7).
84 Ibid, at Article 15(3).
85 Ibid, at Article 15(5).
85 See Ibid, at Article 10(4), preambles (12), (13) and (15).
87 Op. cit. footnote no 13, p 15.
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QOpreferential agreements “uneconomic.” However, while the EU was considered 
“a high-cost producer” of beet sugar, when compared to major low-cost cane sugar
o nproducers, it has also been an important player on the world sugar market. Total 
sugar exports from the EU, including unsubsidised ‘C’ sugar, amounted to 
approximately 6 million tons a year in the late 1990s.8 90 The EU became the 
“second largest sugar exporter in the world.”91 923It must be noted that during the 
2000/2001 marketing year, the EU contributed to about 30 percent of world 
exports, and became the “world’s largest exporter of white sugar.” Brazil, which 
was up until that period the leading exporter, ranked second with 16 percent of 
world exports followed by Australia with 6 percent.94
Consequently, in 2002 and 2003, Brazil, Australia and Thailand (henceforth the 
“complainants”) filed a complaint at the WTO against the ‘basic Regulation’ on 
the EU’s CMO in sugar. The concerns of these countries over the COM in sugar 
were threefold. First, they argued that the amount of EU export subsidies for sugar 
was not complying with its reduction commitments, to the level specified in 
Section II of Part IV of its WTO Schedule of Concessions. This related to the 
excess ‘C’ sugar, and to the approximately 1.6 million tons of sugar per year which 
benefitted from export subsidies. Secondly, they believed that the CMO in sugar, 
which led to over production of sugar, indirectly allowed exporters of ‘C’ sugar to 
export it at prices below its total cost of production, resulting in dumping of cheap
88 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 172.
89 Vandenhole, W., “Third State Obligations under the ICESCR: A Case Study o fE U  Sugar 
Policy”, N ordic Journal o f  International Law , 2007, 76(1), pp. 73-100, p 76.
90 Op. cit. footnote no 45, p 10.
91 Chaplin, H. and Matthews, A., “Coping with the Fallout for Preference-receiving countries from 
EU Sugar Reform”, The E stey Centre Journal o f  In ternational L aw  a n d  Trade P olicy, 2006, 7(1), 
pp. 15-31, p 19.
92 Op. cit. footnote no 5 at p 573.
93 Op. cit. footnote no 30, p 128.
94 Op. cit. footnote no 5 at p 569.
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subsidised sugar on other countries. Thirdly, since domestic sugar refiners 
benefitted from a guaranteed high intervention price that was not offered to 
imported sugar, the latter was thus treated in a less favourable manner. In light of 
these elements, the complainants considered that the EU violated several 
provisions of the WTO AoA, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, and GATT 1 9 9 4 .95
4. The WTO dispute on sugar
4.1 Arguments of the parties
The dispute about the EU CMO in sugar centred on the export subsidies provided 
by the EU within that sector. According to the complainants, the export of ‘C’ 
sugar and ACP/Indian equivalent sugar outside the EU market was subsidised and 
this has led the EU to exceed its agreed level of commitments for export subsidies.
4.1.1 The ‘C’ sugar
As seen above, the so-called ‘C’ sugar referred to the quantity of sugar produced 
over and above the ‘A’ and ‘B’ quantity. In the view of the complainants, exports 
of ‘C’ sugar benefitted from export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) 
of the WTO AoA.96 This article provides that payment on the export of agricultural 
products resulting from government intervention should be considered as export 
subsidies, and therefore be subject to reduction commitments. Such payments 
include those “that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the
95 European C om m unities-E xport su bsid ies on su g a r: request for consultations by Australia, 1 
October 2002 (WT/DS265/1), request by Brazil, 1 October 2002 (W T/DS266/1) and request by 
Thailand, 20 March 2003 (WT/DS283/1).
96 E uropean Com m unities- Export su bsid ies on su gar , report o f the panel, complaint by Brazil, 15 
October 2004, (WT/DS266/R), para. 4.36.
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agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the 
exported product is derived.”97 However the EU disagreed, and rejected this claim 
by recalling that in contrast to the ‘A’ and ‘B’ quota, the ‘C’ sugar did not benefit 
from any form of export subsidies.98
Nevertheless, in the view of the complainants, Article 9.1(c) AoA involves 
different type of payments in the production and sale for export of a product. They 
pointed out, relying on the C a n a d a  -  D a ir y  jurisprudence,99 that “a ‘payment’ 
within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) denoted a ‘transfer of economic resources’ 
whether in the form of money, or in some other form which conferred value such 
as payments-in-kind, and that it ‘‘may take place in many different factual and 
regulatory settings.”100 They argued that because ‘C’ sugar was being sold to the 
world market by the sugar producer at below the average total cost of production, 
the export o f ‘C’ sugar ought to be considered “subsidised.”101
The complainants argued further that even if the ‘C’ sugar did not benefit from 
direct export subsidies, the high prices given to sugar produced within quota 
provided producers “with a strong quota insurance incentive to produce ‘C’ 
sugar.”102 103They believed that export subsidies and high domestic support provided 
to the established ‘A’ and ‘B’ sugar quotas were spilling over into non-quota sugar 
and resulting in the “cross-subsidizing” of exports of ‘C’ production. They
97 Article 9 (1) (c) o f WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
98 Op. cit. footnote no 96 at para. 4.37.
99 WTO Panel Report, Canada — M easures A ffecting the Im portation o f  M ilk  a n d  the E xportation  o f  
D airy  Products , WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, adopted 27 October 1999, as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, 2097.
100 Op. cit. footnote no 96 at para. 4.38.
101 Ibid, at para. 4.39.
102 Ibid, at para. 4.74.
103 Ibid, at para. 4.75.
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believed that it was still profitable for the beneficiaries of ‘A ’ and ‘B’ quota 
allocations to export the supposedly non-subsidised ‘C’ sugar to the world market. 
In contrast, the EU was of the view that the incidental ‘financing’ or ‘cross­
subsidizing’ effects of domestic support provided to sugar subject to a quota limit 
“would not be sufficient to consider that those exports [had] benefited from ‘export 
subsidies’ subject to reduction commitments under the A g r e e m e n t  o n  
A g r ic u ltu re . ” m
4.1.2 The ACP/Indian “equivalent” sugar
The EU was re-exporting an amount of sugar which was equivalent to the quantity 
of sugar imported from the ACP/India. This ACP/Indian equivalent sugar was 
benefitting from export subsidies corresponding to the same level of exports refund 
granted to ‘A’ and ‘B’ quota sugar.104 05 The complainants indicated that during the 
2001/2002 period the EU had exported 1,725,100 tonnes of this preferential sugar 
alone, and that such subsidized exports were thus exceeding its WTO scheduled 
commitment levels for that period.106 107They argued that this type of sugar was part 
of the EU’s budgetary outlay and export quantity reduction commitments. The 
EU agreed with the fact that ACP/Indian equivalent sugar was receiving export 
subsidies. However, it argued that these subsidies were not in excess of its 
reduction commitments. As a justification, it pointed out that its schedule 
commitments provided for a footnote which was misinterpreted by the 
complainants.108 It recalled that its reduction commitments comprised “one
104 Ibid, at para. 4.78.
105 Ibid, at para. 4.176.
106 Ibid, at para. 4.177.
107 Ibid, at para. 4.175.
108 Schedule CXL-European Communities, Part IV, Section II, Footnote 1. This Footnote 1 o f  the 
EU’s schedule excludes sugar o f ACP and India origin from the EU’s export subsidy commitments.
328
Chapter 8 -  The EU sugar import regime
component which has been subject to gradual reduction, and a second component, 
ACP/Indian equivalent sugar, which is subject to a ceiling of 1.6 million tonnes, 
but which has not been subject to a gradual reduction. Overall, subsidies have been 
reduced.”109
4.2 The WTO panel decision
4.2.1 The ‘C’ sugar
It is clear that there were several aspects of the EU sugar regime which had raised 
concerns for DCs. However, the WTO Panel decided to focus specifically on the 
issue of the “cross-subsidization” of ‘C’ sugar, which clearly did not form part of 
the EU CMO in sugar. The decision resulted from the panel’s observation that the 
same companies were producing, at the same time, quota and non-quota sugar, and 
that these were “made in a continuous line of production.”110 The Panel agreed 
with the claims made by the complainants and found that exports of ‘C’ sugar were 
subsidised within the meaning of Article 9.1 (c) of WTO AoA for three reasons. 
First, it found that the sales of 4C’ beet below the total cost of production to ‘C’ 
sugar producers involved subsidies paid to producers.111 12Secondly, these subsidies 
were made on the export of sugar because ‘C’ sugar was not carried forward, and 
must be exported onto the world market. Thirdly, the Panel held that these 
payments were financed by virtue of various governmental actions. According to 
the Panel, these actions included the complete control of the government action 
over the production and sale of ‘A ’ and ‘B’ sugar beet through quotas and high
109 European Communities -  Export subsidies on sugar, first written submission by the European 
Communities, Geneva, 11 March 2004, para. 157.
110 Op. cit. footnote no 96 at para. 7.294.
111 Ibid, at para. 7.269.
112 Ibid, at para. 7.277.
329
Chapter 8 -  The EU sugar import regime
prices, which in turn allowed the government to control and affect the production
i 10and sales conditions of ‘C’ beet. On the basis of discussion in this chapter about 
the trade distorting effects of both direct and hidden subsidies, there is no doubt 
that WTO Panel has given a favourable decision on the ‘C’ sugar which had 
proven to be undermining world market prices as well as DC’ export opportunities.
4.2.2 The ACP/Indian sugar
According to the WTO panel, the total of sugar exported from the EU market since 
1995 went beyond its agreed exports commitment levels.13 14 Its commitment level 
for the 2000/2001 period was of 1,213,500 tonnes of sugar, while its total exports 
of sugar for that same year amounted to 4,097,000 tonnes.115 Accordingly, it is 
clear that the EU was over-producing sugar, and was also importing too much 
ACP/Indian sugar. This practice has led to a “world market distortion,” and has 
adversely affected sugar producers outside the EU though dumping.116 17In the view 
of the Panel, the EU’s export subsidy commitment provided in Footnote 1 of its 
schedule commitments, was “inconsistent and conflict[ed] with Articles 3, 8, 9.1 
and 9.2(b)(iv) of the WTO AoA” and was therefore “of no legal effect.”118 In 
Chapter 1 of this thesis and in this chapter, it has been argued that the SP had a 
special legal status and created legally binding obligations for the EU. As such, 
there is no doubt that the Panel’s decision raises concerns and in light of this 
decision, it is clear that the WTO considers that the EU commitments towards ACP 
countries should not affect its WTO’s legal obligations, which will prevail should
113 Ibid, at para. 7.283 and 7.291.
114 Ibid, at para. 7.239.
115 Ibid, at para. 7.239.
116 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 172.
117 Op. cit. footnote no 108.
118 Op. cit. footnote no 96 at para. 7.197 and 7.198.
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any conflict arise. However, it is this author’s view that in finding that the 
provisions of Footnote 1 to have no legal force, the WTO had clearly disregarded 
the legal value of the SP and its full benefits for ACP sugar producers.
The Panel concluded that the EU was in breach of the provisions of Articles 3 and 
8 of the WTO AoA.119 The EU appealed this 2005 Panel decision to the WTO 
Appellate Body (AB).120 The WTO AB report upheld the rulings of the Panel, and 
recommended that the “Dispute Settlement Body request the [EU] to bring Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001, as well as all other measures implementing or 
related to the [EU’s] sugar regime (...) into conformity with its obligations” under 
the WTO AoA.121
5. The New CMO in sugar
5.1 The rules within the EU market
In light of the WTO legal action brought against the EU COM in sugar, the reform 
of the EU sugar regime was inevitable. In order to meet the WTO AB decision and 
to ensure an appropriate market balance, the EU had to lower its sugar production. 
The EU Commission initially put forward a draft proposal for a sugar reform in 
July 2004.122 Following the WTO AB report, the Commission revised its proposals 
and presented on 22 June 2005 three regulations concerning the new sugar
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119 Ibid, at para. 7.238.
120 E uropean Com m unities-Export S u bsid ies on Su gar (W T/DS265, W T/DS266, W T/D S283), 
appellant submission o f  the European Communities, Geneva, 20 January 2005.
121 E uropean Com m unities-Export S u bsid ies on Sugar, report o f  the Appellate Body, 
(WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R), 28 April 2005, paras. 346 and 347.
122 European Commission, “Accomplishing a sustainable agricultural model for Europe through the 
reformed CAP- the sugar sector reform”, Brussels, 17.7.2004, COM (2004) 499 final, p 5.
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sector. The EU agriculture ministers reached a political agreement on the 
legislative proposals in November 2005, and formally adopted the legal package 
on 20 February 2006.123 24 Accordingly, the sugar reform measures were 
implemented on 1st July 2006 through Regulation (EC) No 318/2006.125 These are 
in place until the end of the 2014/2015 marketing year.126
The 2006 sugar reform package has led to important changes within the EU 
internal market. While the reform has maintained the quota system, it has 
simplified the quota arrangements. The distinction between the ‘A ’ and ‘B’ quotas 
has been removed, and they now form one single production quota.127 Out of quota 
production is still permitted, but it is limited to a total of 1 100 000 tons within the 
EU market and subject to a one-off EUR 730 levy.128 The biggest holder of 
additional sugar quota is Metropolitan France, with a quota of 351 695 tons. It is 
followed by Germany, with 238 560 tons, and Poland with 100 551 tons.129 Sugar
193
123 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Regulation on the common organisation o f  the 
markets in the sugar sector - Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No  
1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural 
policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers - Proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring o f  the sugar industry in the European 
Community and amending Regulation (EC) N o 1258/1999 on the financing o f  the common 
agricultural policy”, Brussels, 22.6.2005, COM (2005) 263 final.
124 Council o f  the European Union, “Proposal for a Council Regulation on the common organisation 
o f  the markets in the sugar sector - Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC)
No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common 
agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers - Proposal for a Council 
Regulation establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring o f  the sugar industry in the 
European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 on the financing o f  the 
common agricultural policy,” 14982/05, Brussels, 30 November 2005.
125 Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 o f 20 February 2006 on the common organisation o f  the 
markets in the sugar sector, OJ L 58, 28.2.2006.
126 Ibid, at Article 46.
127 A total o f  17 440 537 tons was allocated to the EU Member States and their regions (See Op. cit. 
footnote no 125 at Annex III).
128 Ibid, at Article 8(3).
129 Ibid, at Point I o f Annex IV.
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surplus is still subject to the carry-over system.130 13All sugar quotas are charged a
1^1production charge of EUR 12.00 per tonne.
In addition to the above, the intervention prices for white and raw sugar were 
replaced by “reference” prices. These prices were subject to a price cut o f 36 
percent over four years, commencing from the 2006/2007 marketing year.132 As a 
result, since the 2009/2010 period, the reference price for white sugar is EUR
404.4 per tonne and is EUR 335.2 per tonne for raw sugar.133 The intervention 
price was temporarily maintained from 2006 to 2010. It was kept as a transitional 
measure, contributing to “stabilising the market for cases where market prices in a 
given marketing year would fall below the reference price fixed for the following 
marketing year.”134 Until the 2009/2010 marketing year the intervention price was 
set at 80 percent of the reference prices of the following marketing year, and EU 
MS were limited to buying in a maximum of 600 000 tonnes of sugar per year.135 136
A private storage scheme was introduced as a new market tool, replacing the old 
intervention price system, and was used as a safety net in case market prices fell 
below the reference price. In line with the reference price cuts, the minimum 
price for quota beet was also gradually reduced. It is now fixed at EUR 26.29 per 
tonne since the 2009/2010 marketing year.137
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130 Ibid, at Article 14.
131 Ibid, at Article 16.
132 It must be noted that the EU Commission initially proposed a price cut o f 39 percent, see Op. cit. 
footnote no 123.
133 Op. cit. footnote no 125 at Article 3.
134 Ibid, at Preamble (21).
135 Ibid, at Article 18.
136 Ibid, at Preamble (22) and (18).
137 Ibid, at Article 5(1).
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In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 319/2006, in order to compensate EU 
sugar growers for the support prices cuts, their income support has been 
increased.138 139These payments represent on average 64.2 percent of the revenue loss 
from the price cuts. They have been integrated into the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPtS), which was covered in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and hence decoupled from 
production.140 They are also conditional on fulfilling the cross-compliance 
requirements.141 In addition, under Article 36 of Regulation (EC) 318/2006, EU 
MS which reduced their sugar quota by at least 50 percent may grant an additional 
aid to farmers coupled to production. The aid was established as a transitional 
measure, and payments should be equivalent to a maximum of 30 percent of the 
income loss arising from the reduction in support prices, and must be given for a 
maximum of 5 consecutive years ending in the 2013/2014 marketing year.142
In addition to the support price reductions, a temporary restructuring fund was 
established in order to deal with the structural problems faced by the sugar industry 
within the internal market.143 The fund was spread from 2006/2007 to 2009/2010 
marketing years, and was given to the less competitive sugar factories that
138 Preamble (2) o f  Council Regulation (EC) N o 319/2006 o f 20 February 2006 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the 
common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, OJ L 58/32, 
28.2.2006.
139 European Commission, “The European sugar sector- A  long-term competitive future”,
September 2006.
140 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 o f  29 September 2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 
1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, OJ L 
270, 21.10.2003. The arrangements for the SPtS provided in this regulation were amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 319/2006 in order to integrate payments arising from the 2006 sugar 
reform.
141 Op. cit. footnote no 140 at Article 6.
142 Op. cit. footnote no 138 at Article 1 lOq (2).
143 Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 o f 20 February 2006 establishing a temporary scheme for 
the restructuring o f  the sugar industry in the Community and amending Regulation (EC) N o  
1290/2005 on the financing o f the common agricultural policy, OJ L 58/42, 28.2.2006.
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permanently abandoned sugar quota production and renounced to their quota.144 
The aim of this voluntary scheme was threefold. It was designed to provide 
incentives to encourage the less competitive factories to leave the industry, to give 
money to cope with the social and environmental impacts of factory closure, and to 
grant funds for the most affected regions.145 Accordingly, the allocation of aid was 
strictly controlled and subject to the respect of social, economic and environmental 
commitments.146 The restructuring aid was set at EUR 730 per tonne from the 
2006/2007 to 2007/2008 marketing years, EUR 625 per tonne for the 2008/2009 
year and EUR 520 for the final period.147 A minimum of 10 percent of the aid was 
to be reserved for growers of beet sugar and machinery contractors.148
The restructuring fund scheme was an important aspect of the reform, which 
assisted the EU in reducing its level of sugar production. This in turn helped the 
EU to avoid overproduction, with five of the less competitive EU regions, 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia, completely abandoning sugar 
production.149 In May 2007, the Commission reported that the renunciation of 
quota under the scheme reached 2.2 million tonnes from the marketing years 
2006/2007 to 2007/2008.150 However, this was well below the expected target of 5 
million tonnes.151 In order to avoid overproduction, the Commission decided to
144 The restructuring fund is part o f the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and 
since January 2007 o f the European Agricultural Guaranteed Fund. See Ibid, at Article 1(1).
145 Op. cit. footnote no 123, p 7.
146 Op. cit. footnote no 125 at Article 4.
147 Op. cit. footnote no 143 at Article 3(5).
148 Ibid, at Article 3(6).
149 Bruhns, J., “The Reform o f the EU Sugar Regime and its Effects on the Industry”, SugarJournal, 2009, 71(11), pp. 13-16, p 14.
150 1.5 million tonnes during the first marketing year o f implementation and 0.7 million tonnes 
during the second period.
151 European Commission, “proposals to amend Council regulation (EC) No 318/2006 on the 
common organisation o f  the markets in the sugar sector and Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2006
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withdraw a further 2 million tonnes of sugar quota. Given the limited effects of the 
scheme on significantly reducing market imbalances, more adjustments were 
required. The EU Commission proposed in 2007 to improve the restructuring 
scheme, and to make it “more attractive.” It proposed to set the limit of aid to be 
given to growers and machinery contractors at 10 percent, with an additional 
payment for growers to be made retroactively. This change was implemented in 
response to the concerns from sugar processors about the provisions of Article 3(6) 
of Regulation (EC) 320/2006. As discussed above this article provided that farmers 
were to be allocated more than 10 percent of aid, thereby leaving the processors 
uncertain about the exact amount of aid that was available to them. Accordingly, 
this new measure removes the “uncertainty resulting from the [previous] 
possibility that a Member State might decide to set a higher percentage.”152 354 In 
addition to this, farmers who renounced their quotas, within the limit of 10 percent 
of the factory’s total quota, have the possibility of applying directly for 
restructuring aid.155
The introduction of these adjustments resulted in a further renunciation of over 20 
percent of sugar quota from the most efficient producers, namely France, 
Germany, Poland and the UK.156 As a result the overall EU sugar quota was
establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring o f the sugar industry in the Community” 
Brussels, COM (2007) 227 final, 7.5.2007.
152 European Commission, “proposals to amend Council regulation (EC) No 318/2006 on the 
common organisation o f  the markets in the sugar sector and Council Regulation (EC) N o 320/2006 
o f  20 February 2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring o f the sugar industry in 
the Community. OJ C 116/5, 26.5.2007.
153 The amount o f aid for the 2008/2009 marketing year was fixed at EUR 237, 5 per tonne o f  sugar 
renounced (See Council Regulation (EC) No 1261/2007 o f  9 October 2007 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 320/2006 establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring o f  the sugar industry in the 
Community, OJ L 283, 27.10.2007).
154 Op. cit. footnote no 152.
155 Op. cit. footnote no 153 at Article 1(3).
156 Op. cit. footnote no 149, p 14.
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significantly reduced, thereby decreasing the production of sugar in the EU. The 
Commission declared in 2009 that since the implementation of the restructuring 
scheme, a total of 5.8 million tons of production quota was given up, hence very 
close to the anticipated target of 6 million tons.157 The sugar reform was 
considered to be “a success.”158
5.2 The end of the Sugar Protocol
Under the 2006 sugar reforms, the EU  decided to maintain its commitments 
towards ACP countries benefitting from the SP.159 However, in the context of 
the reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) removing progressively 
trade barriers between the EU and ACP countries, the EU Council of Ministers 
denounced the SP in September 2007,160 arguing that “in the context of a transition 
towards liberalization of ACP-[EU] trade, unlimited quantities cannot coexist with 
the price and volume guarantees of the Sugar Protocol.” 161 162In addition, the then EU 
Commissioners for Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid, and Agriculture 
and Development also pointed out that the provisions of the protocol were no 
longer compatible with the reform of the EU’s sugar regime, which was “bringing
157 Press Releases, “CAP reform: Commission welcomes success o f  EU sugar reform as 
restructuring process concludes”, Brussels, IP/09/366, 6 March 2009.
158 Ibid.
159 Op. cit. footnote no 125 at Article 31.
160 The denunciation was made in accordance with Article 10 o f  the Sugar Protocol which provides 
that the latter can be denounced by any parties subject to two years’ notice.
161 Council Decision 2007/627/EC o f  28 September 2007 denouncing on behalf o f  the Community 
Protocol 3 on ACP sugar appearing in the ACP-EEC Convention o f  Lome and the corresponding 
declarations annexed to that Convention, contained in Protocol 3 attached to Annex V to the ACP- 
EC Partnership Agreement, with respect to Barbados, Belize, the Republic o f  Congo, the Republic 
o f Cote d'Ivoire, the Republic o f  the Fiji Islands, the Republic o f  Guyana, Jamaica, the Republic o f  
Kenya, the Republic o f Madagascar, the Republic o f  Malawi, the Republic o f  Mauritius, the 
Republic o f  Mozambique, the Federation o f Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Republic o f  Suriname, the 
Kingdom o f Swaziland, the United Republic o f  Tanzania, the Republic o f  Trinidad and Tobago, the 
Republic o f  Uganda, the Republic o f  Zambia and the Republic o f  Zimbabwe. OJ L 255, 29.09.07.
162 Peter Mandelson was the EU Commissioner for Trade; Louis Michel was the EU Commissioner 
for Development and Humanitarian Aid; and Mariann Fisher Boel as the then EU Commissioner 
for Agriculture and Development.
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1an end to guaranteed prices for the EU’s own producers.” As a result, the SP 
ended on the 1st October 2009, allowing free access for all ACP countries 
exporting sugar, but leading to important consequences for the SP countries’ 
economy. Nevertheless, given the sensitive nature of sugar and its role in the 
economies of ACP sugar producing countries, a transition to duty- and quota-free 
access for sugar exports to the EU market, examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis, has 
been created.
6. The implications for ACP Caribbean countries
6.1 Cane sugar and ACP Caribbean countries
Despite the granting of financial assistance, there is no doubt that the end of the SP 
implied important disruptions in the sugar sector and significant income losses for 
its beneficiaries. In the context of the Caribbean region, the SP was seen as the 
“lifeblood of Caribbean economies and communities.” 163 64 Cane sugar, was the 
prime product at the time of the slave trade, and is still an important industry for 
the Caribbean countries’ economy.165 The Sugar Association of the Caribbean166 167
reported in 2008 that “sugar exports to Europe - which accounts for just under 90 
percent of the Caribbean sugar market - amounted to 349,949 tonnes for the crop 
year to May 2008, earning approximately €496.8 per tonne.” Sugar exported to
163 “Why has the EU proposed to end the EU-ACP Sugar Protocol?” Comment by Commissioners 
Peter Mandelson, Louis Michel and Mariann Fisher Boel in The Guyana Chronicle, 25 July 2007.
164 McDonald, I. on behalf o f the Sugar Association o f the Caribbean (SAC), “The Sugar Protocol- 
Socio-economic aspects”, paper presented at ACP workshop on sugar, Brussels, 2004.
165 Kingsman, J. Sugar Trading Manual, Cambridge, England: Woodhead Publishing Limited, 
2000, p 49.
166 The Sugar Association o f  the Caribbean is an association o f  the sugar industries o f  Barbados, 
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis and Trinidad & Tobago.
167 Jamaica Gleaner News, “Caribbean sugar production falters- volumes, exports down in current 
year,” 23 July 2008 [Online] Available from: http://www.iamaica- 
gleaner.com/gleaner/2008Q723/business/business5.html (Accessed 07/09/2009).
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the EU is therefore considered as an “essential source of Caribbean foreign 
exchange earnings.” 168
Guyana and Jamaica, two former British colonies, are among the two most 
important Caribbean sugar-producing nations.169 Among ACP Caribbean SP 
countries, they were the two largest quotas holders, with fixed quotas originally set 
in 1975 of 157,700 and 118,300 tons per year respectively for Guyana and 
Jamaica.170 These quantities remained around these levels for both countries until 
the end of the SP in 2009. Sugar accounted in 2005 for nearly 12 percent of GDP 
in Guyana171 and earns Jamaica around 100 million Jamaican Dollar per year.172 1734
Any change in this situation would have a profound effect on economy and society 
of both countries.
6.1.1 Jamaica’s Sugar Industry
When the British captured Jamaica in 1655, the island became “a slave-based 
economy producing sugar for export.” Jamaica was the main producer and the
tli tli 174leading exporter of sugar in the world in the 17 and 18 centuries, and
168 Paugam, J.-M. and Novel, A.-S. “Reviving the Special and Differential Treatment o f  Developing 
Countries in International Trade: the twin challenges o f  preferences erosion and differentiation o f  
Developing Countries,” Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 2006, p 78.
169 In 2009, Guyana was the largest producer o f  sugar with 43.608 tonnes followed by Jamaica with 
36.024 tonnes. See Radiojamaoca.com, “Thousands o f  tons o f  sugar exported in March,” 21 April 
2009 [Online] Available from:
http://www.radioiamaica.com/index.php7option-com content&task-view&id-l 7322&Itemid=87 
(Accessed 04/09/2009).
170 Op. cit. footnote no 10 at Article 3(1).
171 The Guyana Office for Investment, “Agriculture and Agro-processing”, [Online] Available 
from: http://www.goinvest.gov.Qv/agriculture.html (Accessed 20/05/2012).
172 African Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Group, “Sugar facts and Figures,” [Online] Available from: 
http://www.acnsugar.org/Facts%20and%20Figures.html (Accessed 04/09/2009).
173 Walden Publishing Ltd., “Jamaica Profile,” Cambridge, England: World o f  Information, 2006.
174 Sugar Industry Authority and Sugar Industry Research Institute, “Jamaica Sugar Industry,”
2001, [Online] Available from: http://www.iamaicasugar.org/ (Accessed 10/04/2010).
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remained an important sugar-exporting region during the 19th and 20th centuries.175 176
Sugar production is therefore a long standing and embedded industry in Jamaica. 
In 1970, the Sugar Industry Authority was established as a statutory body in order 
to “ensure the viability of the industry (...) by taking a leadership role in the 
development of the industry and by being a strong efficient organization with
1 'y z
highly motivated and professional employees.”
When the EU started to produce sugar beet, Jamaica began to diversify its trade 
exports. Therefore, tourism, mineral extraction and mineral refinement, in addition 
to the exports of traditional agricultural products such as bananas and sugar, play 
an important role within Jamaican economy.177 Jamaican cane sugar production 
has declined over the decades. While Jamaica produced a quantity of 186,133 tons 
of sugar in 1998, it produced in 2008 a total of 140,872 tons of sugar.178 179This 
decline was mainly due to worsening hurricane seasons. An example of this was 
Hurricane Dean in 2007, which caused significant flooding and excessive rainfalls 
and led to a significant decline in sugar output. This has resulted in a decline of 
cane sugar production by 307,000 tonnes. Despite this, sugar has a 
multifunctional role in Jamaica, and therefore remains an important commodity for 
the island, mainly in rural areas.180 The existing sugar factories in Jamaica
175 Op. cit. footnote no 173.
176 Jamaica Sugar Industry Authority, “Annual Report,” Sugar Industry Research Institute (SIRI), 
2005.
177 Laaksonen, K., Maki-Franti, P. and Virolainen, M., “Mauritius and Jamaica as case studies o f  
the Lome sugar protocol,” TradeAG Working Paper, Commission o f  the European Communities, 
2007, p 25.
178 Op. cit. footnote no 176.
179 Ibid.
180 Government o f  Jamaica website, “Jamaica,” [Online] Available from: 
http://www.iis.gov.im/special sections/CARICOMNew/iamaica.html (Accessed 26/01/2010).
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i  o  1
contribute largely to the national income, employment and export earnings. 
Sugar is the “largest agricultural export earner” accounting for 5.8 percent of the 
total export. The Jamaica’ Sugar Industry company is also the “largest single 
employer o f labour as well as the largest industry within the agricultural sector.” 18 283
6.1.2 Guyana’s Sugar Industry
Sugarcane is also one of the main cash crops in Guyana.184 Sugar cultivation was 
introduced for the first time into Guyana in the 1630s, and since then the sugar 
industry has played an important role in its economy.185 In 2006, Guyana’s sugar 
industry accounted for “ 18 percent [of its] GDP, 57 percent of [of its] agricultural 
GDP and 30 percent of [of its] merchandise exports.” 186 187Accordingly, it is a 
fundamental export industry for the country which is the largest island within the 
Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM).
The Guyana Sugar Corporation (GuySuCo), which operates five sugar estates and 
eight factories, is the dominant company within the sector and widely controls 
sugar production and processing. It was formed in 1976 as “a world class sugar 
v industry producing high quality sugar and added value by-products, while ensuring 
customer satisfaction, employee development, environmental protection and safe
181 The factories are: Appleton, Bernard Lodge, Frome, Hampden, Long Pond, Monymusk, St. 
Thomas Sugar Estates and Worthy Park.
182 Estandards forum, “Country Brief, Jamaica,” February 2009, [Online] Available from: 
http://wwvv.estandardsforum.org/secure content/countrv profiles/cp 92.pdf (Accessed 29/08/2009)
183 Op. cit. footnote no 173.
184 The other main cash crops in Guyana are rice and shrimps.
185 Guyana’s National Development Strategy Home Page, “Guyana’s Development Strategy, the 
Sugar Industry,” 29 May 1996, [Online] Available from: http://www.guvana.org/NDS/chap33.htm 
(Accessed 25/08/2009).
186 Guyana- European Commission, “EC Multiannual adaptation strategy for the period 2006-2013- 
In support o f  the National Action Plan under the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol 
countries,” 7.08.06, p 4.
187 Guyana Sugar Corporation INC, “GuySuCo and the Guyanese Community,” [Online] Available 
from: http://www.guvsiico.com/about gsc/gsctodav/gsc comm/Default.asp (Accessed 15/08/2009).
341
Chapter 8 -  The EU sugar import regime
• • 188working practices.” It also plays a crucial role in Guyana’s economy. The 
corporation is known worldwide as the exporter of brown Demerara sugar. In 
2004, the annual revenue for sugar exports for Guyana was USD 121m., with sugar 
exports being seen as the “backbone” of Guyana’s economy.18 89
In addition to its role in Guyana’s economy, GuySuCo also contributes to the 
social development of Guyana, and is the largest single employer in the country 
employing around 18 000 employees. Its contribution to Guyana’s society is vast. 
It contributes to Guyana’s rural and youth development by creating educational 
and recreational centres, and sports activities for both the sugar industry, and the 
country as a whole. It also makes donations to several benevolent organizations, 
health improvement, land developments programs to house the population, cultural 
and heritage preservation programs and youth development.190
6.2 The implications for Jamaica and Guyana
The sugar industry has been an important part of Caribbean countries’ history and 
a central business for their welfare. This is why anxious ACP countries pointed out 
that the EU Commission proposals on the EU sugar regime, closely linked to the 
SP, would destroy their sugar industries, with severe consequences for their 
economies and societies.191 The SP was considered the “perfect trading 
instrument” for Caribbean countries, and it has “immensely assisted in
188 Ibid.
189 Ramsaroop, P., “Case study: Guyana-Linking Brazil with the Caribbean- Potential Meets 
Opportunity,” 2009, [Online] Available from: www.visionuuvana.eom/2009/02/page/2/ (Accessed  
09/02/2009).
190 Op. cit. footnote no 185.
191 ACP Press Release, “The ACP group considers that the Commission’s proposals on sugar would 
devastate their sugar industries with severe socio-economic consequences for their populations,” 7 
October 2004, [Online] Available from: http://www.acp.int/en/archives/sugarcmnq en.html 
(Accessed 09/02/2009).
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1 Q9development.” It provided to its beneficiaries guaranteed trade access to the EU, 
with stable prices and an important cash flow for an unlimited period. This is 
particularly true for Jamaica and Guyana, which had the largest EU sugar quotas,
1 09and it was provided the most significant market for their sugar export earnings. 
The benefits of the SP for these islands’ sugar industries, and thus for their 
economies and communities, were apparent. It created jobs in direct or indirect 
employment, developed essential infrastructures, and supported community 
services such as housing, health, pure water supply, education and sports.192 394
Since the SP has been terminated only recently it is difficult to fully evaluate the 
real consequences of this development for both Jamaica and Guyana. However, 
given the socio-economic value of sugar for Caribbean countries, it is undeniable 
that the end of the SP will have serious implications for both Jamaica and 
Guyana’s welfare and poverty. It is undeniable that foreign exchange earnings 
from sugar, which contributed massively to Jamaica and Guyana’s economies, will 
be undermined with a serious drop in revenues. This will probably lead to the 
closure of factories, which will affect hundreds of thousands of workers who 
depend on the sugar industry. These unemployed workers will probably try to 
migrate legally or, more probably, illegally to rich neighbouring countries.195
192 Op. cit. footnote no 164.
193 Hewitt, A. P., “Guyana, Sugar and EBA: Case-study o f  a country which is not quite Least 
Developed,” paper presented at Regulatory Framework of Globalisation, Barcelona, 2001.
194 Op. cit. footnote no 191.
195 Ibid.
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Since the direct welfare gains of these islands arise from sugar cane, there are few 
opportunities to diversity away from sugar.196 Against this background there 
appears to be one main solution in response to this challenge: converting the sugar 
crop to biofuel. Sugarcanes are normally grown to produce sugar, but through the 
process of fermentation, they can also produce ethanol as transportation biofuel, an 
alternative to the increasingly expensive fossil fuels. In view of the current 
challenge of climate change, biofuels are considered to be environmental friendly 
fuels, as they considerably reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.197 Thus, in light of 
the high demand, particularly in industrialized countries, for biofuels, as a source 
of cheaper and cleaner energy, Jamaica and Guyana could, with appropriate and 
targeted investment, develop an infrastructure for the production of sugarcane for 
biofuel exports. With appropriate investment and key staff training, the 
development of biofuel industries on these islands, in order to tackle global 
warming, could be a key future opportunity for ACP countries, and the key factor 
to remedy the estimated socio-economic implications linked to the ending SP. 
These investments need to be made in a timely way in order to ease the transition 
from the SP trading regime to the proposed bio-fuel focused economies.
However, it is must also be noted that serious issues have been raised with regard 
to the production of biofuels and their impact on society, the economy and the 
environment. For instance, it is argued that sugarcane burning before a manual
196 Donald Mitchell points out that Jamaica tried to diversify into fresh fruits and vegetables but this 
have generally been disappointing. See Mitchell, D. O. “Sugar in the Caribbean: Adjusting to 
Eroding Preferences,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3802, 2005, p 18.
197 Hill, J., et al., “Environmental, economic, and energetic costs and benefits o f  biodiesel and 
ethanol biofuels,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2006, 103(30), pp.l 1206-
11210, p 11206.
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harvest can lead to air pollution. It is also pointed out that the growth of food 
crops for the production of biofuels could also “impose pressure on food and water 
supplies.” 198 99 Consequently, a shift to biofuels should also take these concerns into 
consideration.
7. Conclusion
Sugar is one of the products falling under the EU’s CAP. Since 1968 the EU has 
been able to control both the production of EU sugar, and the import of sugar 
within its market, through a plethora of market tools. While the EU sugar market 
was heavily protected by import restrictions, sugar imports from ACP countries 
were facilitated under preferential arrangements. Under the SP, the EU committed 
itself to purchase and import fixed quantities of sugar from ACP countries at 
guaranteed prices. However, the latest sugar reforms have led to a new EU sugar 
regime, which complies with the WTO AoA. In addition, the introduction of the 
EPA arrangements, requiring ACP countries to liberalize their import regimes with 
respect to trade in goods,200 have altered the market conditions for ACP countries 
which benefited from the SP. The sugar reform has led to reduced sugar prices 
within the EU market and therefore lower revenue for sugar beet producers. In this 
context, the SP, denounced by the EU Council of Ministers, ended on the 1st 
October 2009, allowing free access for all ACP countries which export sugar. 
Despite this, the EU has maintained its commitments towards ACP countries, and
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198 Smeets, E., Junginger, M., Faaij, A., Walter, A., Dolzan, P. and Turkenburg, W., “The 
sustainability o f  Brazilian ethanol-An assessment o f  the possibilities o f certified production”, Biomass and Bioenergy, 2008, 32(8), pp. 781-813, p 784.
199 Rajagopal, D., Sexton, S.E., Roland-Holst, D. and Zilberman, D., “Challenge o f  biofuel: filling 
the tank without emptying the stomach?,” Environmental Research Letters, 2007, 2(4) , pp. 1-9, p
2.
200 Op. cit. footnote no 10 at Article 36(1).
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continues to provide them with preferential access under the negotiated EPAs 
which were analysed in Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis.
The SP has been an important feature of the EU trade policy for beneficiary ACP 
countries. Undoubtedly the termination of the SP, as well as the introduction of the 
EPAs arrangements, have deeply undermined the value of the ACP Caribbean 
sugar trade regime. This change will influence the future conditions of access to 
the EU market for ACP Caribbean countries and particularly for Jamaica and 
Guyana which held the largest quotas under the SP. Their loss of guaranteed access 
to the EU market means that they now must compete with other traditional ACP 
suppliers of sugar. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, the EU has imported 
an overall volume of 416 932 tonnes and 197 854 tonnes from Mauritius and Fiji, 
respectively. However, during the same period, the EU only imported 134 332 
tonnes of sugar from Jamaica and 198 026 tonnes from Guyana.201 03 Both Fiji and 
Mauritius204 signed interim EPAs with the EU which cover only trade in goods, in 
December 2009205 and August 2009 respectively.206 Accordingly, Fiji and
201 These countries are Fiji, Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Republic o f  Congo, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. They have in the past 
benefitted from the Sugar Protocol.
202 European Commission “EU raw cane sugar imports from ACP countries (main suppliers), 
average 2007-2009 tonnes (product weight),” 7.3.2012, [Online] Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/developing-countries/commodities/index en.htm (Accessed  
11/04/2012)
203 Ibid.
204 Fiji is a member o f  the ACP Pacific region and Mauritius is a member o f the ACP Eastern and 
Southern Africa region.
205 Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, o f  the one part, and the 
Pacific States, o f  the other part-Protocols-Final Act-Declarations, OJ L 272, 16.10.2009.
206 Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement the 
Eastern and Southern Africa States on the one part, and the European Community and its Member 
States, on the other part. The agreement is not yet published in the Official Journal.
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Mauritius have received duty and quota free access to the EU internal market since 
2008.207
In addition, it must also be noted that the EU has also extended duty and quota free 
sugar access to all LDCs, irrespective of their origin, from 1st October 2009 under 
the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) trade preferences regime.208 The EBA is part of 
the Generalised System of Preferences scheme which was examined in Chapter 5 
of this thesis. Consequently, it is possible that ACP Caribbean countries may lose 
their guaranteed access to the EU market and would have to compete with LDCs. 
In addition to this, all ACP sugar producing countries will also suffer as a result of 
increased competition from highly competitive countries, particularly from 
Australia, Brazil and Thailand.
The current situation has evolved significantly from that of colonial trade 
preferences, and given the multifunctional aspects of the sugar industry, it could be 
difficult for Jamaica and Guyana to reorient their production for external trade. As 
a consequence, there is a risk that the ACP Caribbean countries will suffer massive 
economic and social shocks in the near future, which will have a knock on effect 
for its neighbouring, and wealthier countries. Alternatively Caribbean countries, 
particularly Jamaica and Guyana may benefit from timely and focused investment 
in infrastructure and training in order to redirect their sugar production focus, from
207 Council Regulation (EC) N o 1528/2007 o f 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for 
products originating in certain states which are part o f  the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group o f States provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, 
Economic Partnership Agreements, OJ L 348/1 31.12.2007.
208 See Article 11(3) o f Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 o f  22 July 2008 applying a scheme 
o f generalized system o f  preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and 
amending Regulations (EC) N o 1933/2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 110/2006 and 
(EC) No 964/2007, OJ L 211, 6.8.2008.
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the export of raw and white sugar to the EU market, to the production of high value 
bio-fuels. Given the high cost of transport of fuel oils, bio-fuels will probably find 
a market in the western hemisphere. Either way, there will be less raw sugar 
entering the global market from the Caribbean countries. The future for Jamaica 
and Guyana will depend on the strategic decisions currently being made by their 
governments, and their ability to obtain strategic investment for infrastructure and 
retraining investment for a future in bio-fuels production and export.
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Chapter 9 The EU banana import regime
1. Introduction
Bananas, along with sugar, are traditional agricultural commodities of Caribbean 
countries, and play a major role in the economy, living standards and conditions of 
the population.1 23Banana production for exports had been developed in the 1950s in 
many Caribbean countries, in order to supply the United Kingdom (UK) market, 
and to replace their decline in sugar production. The UK historically operated a 
protective regime for the Commonwealth Caribbean banana export under which 
the Caribbean banana industry was able to flourish. The UK retained its post­
colonial trading relationships with Caribbean countries on accession to the 
European Union (EU), alongside similar banana policies operated by France.4 
These traditional trade preferences were guaranteed under the four Lome 
Conventions concluded between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries.
Trade in bananas forms the largest share of the international fruit trade market, 
with the EU being the largest consumer of bananas.5 However, the EU is not a big 
producer of bananas and its exports are considered “virtually non-existent.”6 Most
1 European Commission, “Banana Accompanying Measures: Supporting the Sustainable 
Adjustment o f the Main ACP Banana-Exporting Countries to New Trade Realities,” Brussels, 
COM (2010) 101 final, 17.3.2010, p 2.
2 Mlachila, M, Cashin, P. and Haines, C., “Caribbean Bananas: The Macroeconomic Impact o f  
trade preference Erosion in Bauer, A., Cashin, P. and Panth, S., Ed., The Caribbean: Enhancing Economic integration, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C, 2008, p 86.
3 The Caribbean Banana Exporters Association website, available from: http://www.cbea.org/ 
(Accessed 23/11/2011).
4 The French market was mainly reserved for bananas from the DOMs and Africa (mainly 
Cameroon and the Ivory Coast).
5 Op. cit. footnote no 1, p 2.
6 European Commission, “Agriculture products: Bananas,” Brussels, 2006, [Online] Available 
from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/l33193.htm (Accessed 23/11/2011).
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EU bananas are produced in the EU Member States’ outermost regions, as 
identified in Article 349 and 355(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). The most important EU banana-producing regions are 
the Spanish’s Canary Islands, the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, as well as the Portugal’s islands of Azores and Madeira, which
o
together account for 16 percent of the EU’s total supply. Cyprus, Greece and 
Portugal also produce bananas, but in very small quantities.7 89 The rest of the EU’s 
supply is mainly imported from the ACP countries and the Latin American 
countries. In 2010, the EU imported a total of 4,491,116 tonnes of bananas from 
these countries. Accordingly, the EU is considered the biggest importer of bananas, 
followed by the United States (US).10
ACP countries, as former EU colonies, have been traditional bananas suppliers to 
the EU. In order to promote the ACP’s economic development, ACP banana­
exporting suppliers were granted duty-free access for specific quantities of bananas 
to the EU market, at the expense of Latin American countries producing the so- 
called “dollar bananas,” 11 which were charged a high import levy. This was in line 
with the special Banana Protocol (BP) attached to the four Lome Conventions12 
and assuring preferential treatment of bananas imported from ACP countries over 
non-preferred banana producers. Consequently, this situation has led to both
7 The EU currently has nine outermost regions. These are Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, 
Reunion, Saint-Barthelemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. OJ C 83, 
30.3.2010.
8 Op. cit. footnote no 6.
9 Ibid.
10 European Commission, “Bananas-Market Report 2010,” Directorate-General for Agriculture and 
rural Development, Brussels, 2011.
11 Dollar bananas refer to bananas grown by Latin American producers for the US Multi National 
Company (MNC) o f  Chiquita, Dole and the Del Monte Corporation. See Dearden, S., “The EU  
Banana Protocol” in Dearden, S. Ed. The European Union and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2002, p 55.
12 Lome I (1975-1980), Lome II (1980-1985) and Lome III (1985-1990) and Lome IV (1990-2000)
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internal and external legal actions against the 1993 Common Market Organisation 
for Bananas (CMOB), which was discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
The legality of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 which implemented the 
CMOB, was challenged before the Court of Justice of the European (CJEU) by 
Germany in May 1993, supported by Belgium and the Netherlands. In accordance 
with the “Banana Protocol” attached to the then Treaty of Rome, Germany was the 
only EU Member State (MS) to give duty-free access to its market for specific 
quotas of bananas imported from Latin American countries.13 4 Germany argued that 
the CMOB was in breach of, inter alia, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the then Protocol on tariff quota for imports of bananas which 
was attached to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.15 The 
dispute was unsuccessful in 1994 when the CJEU denied the direct effect of GATT 
provisions within the EU.16
In addition to this, the CMOB was challenged several times by Latin American 
countries, later joined by the US, leading to a protracted dispute in the 
GATT/WTO since 1993 over the EU banana import regime. This conflict became 
to be known as “the banana war.” However, while the EU banana policy was first 
contested under the GATT, the chapter will focus on the dispute launched under 
the WTO when the US entered the case to act on behalf of Chiquita Brands 
International, Dole Food and Del Monte, all of which were US companies. In
13 Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 o f  13 February 1993 on the common organization o f  the 
market in bananas, OJ L 47, 25.2.1993.
14 Protocol on the tariff quota for imports o f  bananas attached to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, 1957.
15 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union, [1994] ECRI- 
4973, para 26.
16 Ibid, at paras 110 and 111.
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1978, the Chiquita Company, which was then known as the United Brands 
Company (UBC), was involved in a major competition law case. In this case, 
UBC, then the largest banana group in the world and which accounted for 35 
percent of world exports, was found by the European Commission to have abused 
its dominant position in the EU M S’ banana supply markets, thereby breaching the 
(post-Lisbon) rules on competition provided in Article 102 TFEU.17 18In an appeal 
against this decision, the CJEU considered bananas as a separate product market 
from the other fresh fruits markets because the prices of the latter only affected 
bananas prices during a short period and to a limited amount. This can be 
explained by the fact that bananas can be produced and supplied throughout the 
year in sufficient quantities as opposed to other fruits. The CJEU upheld most 
findings of the Commission’s decision on the abuse of UBC’s dominant position.
Earlier GATT rulings have found both previous EU national banana regimes and 
the 1993 CMOB to be illegal.19 However, given the weaknesses of the GATT 
dispute settlement system, as highlighted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the EU has 
been able to ignore the panel reports. As was discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
with the upgrade from the GATT rules to the WTO rules, the EU’s approach in this 
area can no longer be sustained. The original CMOB was repeatedly changed due 
to successive GATT/WTO rulings. The last reform of the CMOB took place in 
2001 when, in order to comply with its legal obligations stipulated under WTO 
law, the EU adopted a tariff-only import regime for bananas, applicable from 1st
17 Commission Decision 76/353/EEC o f  17 December 1975 relating to a procedure under Article 86 
o f  the EEC Treaty (IV/26699- Chiquita), OJ L 95, 9.4.76.
18 Case 27/76, United Brands Co v Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECR 207, 
para. 26.
19 GATT, EEC-Member States ’ Import Regimes for Bananas, Report o f  the Panel, 3 June 1993, 
DS32/R, (not adopted) (EEC-Bananas I) and GATT, EEC- Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, 11 Februaiy 1994, DS38/R, (EEC-Bananas II) (not adopted).
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January 2006. Accordingly, the system ended all restrictions on the volumes of 
bananas imported. The EU bananas market is now supplied on a “first come, first 
served” basis, thereby avoiding discrimination between suppliers. However, 
issues remained with regard to the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff level for 
bananas. This was settled in 2009 with the conclusion of two agreements on 
bananas, one between the EU and the Latin American countries, and the other 
between the EU and the US. The “banana war” was then finally over. The terms of 
these agreements will be analysed further in this chapter.
Against this background, it remains to examine whether developing countries 
(DCs) will still encounter issues to export bananas to the EU market in the future, 
under the new rules of the 2006 CMOB. Although attempts have been made to 
keep a layout comparable to the sugar chapter, this chapter had to be written in a 
format that makes it more compatible to the complexity of the banana issue. It 
should be noted that for the purposes of this chapter, “bananas” refer only to fresh 
bananas, classified under the combined nomenclature (CN) code 08030019, 
thereby excluding plantains.
2. The pre-2006 Common Market Organisation for Bananas
2.1 The arrangements within the EU internal market
Following the introduction of the 1993 CMOB, the protection that domestic 
bananas producers enjoyed in the past under the national arrangements was 20
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20 European Commission, “the ‘First Come, First Served’ method for the banana regime and the 
implications o f  a ‘tariff only’ system”, Brussels, COM (2000) 621 final, 4.10.2000.
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altered. In order to cover the loss of incpme resulting from the implementation of 
the CMOB, a compensatory aid scheme was established. The scheme gave EU 
bananas producers “an adequate income to cover their production costs.”21 2 23In 
accordance with Article 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93, aid was 
granted to producers who were “members of a recognised producers’ organization 
which [was] marketing in the [EU] bananas complying with the [common quality 
and marketing standards].” There were twenty one such recognised organizations 
of producers, with the Canary Islands regrouping comprising the biggest number.24 256
Compensation given to farmers under the above scheme was calculated on an 
annual basis. It was based on the difference between the “flat-rate reference 
income” and the “average production income” for bananas produced and marketed 
within the then Community. The “flat-rate reference income” was calculated for 
the ex-packing shed stage on the basis of the data recorded during the 1991. In 
1998, it was fixed at EUR 62.25 per 100 kg and at 64.03 per 100 kg in 1999.27 The 
“average production income” was also calculated for the ex-packing shed stage. It 
was based on “the average selling prices on local markets, less a flat-rate amount 
of EUR 0.29 per 100 kg net weight corresponding to the forwarding costs to the
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21 Thagesen, R. and Matthews, A., “The EU’s Common banana Regime: An Initial evaluation”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1997, 35(4), pp. 615-627, p 616.
22 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Preamble (12).
23 Exceptionally, individual producers unable to join a producers’ organization because o f  their 
geographical situation could also receive aid. See Ibid, at Article 12(1).
24 The Canary Islands regrouped 5 producers’ organisations, Guadeloupe (2), Martinique (4), 
Madeira (2), Azores (5), Algarve (1), Crete (1) and Laconia (1). See: European Commission, 
“Report on the operation o f  the common organisation o f  the market in bananas,” Brussels, COM 
(2005) 50 final, 17.2.2005.
25 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Article 12(3).
26 Article 2(1) o f  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1858/93 o f 9 July 1993 laying down detailed 
rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the aid scheme to compensate 
for loss o f  income from marketing in the banana sector, OJ L 170, 13.7.1993.
27 Ibid, at Article 2(2).
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markets concerned.”28 29In addition to this, the Council also recognised that certain 
very small regions with inappropriate climatic conditions were struggling with the 
production of bananas. Therefore, in order to encourage the definitive cessation 
of banana production, farmers received a single premium of ECU 1 000 per 
hectare.30
Compensation was paid to EU producers up to a total banana production of 854 
000 tonnes.31 32This quantity was divided between the eight EU regional producers, 
namely the Canary Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Madeira, Azores, Algarve, 
Crete and Laconia. With a quota volume of 15 000 tonnes each, Crete and 
Lakonia were holding the lowest quantity among the producers, whereas the 
Canary Islands received almost 50 percent of the share. The French DOMs and the 
Portuguese territories were given a general quota of 369 000 tonnes, and 50 000 
tonnes, respectively.
2.2 The EU’s external banana trading provisions
In contrast with the internal arrangements, the rules for importing bananas from 
third countries were more complex. Bananas were imported under a tariff-quota 
scheme which consisted of three categories of bananas comprising traditional ACP 
bananas, non-traditional ACP bananas and third-countries bananas, which each 
group subject to a particular tariff-quota treatment.
28 Ibid, at Article 3(2).
29 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Preamble (13).
30 Ibid, at Article 13(3). The premium was given in accordance with the conditions established 
under Article 13(2) o f  Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93.
31 Ibid, at Article 12(2).
32 Op. cit. footnote no 24.
33 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Article 12(2).
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2.2.1 Preferential Banana Imports Arrangements
2.2.1.1 The ACP/EU Banana Protocol
As was discussed earlier in Chapter 5 of this thesis, in order to maintain the past 
colonial ties, ACP agri-food products were granted non-reciprocal duty and quota- 
free access to EU market under the Lome Conventions.34 With regard to bananas, 
the BP successively attached to each Lome Convention allowed “the improvement 
of the conditions under which bananas originating in the ACP states are produced 
and marketed.”35 3678Under the BP the EU promised that, in relation to ACP exports to 
the EU market, “no ACP state shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional 
markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in
r
the past or at present.” This provision, in itself, clearly required the EU to provide 
preferential market access to ACP bananas. ACP countries were therefore given 
duty-free access for specific quantities of bananas. ACP countries were mainly 
exporting bananas to France, Italy and the UK. The UK Commonwealth Caribbean 
producers were the most important banana suppliers to the UK. The majority of 
banana supplies exported to France were coming from its Departements d' Outre- 
Mer (DOMs) and the ACP countries of Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Madagascar. 
Italy’s traditional ACP supplier was Somalia. However, it is also argued that the 
specific commitment of the BP have “authorized” the EU MS “to restrict the
34 See for instance Article 2(1) and Article 3(1) o f  ACP-EEC Convention o f Lome OJ L 25, 
30.01.1976
35 Article 18 o f  the second ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome on 31 October 1979, OJ L 347, 
22/12/1980.
36 Article 1 o f Protocol 6 on bananas o f  Lome I, Protocol 4 o f  Lome II, Protocol 4 o f  Lome III and 
Protocol 5 on bananas o f Lome IV.
37 “French overseas department.”
38 Chacon-Cascante, A. and Crespi, J.M., “Historical overview o f  the European Union banana 
import policy”, Agronomia Costarricense, 2006, 30(2), pp. 111-127, p 113.
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-IQ
importation” of bananas from non-ACP countries and non-overseas territories. 
These latter bananas were taxed a 20 percent common external tariff (CET) of 
import value and subject to quantitative limitations.39 40 This has led to the pre 1993 
EU market being fragmented into different banana import regimes, which 
obstructed the free movement of bananas between the then EU MS.
The BP also provided for trade development measures. In accordance with Article 
2 of the BP, the EU also agreed to provide financial and technical support in order 
to “ improve conditions for the production and marketing of [ACP] bananas.”41 The 
measures implemented for this purpose, such as the Stabilisation of Exports 
Earnings (STABEX) finance scheme, aimed to enhance the competitiveness of 
ACP countries on the EU market, and hence expand the EU-ACP banana trade.42 
Given the economic dependence of certain ACP countries, such as Caribbean 
countries, on banana exports, the BP gave ACP banana suppliers legal 
commitments to safeguard their traditionally advantageous access to the EU 
market in the long term.43
When the 1993 CMOB was created, Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 had to 
honour the EU’s legal commitments towards ACP banana suppliers, as defined in 
the BP attached to the fourth Lome Convention. The latter was signed in 1989 for a
39 Bartels, L., “The trade and Development Policy o f  the European Union”, The European Journal of International Law, 2007, 18 (4), pp 715-756, p 735.
40 Peter, C., “Caribbean Banana Trade: from Colonialism to Globalization”, Gordonsville, VA, 
USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 101.
41 Article 2 o f Protocol 5 on bananas attached to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome 
on 15 December 1989, OJ L 229, 17.08.1991.
42 Ibid, at Article 2 o f Protocol 5 on bananas.
43 Op. cit. footnote no 40, p 104.
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period of 10 years, starting on 1st March 1990.44 The CMOB provided that in 
accordance with the BP, the EU had to preserve the “traditional trade patterns” of 
ACP bananas countries under the common regime, and could not limit their 
imports 45 Accordingly, in order to meet the Lome commitments, the EU import 
regime maintained duty-free access for ACP bananas, but introduced a system of 
quotas which differentiated between traditional and non-traditional ACP banana 
suppliers.
2.2.1.2 Imports of bananas from traditional ACP countries
ACP countries which exported specific quantities of bananas to the EU under the 
BP were considered as traditional ACP suppliers.46 They consisted of 12 countries, 
with the majority being in the Caribbean region.47 These countries received under 
the 1993 CMOB duty-free access for fixed quantities of bananas.48 The total 
annual ACP banana quota allowed duty-free access, and was fixed at 857, 700 
tonnes. Each country received a quantity of that amount, according to the amount 
of bananas they had traditionally exported to the EU prior to 1991.49 In the context 
of ACP Caribbean countries, Saint Lucia held the biggest quota within the 
Caribbean region with a total quantity of 127, 000 tonnes. This was followed by 
Jamaica which was granted an annual import volume of 105, 000 tonnes. St 
Vincent and the Grenadines was allocated a quota of 82 000 tonnes, Dominica had 
a quota of 71 000 tonnes, Belize, Suriname and Grenada, each being given a quota
44 Article 366(1) o f  the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome on 15 December 1989, OJ L 
229, 17.08.1991.
45 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Preamble (15).
46 Ibid, at Article 15(1).
47 Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Madagascar, Somalia, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname. See Ibid, at Annex X.
48 Ibid, at Article 21.
49 Ibid, at Article 15(1).
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of 40 000, 38 000 and 14 000 tonnes respectively.50 Despite the imposition of 
quota limits, it must be noted that the 1993 banana regime aimed to maintain ACP 
countries’ “traditional trade patterns as far as possible.”51 Accordingly, it was 
pointed out that these restrictions did not affect the export performance of ACP 
countries which almost all exported bananas below “the maximum duty-free 
quantities allowed from 1994 to 2000.”52
2.2.1.3 Imports of bananas from non-traditional ACP countries
On the other hand, the term “non-traditional” ACP countries referred to bananas 
imported within the EU market from traditional ACP suppliers above the agreed 
quantity level, or bananas imported from non-traditional ACP suppliers.53 Non- 
traditional ACP bananas were also subject to an import restriction. A total of 
90,000 tonnes was allocated to non-traditional ACP bananas. This quantity was 
shared between the Dominican Republic, as a non-traditional ACP supplier, and 
the traditional suppliers, namely Belize, Cameroon, and the Ivory Coast.54 In 
accordance with Article 18 of the CMOB, non- traditional ACP banana-suppliers 
received duty-free access to the EU market within the established quota limit.55 
However, bananas imported above the agreed quantity were subject to a penalty 
levy of ECU 750 per tonne.56 This high duty rate was imposed in order to ensure 
that internal production and traditional ACP quantities were “disposed of in
50 Ibid, at Annex X. The biggest quota holders among the traditional ACP countries were Ivory 
Coast and Cameroon with a quantity o f  155 000 tonnes.
51 Ibid, at Preamble (15).
52 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 117.
53 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Article 15(2).
54 Annex I o f  Commission Regulation (EC) No 478/95 o f  1 March 1995 on additional rules for the 
application o f  Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the tariff quota arrangements for 
imports o f bananas into the Community and amending Regulation (EEC) No 1442/93, OJ L 49, 
4.3.1995.
55 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Article 18(1).
56 Ibid, at Article 18(2).
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acceptable conditions.”57 The biggest quota holder was the Dominican Republic 
with 55,000 tonnes. It was followed by Belize which was holding a quota of 
15,000 tonnes. The Ivory Coast and the Cameroon were allocated each 7,500 
tonnes.58 The EU also reserved 5,000 tonnes for bananas imported from ACP 
countries which were newly embarked or were about to embark on banana sector 
activity.59 These countries were referred to under the “other ACP States” 
category.60
2.2.2 Import from non ACP-third countries
In order to protect the internal and preferential imports arrangements, the EU 
imposed a high duty rate under a tariff-quota on bananas from non-preferred 
suppliers. Imports of bananas from non ACP-third countries, together with non- 
traditional ACP suppliers, were subject to an annual basic tariff quota of 2 million 
tonnes per year.61 This quota was to be adjusted in accordance with the “forecast 
supply balance on production and consumption in the [Union] and of imports and 
exports.”62 63Bananas imported from non ACP-third countries within the agreed 
quota limit were subject to a levy of ECU 100 per tonne. Bananas exported above 
the fixed quota faced a punitive duty of ECU 850 per tonne.
In addition to this, imports of third countries bananas were restricted by a system 
of import licences which divided the 2 million tonnes tariff quota into three
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57 Ibid, at Preamble (16).
58 Op. cit. footnote no 54 at Annex I.
59 Ibid, at Annex I and Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Preamble (18).
60 Article 3(1) (a) and Annex I o f Commission Regulation (EC) No 478/95.
61 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Article 18.
62 Ibid, at Article 16 2) and (3).
63 Ibid, at Article 18(1) and (2).
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categories of EU importers.64 In accordance with Article 19 of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 404/93, the tariff quota system guaranteed EU operators who marketed 
on their own account EU and/or traditional ACP bananas, a market share of 30 
percent. This quota is referred to as “Category B” . Operators for third country 
and/or non-traditional ACP bananas were allocated 66.5 percent of the 2 million 
tonne quota (“Category A”). The remaining 3.5 percent, referred to as “Category 
C,” was reserved to operators who started marketing bananas other than EU and/or 
traditional ACP bananas from 1992. In accordance with Article 13 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1442/93, import licences were transferable between 
operators in the same category, and among Category A and B operators. These two 
categories were also able to transfer their import licences to Category C importers.
3. Issues with the EU banana regime
As stated earlier, the 1993 CMOB was designed in accordance with the framework 
of the Lome Convention. It continued to give preferential treatment to ACP banana 
countries while maintaining a protectionist approach vis-a-vis the EU banana 
market. The tariff quota system and specific import duties have restricted imports 
from non-ACP countries, thereby resulting in an important difference between the 
world price and the EU market price for bananas, with the latter being higher.65 
These practices have helped secure market access for ACP bananas, hence 
ensuring full respect of the EU’s commitments set out in Article 1 of the BP. As a 
consequence, ACP countries were protected from non-favoured banana exporting 
countries, those being mainly in Latin American countries, which are considered to
64 Ibid, at Article 18. This system was implemented in order to monitor banana imports under the 
tariff quota arrangements (Article 17 o f  Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93).
65 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 618.
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produce “cheaper” bananas than those of ACP bananas.66 67This price difference is 
explained by the large capital traditionally invested by multinational corporations 
in the Latin American banana industry. These factors make their plantations 
“larger than those of the ACP and significantly more efficient,” thereby reducing 
considerably the cost price of production.
It addition, it has been observed that the CMOB has provided a further “incentive” 
to import ACP bananas through the system of import licences.68 In light of the 
poor competitiveness of ACP bananas when compared to Latin America countries, 
the import licence procedure was “designed to make marketing EU/ACP bananas 
more attractive by reducing the effective price differential between dollar and 
EU/ACP bananas.”69 Accordingly, it is believed that the system intended to allow 
the “cross-subsidisation” of ACP bananas “with the more lucrative sources” in the 
dollar region.70
It is clear that such discriminatory treatment between DCs associated with the EU 
external protection has “adversely affected” non-ACP exporting countries,71 
thereby conflicting with the then EU’s goal not to “undermine imports of bananas 
from other third countries suppliers.”72 Given that Latin American bananas 
suppliers are also DCs, it is to be assumed that preferential treatment provided in 
favour of ACP countries, which was not falling under one of the Special and
66 Lyons, R., “European Union banana controversy”, Fla. J. Int’l L., 1994, 9(1), pp. 165-188, p 167
67 Ibid, p 173.
68 Op. cit. footnote no 11, p 63.
69 Op. cit. footnote no 21, p 618.
70 Ibid., p 618.
71 Trachtman, J.P., “Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance”, EJIL, 1999, 10(4), pp. 655-678, p 
661
72 Op. cit. footnote no 13 at Preamble (8).
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Differential Treatment provisions,73 was in contradiction with the GATT MFN 
principle.74 As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, this MFN principle requires 
equal treatment between all GATT/WTO members with regard to the imposition of 
customs duties on imports. There is therefore no doubt that the EU’s commitments 
towards ACP banana suppliers under the CMO in bananas were in direct 
contradiction to the EU’s GATT/WTO obligation to achieve “the fullest 
liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products.”75 76 This situation has 
resulted in strong reactions from the Latin American countries, supported by the 
US, in 1995, acting on behalf its multinational bananas firms.
4. The WTO dispute on bananas
Legal action at the WTO against the EU CMOB started in September 1995, when 
the US and three Latin American countries, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, 
requested consultations with the EU with regard to its banana regime. The most 
significant allegations brought by these countries were that the provisions of the 
1993 CMOB were illegal under GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures (The Licensing Agreement). They particularly challenged 
the conformity of the CMOB provisions with the MFN principle, the EU 
obligations regarding the imposition of quantitative import restrictions, and the
’llEU’s compliance with the WTO rules on import licensing.
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73 As discussed in Chapter 3 o f  this thesis.
74 Preferences given to ACP countries were not legally justified by the Enabling Clause or GATT 
Article XXIV.
75 Preamble (5) o f the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
76 WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Request for Consultations by Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, W T/DS16/1, 4 
October 1995.
77 The complainants referred to Articles I, II, III, X and XIII o f the GATT 1994, Articles 1 and 3 o f  
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and Articles II, XVI.
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Consultations with the EU were terminated with the accession of the then world’s 
largest banana exporter, Ecuador, to the WTO in January 1996. In February 1996, 
Ecuador, together with the four aforementioned complainants, lodged a joint 
complaint against the EU CMOB, and requested new consultations with the EU.78 
The joint request repeated the same legal grounds previously brought in the 1995 
request. It must also be noted that the complainants also relied on two other WTO 
Agreements, namely the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs Agreement”).
However, attempts to reach mutually acceptable solutions were fruitless and in 
April 1996, the complaining parties reported that the consultation stage had “failed 
to settle the dispute.”79 801As a consequence, they required the establishment of a 
panel in order to examine their allegations, and rule against the legality of the 1999
OA
CMOB. The panel was established in May 1996 and the case became to be
oi
known as EC-Bananas III.
The first interesting issue raised in the case was whether the US had sufficient 
legal interest to bring the case at the WTO. The US involvement in the dispute was 
strongly criticised by the EU. In its view, the US “had no legal right or no legal or 
material interest in the case,” since it had only a “token production of bananas” and
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78 WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, 
WT/DS27/1, 12 February 1996.
79 WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Request for the Establishment o f a Panel, WT/DS27/6, 12 April 1996.
80 Ibid.
81 WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Constitution o f the Panel established at the request o f  Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and the 
United States, Communication by the DSB Chairman, WT/DS27/7, 7 June 1996.
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o?
it did not export bananas to the EU. In response to these allegations, the US 
argued that it had a “significant commercial interest” in the case, as it produced 
bananas in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, both areas falling within the US customs 
territory. Although banana production on these islands is minimal, the US pointed 
out that the Hawaii banana producers alleged that their ability to produce and 
export bananas was harmed by the low world banana prices, caused by the EU 
CMOB. The US went on to point out that the measures o f the EU CMOB were 
“constraining” the import, delivery, and distribution flexibility of two US large 
companies, Chiquita and Dole Foods. It has been argued by some commentators 
that the US decision to join in the WTO complaint was heavily influenced by the
OA
powerful lobbying efforts of Chiquita.
According to the WTO Panel, it is to be assumed that since the US’ internal market 
could be “directly and indirectly” affected by the EU CMOB’s impact on world 
supplies and prices, “it would have an interest in a determination” of whether the 
EU regime complied with the WTO rules. Consequently, the panel held that “a 
Member’s potential interest in trade in goods [...] and its interest in a 
determination of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement,” constitute
o c
each a right to bring a complaint before a WTO panel. Significantly, it was 
pointed out that the panel also took “a fairly positivist approach” to WTO law82 3456
82 WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Complaint by the United States, Report o f  the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA, 22 May 1997, para. 2.2
83 Ibid, at para. 2.23
84 Alter, K. J and Meunier, S., “Nested and overlapping regimes in the transatlantic banana trade 
dispute”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2006, 13(3), pp. 362-382, p 369.
85 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para. 7.50.
86 Op. cit. footnote no 71, p 666.
365
Chapter 9 -  The EU banana import regime
insofar as it established that the provisions of the DSU do not oblige a Member to 
have a “legal interest” in order to bring a claim before the panel.87 8
4.1 Arguments of the parties
The complainants focused on three elements of the EU CMOB, namely the tariff 
structure, the quota allocations and the import licensing system.
4.1.1 Tariff issues
The discriminatory tariffs of the EU banana import regime were challenged by the 
complaining parties. They argued that tariffs applied under the tariff quota system 
were set according to whether bananas were imported from non ACP-third 
countries or non-traditional ACP countries. The complainants pointed out, relying 
on previous GATT panel reports, that such a difference “on the basis of foreign 
source” was considered a direct breach of the general MFN principle of GATT 
Article 1(1). It was held by the GATT panel in 1981 that the application of 
different import tariffs cannot be justified on the grounds of “geographical
D O
factors,” “cultivation methods,” or other factors linked to the end-product. In 
addition, they pointed out that in both the EEC -Bananas I  and II cases, the GATT 
panel found the preferential tariffs treatment granted to ACP countries to be in 
breach of GATT Article I(l).89
87 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para. 7.49.
88 GATT, Spain-Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, report o f  the panel adopted on 11 June 1981, 
BISD 28S/102, para. 4.6.
89 GATT, EEC-Member States ’ Import Regimes for Bananas, Report o f  the Panel, 3 June 1993, 
DS32/R, para, 375 and GATT, EEC- Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, 11 February 
1994, DS38/R, para. 155
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In response to this, the EU pointed out that in 1994, it had obtained a waiver for 
the Lome IV Convention, and that its obligations under provisions of GATT 1(1) 
were waived until 29 February 2000.90 Accordingly, the waiver had authorised the 
EU to continue granting preferential access to its market for ACP countries’ 
products under the umbrella of the Lome provisions, “without being required to 
extend the same preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting 
party.”91 This provision, in itself, provided an exception to the general MFN rule. 
The EU further claimed that the waiver also extended to “any measure necessary to 
permit it to fulfil its obligations under the Lome Convention to provide preferential 
treatment [to products imported from ACP countries].”92 As a consequence, the EU 
argued that it was legally allowed to continue its trade development strategy in 
respect of ACP countries, through enforcing the provisions of the Fourth Lome 
Convention and the attached BP.93
The interpretation of the Lome waiver has therefore been the subject of critical 
debate between the complaining parties and the EU. The complainants disagreed 
with the EU’s explanations, arguing that its interpretation of the waiver was too 
broad and thereby incorrect. They based their argument on the Sugar Headnote 
case, where the GATT panel established that since waivers of the obligations under 
GATT Article I are “granted according to Article XXV:5 only in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ , [...]their terms and conditions consequently have to be interpreted
90 The EU requested this waiver following the ruling o f  the GATT panel report in EEC-Bananas II.
91 GATT, “the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention o f  Lome,” decision o f  9 December 1994, L/7604, 
para. 1.
92 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para. 4.44.
93 Ibid, at para. 4.44.
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narrowly.”94 Accordingly, they assumed that “the waiver did not apply to all 
measures that the [EU] might adopt under the Lome Convention’s objectives.”95
The complainants further focused on tariff preferences given to non-traditional 
ACP bananas.96 They pointed out that since Article 1 of the BP provides for a 
special treatment solely in favour of traditional ACP countries, the EU had “no 
special obligations with respect to [non-traditional ACP bananas exports].”97 
Consequently, the Lome waiver could not apply to non-traditional ACP tariff 
preferences.98 The EU replied that the duty-free treatment granted to non 
traditional ACP countries was not indeed provided in the BP. Nevertheless, such a 
treatment was given in accordance with Article 168(2)(a)(ii) of the Lome IV 
Convention which also fell under the Lome waiver.99
The complainant parties then focused on the EU tariff rates which applied 
particularly to third-countries’ bananas. In their view, the two tariff rates imposed 
on non ACP-third bananas violated the EU’s “ long-standing GATT-bound tariff of 
20 percent ad valorem for the product.” 100 They based their argument on GATT 
Article II which requires WTO Members to “accord to the commerce of the other 
contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the
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94 GATT, United States -  Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, 
Report o f the Panel adopted 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/228, para 5.9.
95 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.52.
96 Preferential access for traditional ACP countries was not an issue in the dispute.
97 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para. 4.70 and para 4.73.
98 Ibid, at para. 4.90.
99 Ibid, at para 4.87. Article 168(2)(a)(ii) o f  the Lome Convention provides that the EU “shall take 
the necessary measures to ensure more favourable treatment than they granted to third countries 
benefiting from the most-favoured-nation clause for the same product.” According to the EU this 
provision includes also bananas.
100 Ibid, at para 4.7.
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appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.”101 1023They 
pointed out that the E C -B a n a n a s  I I  GATT panel found that the tariffs structure for 
bananas from third countries was in breach of GATT Article II. According to the 
GATT panel, the specific nature of these tariffs had “led to the levying of a duty on 
imports of bananas whose a d  v a lo r e m  equivalent was, either actually or 
potentially, higher than 20 percent a d  v a lo r e m .” However, the EU argued that
because the conclusions of the report have never been accepted or endorsed, “no
103authority whatsoever” emanates from them.
4.1.2 Allocation issues
In addition to the above issues relating to the tariff structure, the complainants 
claimed that the EU applied “differential volume restrictions by source” among 
banana suppliers, which were inconsistent with GATT Article XIII(l).104 The latter 
provision prohibits the application of quantitative restrictions on products imported 
from contracting parties, “unless the importation of the like product of all third 
countries [...] is “similarly prohibited or restricted.”105 The complainants’ 
arguments refer to quotas allocated to ACP countries, third-countries and Latin 
American countries signatories of the Banana Framework Agreement (BFA).106 
The BFA was signed in 1994 between the EU and four Latin American countries, 
namely Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela, in order to settle the
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101 GATT Article n(i)(a).
102 GATT, EE C- Im port R egim e fo r  Bananas, Report of the Panel, 11 February 1994, DS38/R, para. 
134.
103 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.98.
104 Ibid, at paras 4.217 and 4.218.
105 GATT Article XIII(l).
106 The BFA was laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the 
adjustments and transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement 
the agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, OJ L 349, 
31.12.1994.
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1 0 7dispute over the EU’s banana regime in GATT. It allocated these countries an 
annual import quota of 2.1 million tonnes for 1994 and 2.2 million tonnes for 
1995.107 08 The complainants argued that such “volume discrimination by source” had 
not been justified by the EU.109 However, according to the EU, because these two 
import regimes were separate from each other and “legally justified on a different 
basis,” the claim for discrimination could not apply.110 1
The complainants argued further that the EU granted to favoured suppliers import 
volumes that “greatly exceeded the shares of trade they would be expected to 
obtain in the absence of restrictions,” thereby conflicting with GATT Article 
XIII(2).m The latter requires instead a distribution of trade in a product 
“approaching as closely as possible the shares” which GATT contracting parties 
could have been expected to obtain in the absence of such import restrictions. 
According to the complainants, the EU could have met this requirement by 
distributing its market in line with the provisions of Article XIII(2)(d). This latter 
provision provides that in allocating quotas among suppliers an agreement must be 
sought with all parties substantially interested in supplying the same product. 
Alternatively, quotas must be allocated according to “the proportions, supplied by 
such contracting parties during a previous representative period, of the total 
quantity or value of imports of the product.” The complaining parties pointed out 
that the EU has allocated quotas to specific categories of suppliers which “did not
107 Op. cit. footnote no 19.
108 “Framework Agreement on Bananas”, Annex to Part I, Section I-B (tariff quotas) in Schedule 
LXXX- European Communities.
109 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.218.
110 Ibid, at para. 4.220 These two regimes according to the EU are: the preferential regime for 
traditional ACP bananas and a regime for all other bananas, paras 4.16 and 4.17.
111 Ibid, at para. 4.9. GATT Article XIII (2) requires that a distribution of trade in a product 
approach “as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected 
to obtain in the absence of such restrictions.”
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reflect commercial or historical patterns” and left other countries which are 
considerably interested in exporting bananas to the EU, such as Ecuador, without 
quotas.112
In response to this, the EU claimed that because the 1993 CMOB comprised two 
different regimes, the GATT Article XIII could not apply. With respect to ACP 
countries, the EU pointed out that they were allocated traditional quantities 
according to their “best ever” exports, up until and including the year 1990. 
According to the EU, the notion of “best ever” export performance has been given 
a broad interpretation in order to be consistent with the EU development policy 
towards ACP countries.113 14It further pointed out that the quota of 2 million tonnes 
originally given to imports from non-traditional ACP bananas and non-ACP third 
countries was set in line with “the average yearly imports during the 1989- 
1991.”'14
The complainants further challenged the reallocation of “short-fall” provided in 
paragraph 4 of the BFA. They alleged that the possibility given to the four Latin 
American countries to transfer their quotas among themselves was inconsistent 
with the provisions of Article XIII GATT,115 because this advantage was not 
offered to other tariff quota supplying countries.116 However the EU disagreed with 
these claims, arguing that the transfer of unused quotas fell under the GATT 
requirement that “no conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would 
prevent any contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total
112 Ibid, at para 4.113.
113 Ibid, at para 4.131.
114 Ibid, at para 4.136.
115 Op. cit. footnote no 108 at Paragraph 4.
116 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.241.
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quantity or value which has been allotted to it [...].9,117 The EU went on to point 
out that the “others” suppliers category disposed already of “the widest possibility” 
of quota transfer.17 18 Consequently, the EU considered that there was no violation 
of GATT Article XIII(2)(d).
4.1.3 Import licensing issues
Finally, the whole functioning of the licensing system has led to strong criticism 
from the complaining parties. In their view, the import licensing system applied to 
Latin American banana suppliers was “highly complex,” and had led to “highly 
unfavourable conditions of competition” when contrasted with the “simple” 
arrangements applied to traditional ACP bananas.119 120 In addition, because no 
limitations were imposed on EU internal bananas sales or distribution, the 
complainants alleged that the EU tariff quota licensing scheme was 
“discriminatory and unfair” against Latin American bananas. They continued to 
point out that such discrimination, associated with “the overwhelming onerous 
requirements” of the system, have “restricted and distorted trade.” The countries 
also argue that it has created “unnecessary administrative burdens” for these 
countries, thereby violating in te r  a l ia  GATT Article 1(1) and the Licensing 
Agreement.121 They were therefore of the view that the system applied to Latin 
American bananas amounted to “a non-tariff barrier to trade.”122
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117 GATT Article XIII(2)(d).
118 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.243.
119 Ibid, at para. 4.11.
120 Ibid, at para. 4.250 and 4.251.
121 Ibid, at para. 4.250 and 4.251.
122 Ibid, at para. 4.249.
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The complainants further challenged the Category B operator criteria and pointed 
out that despite the fact that these were found to be in breach of Articles I and III 
of GATT by the E C -B a n a n a s  I I  panel, the EU had continued to use them under 
the CMOB.123 24 According to the panel, the 30 percent of the tariff quota allocated to 
operators was based on bananas which had been purchased from domestic or 
traditional ACP sources during the preceding period. Accordingly, operators were 
encouraged to purchase more ACP and EU bananas if they wanted to “increase 
their future share of bananas which would benefit from the tariff quota.”125 1267
In response to this, the EU argued that the Licensing Agreement clearly states in 
Article 1(1) that its scope was to “regulate all the procedures, others than customs 
operations, prior to the importation.” It indicated that there were no provisions 
within this Agreement providing for its application also to situations where “no 
import restriction was applied at the border.” The EU pointed out, relying on the 
E C -B a n a n a s  I I  panel, that since a tariff quota was not an “import restriction,” the 
Licensing Agreement could not apply to the EU banana tariff quotas.128 
Furthermore the EU argued that, since a “licensing system could not be considered 
by any means as an advantage, favour, privilege or immunity,” it could not fall 
under the provisions of GATT Article 1(1).129
123 As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, GATT Article III requires an equal treatment between 
imported and domestic products. This article therefore prohibits the application of internal taxes 
and charges on imported products “so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
124 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 4.363.
125 Op. cit. footnote 102 at para 144.
126 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para. 4.255.
127 Ibid, at para. 4.255.
128 Ibid, at para 4.254 and 4.273.
129 Ibid, at para 4.281.
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With regard to the Category B eligibility criteria, the EU argued that the 
complainants have failed to prove that they have “affected [...] the internal [EU] 
distribution of bananas” and that they have resulted in “operators] involved in 
trade in Latin American bananas [...] losing market share.” It demonstrated, in 
contrast, the statistics showed that “these companies were actually increasing their 
market share of the primary import of ACP bananas and in marketing [EU] 
bananas.”130 31 Consequently the EU argued that the complainants’ allegations as 
well as the conclusions of the panel report in the E C -B a n a n a s  I I  were “totally 
unfounded.”132 13
4.2 The WTO Panel decision
In light of the “unprecedented number” of issues raised in this dispute and the 
number of members involved, the WTO panel has recognised the E C -B a n a n a s  I I I  
as an “exceedingly complex” case, which resulted in “a long report” comprising 
“an unprecedented number of findings.” With regard to the complaints of the 
parties, the panel decided to focus its findings on three separate issues; the quotas 
allocated to all banana suppliers, the tariff issues, and the EU licensing procedures 
for bananas. It must be noted that, the Panel started its reasoning by concluding 
that despite their differences in quality, size, taste or point of origin, all bananas are 
Tike’ products for purposes of GATT Articles I, III, X and XIII.134
130 Ibid, at para 4.394 and 4.395.
131 Ibid, at para 4.395.
132 Ibid, at para 4.395.
133 Ibid, at paras. 7.1 and 7.399.
134 Ibid, at para 7.63.
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4.2.1 Allocation issues
The WTO Panel has found that the EU’s tariff quota allocations applied a 
differential treatment of bananas between WTO Members, thereby breaching the 
requirements of GATT Article XIII(l) for two reasons. Firstly, quotas were 
allocated whether by agreement and by assignment to some ACP countries, and to 
Latin American countries signatories of the BFA that did not have a substantial 
interest in supplying bananas to the EU, whereas such shares were not allocated to 
the rest of Latin America countries. Secondly, the BFA countries were the only 
countries which benefited from the possibility to reallocate their tariff quota shares 
among themselves. However, the Panel agreed with the EU’s claim on the scope 
of the Lome waiver, and ruled that the waiver also covered the EU’s obligations 
under GATT Article XIII. The panel considered that it was important to give “real 
effect” to the waiver, and that there was a “close relationship” between both GATT 
Articles I and XIII(l), as they both prohibit discrimination treatment between 
WTO Members. Therefore it concluded that the EU was allowed to give “shares 
of its banana tariff quota to specific traditional ACP banana supplying countries in 
an amount not exceeding their pre-1991 best-ever exports to the [EU].”
4.2.2 Tariff issues
With regard to the concerns raised by the complaining parties in relation to the EU 
bananas tariffs, the panel confirmed that they did not challenge the tariff 
preferences granted to traditional ACP bananas, but those given to non-traditional 
ACP bananas.135 6738 The panel ruled that since bananas are “like” products, EU’s
135 Ibid, at paras 7.89 and 7.90.
136 Ibid, at para 7.106 and 7.107.
137 Ibid, at paras 7.110 and 7.107.
138 Ibid, at para 7.131.
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preferential tariffs for non-traditional ACP bananas should be found inconsistent 
with the non-discrimination obligations provided in GATT Article 1(1). However, 
it recognised that these obligations have been waived by the Lome waiver, which 
therefore permitted the EU to continue to give preferential treatment to non- 
traditional ACP bananas.139
4.2.3 Import licensing issues
In addressing the complainants’ claims regarding the EU import licensing 
procedures, the panel clarified some important points. First, it was of the view that 
Article 1(1) of the Licensing Agreement does not explicitly include, or for that 
matter, exclude, licences for quotas.140 However, the panel also pointed out that 
footnote 1 of this Article clearly states that administrative procedures, including 
those referred to as “licensing,” are covered by the Licensing Agreement.141 
Therefore, the panel regarded the provisions of the Licensing Agreement as 
applying to licensing procedures for tariff quotas.142 On this basis, it also decided 
to examine whether the EU’s import licensing procedures for bananas were falling 
under the provisions of GATT 1994, the Licensing Agreement and also the TRIMs 
Agreement. The panel found that in accordance with the WTO General 
Interpretative Note,143 there were obligations within the provisions of the Licensing 
Agreement, and those of the TRIMs Agreement, conflicting with those stipulated 
in GATT 1994. Consequently, the panel stated that GATT 1994, the Licensing
139 Ibid, at para 7.136.
140 This Article defines “import licensing” as “administrative procedures used for the operation of 
import licensing regimes [...]”
141 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 7.147.
142 Ibid, at para 7.156.
143 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the Agreement Establishing the WTO provides 
that when a conflict arises between a provision of the GATT 1994 and a provision of another 
Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement, the provision of the other 
agreement will prevail to the extent of the conflict.
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Agreement, as well as the TRIMs Agreement, were all deemed to apply to the 
EU’s import licensing regime.144 Finally, the Panel considered that traditional ACP 
licensing procedures, as well as non-traditional ACP and third-country licensing 
procedures, constituted one single licensing regime. In the view of the panel, if  it 
was possible for WTO Members to “create separate regimes for imports of like 
products based on origin,” it would “defeat [...] the object and purpose of the 
[GATT] non-discrimination provisions.”145 It pointed out further that while WTO 
Members are allowed to create import licensing regimes that contained particular 
“technical aspects,” “the measures for implementing a preferential tariff permitted 
under WTO rules should not” lead to the creation of non-tariff preferences “in 
addition to the tariff preference.”146
With regard to the claims made against the allocation of 30 percent of the licenses 
to Category B operators, the WTO panel considered that the “design, architecture, 
and structure” of the EU measure providing for such allocation was applied “so as 
to afford protection to [EU] producers.”147 In addition, the panel noted that since 
the rules concerning operator categories remained unchanged since the E C -  
B a n a n a s  I I  panel rulings, it decided to adopt these rulings as its own findings.148 
As a consequence, the general application of operator category rules, with regard 
to third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas, as well as the 30 percent 
allocation of import licenses to Category B operators, were found to be in breach 
of both GATT Article 111(4) and Article I(l).149 It should be noted that the Panel
144 Op. cit. footnote no 82 at para 7.163.
145 Ibid, at para 7.165.
146 Ibid, at para 7.166.
147 Ibid, at para 7.181.
148 Ibid, at para 180.
149 Ibid, at paras 7.182 and 7.195.
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also decided to interpret the Lome waiver narrowly, and found that the waiver did 
not cover the EU’s obligations under Article 1(1) in respect of the licensing 
procedures.150
To conclude, the WTO panel upheld most of the claims from the US and the Latin 
American countries and ruled against several aspects of the 1993 CMOB. The 
CMOB of the current EU was found in violations with a number of provisions 
in te r  a l ia  GATT Articles 1(1), 111(4), XIII(l) and Article 1(3) of the Licensing 
Agreement. Accordingly, the Panel recommended that the DSB request the EU to 
change its import regime for bananas in order to make it conform to its obligations 
under the aforementioned GATT and WTO agreements.151
Following the EU’s appeal of the Panel decision,152 153the WTO Appellate Body 
(AB) issued a report in September 1997, which reaffirmed the panel’s ruling. 
However the WTO AB disagreed with the panel’s finding that the Lome waiver 
could cover GATT Article XIII with respect to the EU’s allocation of quota shares 
to traditional ACP banana suppliers. According to the AB, because waivers 
provide an exception to the general non-discrimination rule, the extent of their 
coverage should be interpreted “with great care.” It pointed out that when the 
Lome waiver was negotiated, WTO Members narrowed its scope by replacing the 
word “foreseen” by “required” in “preferential treatment foreseen by the Lome
150 Ibid, at para 7.204. The panel decided to follow the panel report on the Sugar Headnote case 
previously mentioned (Op. cit. footnote no 94).
151 Ibid, at para. 9.2.
152 WTO, European Communities-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, 
Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), WT/DS27/9, 
13 June 1997.
153 WTO, European Communities-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997, para 185.
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Convention.”154 It therefore decided that the Lome waiver should only apply to the 
provisions which were explicitly referred to or mentioned in the waiver. Hence, 
since GATT Article XIII is not clearly mentioned in the waiver, it cannot be 
included within the scope of the waiver’s application In accordance with this 
restrictive and literal reading of the Lome waiver, the AB concluded that the panel 
has “erred in law” in interpreting the scope of the Lome waiver.155 Consequently, 
the EU was required to provide the same quota arrangements to both ACP and 
non-ACP bananas, but was nevertheless entitled to continue to give preferential 
access to traditional and non-traditional ACP bananas.156
As a result of the AB report, the 1993 CMOB was, once again, found to be 
inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules. The EU was required to bring its banana 
regime into conformity with its international obligations and therefore unlike the 
GATT rulings, the EU now had no choice but to accept the WTO decision.157
5. The New CMO in bananas
5.1 The “tariff-only” import regime
In response to the WTO challenges, the EU issued in 1998 Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1637/98 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2362/98 that revised the 
1994 CMOB.158 However, with the EU banana regime under strict scrutiny by the
154 Ibid, at para 186.
155 Ibid, at paras 183 and 188.
156 Ibid, at para 178, para 255(i).
157 The DSB adopted both Panel and Appellate Body reports on 25 September 1997: WTO, 
European Communities-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, Appellate 
Body Report and Panel Reports- Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DS27/12, 10 October 
1997.
158 Council Regulation (EC) No 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404 on 
the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 210, 28.7.1998; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council
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other WTO Members, the reform did not meet all the requirements of the WTO 
AB ruling, and the regulations were found to be still inconsistent with the EU’s 
obligations.159 Consequently, in April 2001, the EU reached a “mutually 
satisfactory” understanding with the US and Ecuador to resolve the bananas 
dispute.160 The EU committed itself to introduce a tariff-only system for imports of 
bananas before 1 January 2006.161 However, in order to prepare ACP countries for 
the new regime, a transitional tariff quota system was applied from January 2002 
to December 2005. The transitional tariff-only system was implemented by 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 of 7 May 2001, Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 and Council Regulation (EC) No 
349/2002 of 25 February 2002.162 During this period, three tariff-rate quotas were 
opened to banana imports according to whether they originated from all third- 
countries, or from ACP countries. Each year, a quota of 2,200,000 tonnes, 
designated as “quota A”, and an additional quota of 453 000, called “quota B”, 
were opened by the EU to all third countries and subject to a tariff duty of EUR 75 
per tonne. In line with the general 2001 “Doha waiver”, referred to in Chapter 5 of
Regulation (EEC) No 404 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 293, 
31.10.1998.
159 WTO, European Communities-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, 
Recourse to article 21.5 by Ecuador, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 12 April 1999.
160 Ecuador was recognised as the principal supplier in the banana negotiations made pursuant 
GATT Article XXVIII on the modification of schedules.
161 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities -  Regime fo r  the 
Importation,
Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, WT/DS27/58, 2 July 2001.
162 - Commission Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 of 7 May 2001 laying down detailed rules for 
applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the arrangements for importing bananas 
into the Community, OJ L 126, 8.5.2001.
- Council Regulation (EC) No 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 345, 29.12.2001.
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 349/2002 of 25 February 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 
896/2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards 
the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community, OJ L 55/17, 26.2.2002.
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1this thesis, ACP countries continued to enter the EU banana market duty-free. In
order to “ensure access for a specific quantity of bananas” from ACP countries,
and thereby protecting their economy, an autonomous “quota C” was fixed at 750
000 tonnes, and opened exclusively to them. In order to legally reserve this quota
to ACP countries, the EU was granted a second waiver, the “Article XIII Doha
waiver”, which covered its obligations under GATT Article XIII(l) and (2) until
31 December 2005.163 64 Since the quota system was operated on a “first come, first
served” basis,165 the distinction between traditional and non-traditional ACP
suppliers disappeared, and all ACP bananas benefitted from a zero duty rate.166 167
Bananas imported from ACP countries, and third- countries outside the agreed
quota, were subject to a tariff preference of EUR 300 and EUR 680 per tonne 
1respectively.
Quotas were distributed to “traditional” and “non-traditional” operators168 on the 
basis of historical references, using imports made during 1994, 1995 and 1996, as 
the reference period.169 In accordance with Article 1 of Commission Regulation 
(EC) 349/2002,170 “traditional” and “non-traditional” operators were distributed
163 Article 18(1) and (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 345, 
29.12.2001.
164 WTO, “European Communities-transition regime for the EC autonomous tariff rate quotas on 
imports of bananas,” WT/MIN(01)/16, Ministerial conference, fourth session, Doha, 9-14 
November 2011, 14 November 2001.
165 Op. cit. footnote no 20.
166 Op. cit. footnote no 163 at Article 18(3).
167 Ibid, at Article 18(4).
168 “Traditional” operators are defined as economic agents who have purchased a minimum quantity 
of 250 tonnes originating in third countries in any one year of the reference period. Article 3(1) of 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 896/2001 of 7 May 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the arrangements for importing bananas into the 
Community, OJ L 126, 8.5.2001.
169 Ibid, at Article 4.
170 Commission Regulation (EC) No 349/2002 of 25 February 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 
896/2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards 
the arrangements for importing bananas into the Community, OJ L 55/17, 26.2.2002.
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import licences for 83 percent and 17 percent of quota A and B, respectively.171 
With regard to “quota C”, import licences for 89 percent of the quota were 
allocated to “traditional operators,” and “non-traditional operators” received 
licences for the remaining 11 percent.172
The proposed tariff-only regime did not contain a definitive tariff schedule and 
agreeing on a MFN tariff level “has become a long process for the EU.”173 In 2004 
the EU Commission proposed opening WTO negotiations with the relevant 
producer countries on the new tariff rate.174 However, the then EU Commissioner 
Franz Fischler also pointed out that while these negotiations aimed to replace “the 
complex quota system by a simple tariff system,” any change would relate to the 
import system and “not the level of protection.”175 The then EU Commissioner for 
Trade, Pascal Lamy, for his part, noted that the EU will comply with its WTO 
obligations, but it will also “pay [...] particular attention to the situation of ACP 
countries and safeguarding the interests of EU producers.”176 Accordingly, the EU 
originally proposed in January 2005 a single MFN tariff rate of EUR 230 tonne.177 
However, in accordance with the Annex to the “Doha waiver”, the Latin American 
countries requested arbitration. The WTO arbitration panel examined the proposed 
tariff and concluded in August 2005 that it would not maintain a “total market
Chapter 9 -  The EU banana import regime
171 “Traditional operators A/B” were those who carried out the minimum quantity of primary 
imports o f ‘third-country’ and/or ‘non-traditional ACP’ bananas. Op. cit. footnote no 168 at Article 
3(2).
172 “Traditional operators C” are those who have carried out the minimum quantity of primary 
imports of “traditional ACP bananas.” Ibid, at Article 3(3).
173 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 125.
174 European Commission, “Banana imports: Commission proposed to open tariff-only 
negotiations,” Brussels, EUR/NR 90/04, 2 June 2004.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 WTO, Article XXVIII: 5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL -  European Communities, Addendum, 
(G/SECRET/22/Add. 1), 1 February 2005.
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access for MFN banana suppliers.”178 As a result, the EU proposed to lower the 
MFN tariff to EUR 187 per tonne, and to grant duty-free access to ACP countries 
up to 775,000 tonnes. However, the proposal was appealed for the second time by 
the Latin American countries and the arbitrator found again that the revised 
proposal did not satisfy the requirement to “at least maintain[...] total market 
access for MFN banana suppliers.”179
After a long consultation process, the EU finally issued Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1964/2005,180 18which implemented the tariff-only regime from 1 January 2006, 
thereby officially replacing the transitional tariff-rate quota. The regulation
l o timposed a high MFN tariff of EUR 176 per tonne on third-countries bananas, 
thereby providing “a level of protection and trade as close as possible to the system 
of tariff-rate quotas of the transitional period.”182 183ACP countries, in contrast, 
continued to receive an autonomous tariff quota of 775 000 tonnes, free o f customs
1RTduties, until the end of the Doha waiver in 2007.
The new regime was welcomed by the then EU commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development, Mariann Fischer Boel, who believed that the banana import 
regime was now “fair and balanced” for all developing countries. She went on to
178 WTO, “European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement-recourse to Arbitration 
pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, award of the arbitrator,” WT/L/616, 1 August 2005, 
para 94.
179 WTO, “European Communities-The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement- second recourse to 
Arbitration pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, award of the arbitrator,” WT/L/625, 27 
October 2005, para 127.
180 Council Regulation (EC) No 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005 on the tariff rates for bananas, OJ 
L 316, 2.12.2005.
181 Ibid, at Article 1.
182 Guyomard, H. and Le Mouel, C., “The New Banana Import Regime in the European Union: A 
Quantitative Assessment”, The E stey C entre Journal o f  in ternation al L aw  a n d  Trade P o licy , 2003, 
4(2) pp. 143-161, p 147.
183 Op. cit. footnote no 180 at Article 1.
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point out that the EU would “fully maintain access for Latin American producers 
while continuing to take into account EU and ACP producers.”184 However, issues 
remained with regard to the MFN tariff level for bananas. ACP countries criticised 
the MFN tariff as being too low, whereas in the view of Latin American countries, 
it remained too high.185
Consequently, the Latin American countries challenged the revised EU banana 
regime and requested the establishment of a panel, pursuant to Article 21(5) o f the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), with regard to the inconsistency 
of the EU’s 2006 regime with the DSU rulings and recommendations.186 Two 
WTO panels were composed in June and August 2007.187 In 2008, both panels 
found that the set MFN tariff of EUR 176 and the preferential tariff quota reserved 
to ACP countries were inconsistent with GATT Articles I, II and XIII.188 In the 
view of the panels, the MFN tariff was in excess of the previous EUR 75 tariff, 
thereby resulting in “a treatment for the commerce of bananas from MFN countries 
that [was] less favourable than that provided for in Part I of the European
184 EU Press Release, “European Union adopts new ‘tariff-only’ import regime for bananas from 1 
January 2006,” Brussels, IP/05/1493, 29 November 2005.
185 ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Bureau, “Fact-Finding mission to Suriname, Saint- 
Vincent and Saint Lucia, 29 May-3 June 2008”, 24 March 2009, p 8.
186. WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, Request for the Establishment of a Panel, 
WT/DS27/80, 26 February 2007.
- WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Request for the Establishment of a Panel, 
WT/DS27/83, 2 July 2007.
187 - WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, Constitution of the Panel, WT/DS27/82, 18 June
2007.
- WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, constitution of the Panel, WT/DS27/84,
13 August 2007.
188 _ WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, 7 April
2008, para 8.2.
- WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Panel, 19 May 
2008,WT/DS27/RW/USA, para 8.3.
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1 £QCommunities’ Schedule.” In addition, the preferential tariff quota granted to 
ACP banana countries was considered “an advantage” for them, which was “not 
accorded to like bananas originating in non-ACP WTO Members,” thereby 
breaching GATT Article 1(1).189 90 The findings of both Panels were upheld by the 
WTO AB on 26 November 2008.191 The reports of the WTO Panels and the AB 
were adopted by the DSB in December 2008, thereby obliging the EU to rebind its 
banana duty at a lower rate.192
The dispute over the banana trade finally ended on 15 December 2009 with the 
conclusion of the Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, between the EU and 
the Latin America banana suppliers, on the future EU trading regime for 
bananas.193 Under this agreement, the EU has agreed to progressively reduce the 
previous MFN tariff rate on bananas, from EUR 176 per tonne to EUR 114 per 
tonne, from December 2009 to January 2017.194 Accordingly, the EU agreed to 
maintain an “MFN tariff-only regime for the importation of bananas.”195 The first 
tariff of EUR 148 per tonne, which was also the biggest tariff cut, took place from 
the 15th December 2009 to 31 December 2010, and applied retroactively to all
189 WTO, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, 7 April 2008, para 7.504.
190 WTO report of the Panel, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, 7 April 2008, para 8.2 (a) and WTO Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS27/RW/USA, 19 May 2008, para 8.3 (a).
191 WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
second recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU and the United 
States, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 26 November 2008, para 478.
192 WTO, European Communities- Regime fo r  the importation, sale and distribution o f  bananas, 
second recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador and the United States, Appellate Body 
Report and Panel Report pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Action by the Dispute Settlement 
Body, WT/DS27/94, 17 December 2008 and WT/DS27/95, 6 January 2009.
193 The Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, communication from Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” WT/L/784, 2009. The Agreement was published in the Official 
Journal of the EU in 2010 (OJ L 141, 9.6.2010).
194 Ibid, at Article 3(a).
195 Ibid, at Article 3(c).
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signatories upon signature of the agreement.196 The tariff rate is then to reduce 
annually from January 2011 for six years.197 However, the agreement provides 
further that if a consensus on the new terms for global trade in agriculture is not 
been reached in the Doha Round negotiations by the 31st December 2013, the EU 
will delay the tariff cuts up to a two year period, and freeze the tariff level at EUR 
132 per tonne. Then as from January 2016, irrespective of whether the Doha 
Round has been concluded or not, the tariff rate should be set at EUR 127 per 
tonne, and should continue to decrease each year at the agreed rates, until it 
reaches EUR 114 per tonne in 2019.198 In return, the Latin American banana 
producers undertook not to take any further action with respect to the pending 
disputes and claims against the EU banana trade regime. They also agreed that 
these tariffs constituted the final results, and thus no additional cuts would be 
sought during the Doha Round negotiations.199 The conflict between the EU and 
the US was also settled, with an agreement under which the EU reaffirmed its tariff 
reduction obligations, and its commitment to maintaining a MFN tariff-only 
regime for the importation of bananas.200
5.2 The rules within the EU market
In line with the new imports arrangements, the EU reformed the internal aspects of 
the CMOB. According to the Commission, there was a need to particularly focus 
on aid granted to EU producers. In its view, they were “artificially isolated from
196 Ibid, at Footnote 1.
197 EUR 143 per tonne, EUR 136 per tonne, EUR 132 per tonne, EUR 127 per tonne, EUR 122 per 
tonne, EUR 117 per tonne, EUR 114 per tonne. Ibid, at Article 3(a).
198 Ibid, at Article 3(b).
199 Ibid, at Articles 6 and 7.
200 Agreement on trade in bananas between the European Union and the United States of America, 
O JL 141,9.6.2010.
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201the market trends since the aid automatically compensates for price changes.” 
Therefore, given the “small proportion of the total [Union] production concerned,” 
the compensatory aid for bananas produced within the EU regions, other than for 
the outermost regions of the EU, was abolished in January 2007.201 02 As a 
replacement, compensatory aid scheme was transferred to the single payment 
scheme (SPtS),203 as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Payments made under 
the SPtS are no longer linked to production and are classified within the WTO 
“green box” as support measures, as they have “no, or at most minimal, trade­
distorting effects or effects on production.”204 205In the context of bananas, EU MS 
had to establish reference amounts on the basis of the 2000, 2001 and 2002 
representative period and non-discriminatory criteria. The national ceilings for 
EU MS as provided in Article 41 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, were 
fixed in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2013/2006.206
With regard to bananas produced in the outermost regions, the financial support 
provided to producers under the CMOB was transferred to the POSEI 
programmes.207 These programmes were established in the 1990s, and relate
201 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No 
404/93, (EC) No 1782/2003 and (EC) No 247/2006 as regards the banana sector,” Brussels, 
20.9.2006, COM (2006) 489 final, p 2.
202 Preamble (8) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2013/2006 of 19 December 2006 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93, (EC) No 1782/2003 and (EC) No 247/2006 as regards the banana 
sector, OJ L 384/13, 29.12.2006.
203 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 
1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, OJ L 
270,21.10.2003
204 Op. cit. footnote no 75 at Annexe 2.
205 Op. cit. footnote no 202 at Preamble (8) and Article 2.
205 Ibid, at Annex VIII.
207 From French “Programme d’Options Specifiques a l’Eloignement et l’Insularite” (Programme of 
Options Specifically Relating to Remoteness and Insularity).
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specifically to the remote and insular nature of the outermost regions. The 
POSEI system was reformed by Council Regulation (EC) 247/2006208 09 210 and 
Commission Regulation (EC) 793/2006. It includes specific measures to “ensure 
the continuity and the development of local lines of agricultural production in each 
outermost region.” These measures take into account the specific challenges 
faced by these regions as a result of their geographical location and economic 
difficulties.212 The financing of the POSEI programmes, which includes the French 
overseas departments, the Azores and Madeira and the Canary Islands, must not 
exceed EUR 84.7 million, EUR 77.3 million and EUR 127.3 million 
respectively.213 Consequently, the POSEI is now “the only market support 
instrument for bananas in the outermost regions.”214 The POSEI programmes have 
been considered “very effective” for the banana export sectors in Guadeloupe, 
Martinique and the Canary Islands, the regions of the EU which produce the 
greatest volume of bananas.215 Nevertheless, given the outermost regions’ small 
scale of production, it can be said that the impact of the POSEI programmes on the 
global trade of banana would be negligible. In 2010, 657 155 tonnes of bananas
208 The POSEI system comprises the POSEIDOM for the French Overseas Department established 
by Council Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 OJ L 356, 24.12.1991, the POSEICAN for the Canary 
Islands established by Council Regulation (EEC) 1601/92 OJ L 173, 27.6.1992 and the POSEIMA 
for the Azores and Madeira established by Council Regulation (EEC) 1600/92, OJ L 173, 
27.6.1992.
209 Council Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 of 30 January 2006 laying down specific measures for 
agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, OJ L 42, 14.2.2006.
210 Commission Regulation (EC) No 793/2006 of 12 April 2006 laying down certain detailed rules 
for applying Council Regulation (EC) 247/2006 laying down specific measures for agriculture in 
the outermost regions of the Union, OJ L 145, 31.5.2006.
211 Op. cit. footnote no 209 at Article 10.
212 Ibid, at Article 1.
213 Ibid, at Article 23(1).
214 Op. cit. footnote no 201, p 3.
215 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “First report on the 
impact of the POSEI reform of 2006”, COM (2010) 501 final, Brussels, 24.9.2010, p 8.
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were produced in the EU outermost regions whereas the EU imported the same 
year a total of 4 491 116 of bananas from MFN and ACP countries.216
6. The implications for ACP Caribbean countries
6.1 Bananas and ACP Caribbean countries
ACP Caribbean countries currently involved in the banana export trade include 
Belize, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Suriname and the Windward Islands of 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.217 
Representatives of these countries’ exporting companies formed the Caribbean 
Banana Exporters Association, which works towards the protection of the 
Caribbean banana trade against external “threats.”218 2190
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these countries (with the exception of the 
Dominican Republic) constituted the main exporters among ACP traditional 
suppliers under the Lome Convention. In the early 1990s, the banana industry 
accounted for about 20 percent of the Windward Islands and Belize’s GDP, but 
this has declined to less than 5 percent of GDP in recent years due to “competition 
from African ACP countries.” “Uncertainty” with regard to the status of the EU 
banana regime has also been a contributing factor.221 Caribbean banana exports
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216 Op. cit. footnote no 10.
217 Op. cit. footnote no 3.
218 Ibid.
219 Dominican Republic was a non-traditional ACP supplier of bananas.
220 Op. cit. footnote no 2, p 86.
221 Ibid., p 86.
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also account for a small part of the world banana exports. In 2000, for instance, 
these represented 2.41 percent of global banana exports.
Nevertheless, bananas remain an important “source of income and export earnings” 
to several countries in the Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM).* 223 24The 
banana industry is particularly significant for the economies of the former British 
Caribbean colonies of the Windward Islands, where it accounts for “over half of all 
export earning.” The Windward Islands banana trade developed during the 
1950s, following a reduction in sugar production, but also to “challenge” the 
dominant position of Jamaican bananas within the UK market.225 267Between 1997 
and 2002, bananas held a high share in total merchandise exports for these 
countries. Bananas from Saint Lucia, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
and Belize, accounted for 42 percent, 24 percent, 18 percent and 10 percent of total 
national exports, respectively. During the same period the majority, and for 
some countries the total, of their bananas were shipped to the protected EU banana 
market. For instance, the EU imported 35 percent and 21 percent of Saint Lucia 
and Dominica’s banana total exports respectively. Consequently, there is no 
doubt that economies of these islands are almost completely reliant on the EU 
market.
UNCTAD, “Major developments and recent trends in international banana marketing 
structures”, UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2003/1, 2003, p 19.
223 Gillson, I., Hewitt, A. and Page, S., “Forthcoming Changes in the EU Banana/Sugar Markets: A 
Menu of Options for an Effective EU Transitional Package”, Overseas Development Institute, 
2005, p. 12.
224 Op. cit. footnote no 3.
225 Op. cit. footnote no 11, p 56.
226 Op. cit. footnote no 223, p 12.
227 Ibid., p 13.
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6.1.1 Jamaica’s Banana Industry
Bananas are one of Jamaica’s traditional export crops. Jamaican banana production 
for export is primarily confined in the parishes of St James, Portland and St Mary, 
due to their particular soil and weather conditions which are favourable to banana 
production.228 Jamaica was one of the first Caribbean islands to establish a banana 
export industry.229 It has since then became the main Caribbean banana supplier to 
the UK.230 231Bananas became Jamaica’s second largest cash crop, after sugar, 
thereby making an important contribution to Jamaica’s foreign exchange
231earnings.
Jamaica, which has long benefited from the BP, remained an important banana­
exporting country within the Caribbean region. The Jamaica Producers Group Ltd. 
is the country's major banana exporter. The company operates the two largest 
farms in Jamaica, the Eastern Banana Estates in St. Thomas and the St. Mary 
Banana Estates, which between them account for over 90 percent o f total 
exports.233 However, banana production in Jamaica has been in constant decline 
since 1998. Production fell from 62,338 tonnes in 1998 to 39,936 tonnes in 
2003.234 Exports of bananas have also decreased.
228 Jamaica Gleaner, “Communities feeling impact from banana sector decline,” 2006, [Online] 
Available from: http://iamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/200604Q3/business/business2.html (Accessed 
23/11/2011).
229 Jostling, T., Banana Wars: The A n atom y o f  a  T rade D ispu te , Cambridge, MA, USA: CABI 
Publishing, 2003, p 123.
230 Ibid., p 123.
231 Op. cit. footnote no 3.
232 Jamaica Producers Group Ltd. website, available from: http://www.ipiamaica.com/ (Accessed 20/11/2011).
233 Jamaica Producers group Limited, Annual Report 2008. Available from: 
http://www.ipiamaica.com/ (Accessed 20/11/2011).
234 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Jamaica,” Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/139, 11 October 
2004, p 91.
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In 2004, export per volume was estimated at 27,657 tonnes and fell to 11,560 
tonnes in 2005. After a sharp rise in 2006, the production then decreased again to 
17,391 tonnes in 2007. According to the Jamaican authorities, such a decrease 
was due to the “inability of some farmers” to comply with stricter standards 
imposed “by export markets as well as increased domestic demand.”235 36 Between 
15 and 20 percent of banana produced are sold on the domestic market.237 2389This is 
equivalent to 100, 000 tonnes of bananas which are locally consumed yearly as 
“green fruit, ripe fruit, and [...] chips.” Given those numbers, the Jamaican 
Minister of Agriculture is of the view that the domestic market is the “major 
market for banana production” on the island. Nevertheless, the banana industry 
continued to provide employment opportunities in Jamaica. Banana production 
employed around 6,000 people.240 Consequently, it was considered to be a source 
of between 5 and 10 percent of total employment in the island 241
However, in August 2008, Jamaica was severely hit by a tropical storm, Gustav, 
for the fourth time since the 2004 Hurricane Ivan. The Jamaican Ministry of 
Agriculture reported losses in the local agricultural sector amounting to 1.6 billion 
Jamaican dollars (JMD).242 In the banana sector, the passage of the storm has 
destroyed 79 percent of Jamaica’s banana industry. Bananas crops at the Eastern
235 Agriculture Task Force, (2009) “Vision 2030 Jamaica- National Development Plan: Final Draft 
Agricultural Sector Plan,” p 8 available from:
http://www.vision2030.gov.im/MTF/tabid/74/Default.aspx (Accessed 23/11/2011).
236 Op. cit. footnote no 234, p 32, para 12.
237 “Statement to the house of representatives by Dr the honourable Christopher Tufton, Minister of 
Agriculture on the post Tropical Storm Gustav Banana Industry situation,” 23 September 2008 
[Online] Available from: http://www.moa.gov.im/ (Accessed 20/11/2011).
238 Op. cit. footnote no 223, p 92, footnote 4.
239 Op. cit. footnote no 237.
240 Op. cit. footnote no 223, p 93, para. 15.
241 Op. cit. footnote no 3.
242 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Jamaica, “Post-Gustav damage to the Agricultural 
sector stands at $1.3 billion”, 9 September 2008 [Online] Available from: 
www.moa.gov.im/news/data/post%20gustav%20damage.pdf (Accessed 20/11/2011).
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Banana Estates in St Thomas and at the St Mary Banana Estates were destroyed by 
95 percent and 60 percent, respectively.243 Such damage amounted to a total loss of 
JMD 505.5 million and led to high restructuring costs.244 This loss is a clear 
increase of the JMD 479.1 million loss incurred the previous year, following the 
damage caused by Hurricane Dean.245 Consequently, the Jamaica Producers Group 
did not export bananas. In addition to this, the company pointed out that the 
competitiveness of their banana exports have been affected by the reduction of 
preferential treatment in the UK market. Accordingly, the company concluded that 
the restructuring charges could not be justified in that context. In the face of these 
challenges, the company believed that growing bananas as an export crop was 
“simply uneconomic.” As a consequence, it made the “painful” decision in 2008 to 
stop exports to the EU and to close the Eastern Banana Estates.246 247This decision 
has resulted in the loss of 460 jobs. The Jamaican Group has retained St Mary 
Banana Estates for a diversification towards banana chips and other tropical snacks 
originating from root crops 248 However, the lands in St Thomas are now being 
used for sugar production.
6.1.2 Guyana’s Banana Industry
As was discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis, sugar is a crucial commodity sector 
for the economy of Guyana, and one of its most dynamic exports. In contrast, 
bananas are considered “locally-grown non-traditional crops” in Guyana, and the
243 Op. cit. footnote no 237.
244 Op. cit. footnote no 242.
245 Jamaica Producers group Limited, Annual Report 2007, p 4 [Online] Available from: 
http://www.ipiamaica.com/ (Accessed 20/11/2011).
246 Op. cit. footnote no 233.
247 Op. cit. footnote no 237.
248 Jamaica Producers Group Limited, Annual Report 2010, p. 4 Available from: 
http://www.ipiamaica.com/ (Accessed 04/07/2012).
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economy of the country does not depend on bananas exports.249 250 Bananas are 
ranked 9th amongst the 20 most important food and agricultural commodities 
produced there, with a total volume of 6,385 tonnes in 2009. A small quantity of 
Guyanese bananas are exported to other countries in the region, such as Barbados, 
and further afield to Canada. In 2002, Canada imported a total of 5 tonnes from 
Guyana.251 25However, Guyana is considered to be “neither a banana republic nor a 
banana island,” in that banana production and the export of bananas to intra- 
regional and extra-regional markets do not play a significant role in the economy 
of Guyana. Consequently, Guyana as a non banana exporting country has 
therefore not benefitted from preferential access to the EU banana market. In 2009, 
the Government of Guyana recalled that their economy continues to depend 
“predominantly” on sugar.253
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6.2 The Implications for Jamaica and Guyana
The export banana industry is important for the economies of many ACP countries. 
This is why ACP representatives argued in 2008 that MFN tariff cuts proposed by 
the EU were “unacceptable.” They recalled that bananas constitute “one of the 
major instruments of development and a powerful factor in the regional integration 
process and in their fight against poverty.” In their view, these tariffs would “deal a 
lethal blow to the ACP banana industry,” and put the ACP banana production in an 
“irreversible jeopardy,” since they would give Latin-American producers “undue
249 Government Information Agency, “Exporting non-traditional produce”, 2003, GINA, p. 2 
[Online] Available from: www.gina.gov.gy/gina pub/nontradcrops.pdf (A ccessed  2 3 /11 /2011).
250 FAOSTAT, 2009.
251 Op. cit. footnote 249, p 2.
252 Hewitt, A. P., “Guyana, Sugar and EBA: Case-study of a country which is not quite Least 
Developed”, paper presented at R egu latory F ram ew ork  o f  G lobalisation , Barcelona, 2001, p 3.
253 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Guyana”, Record of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/218, 6 August 
2009, para 8.
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advantage” on the EU market, at the expense of ACP countries. Consequently, they 
believe that all chances for ACP countries to participate in the multilateral trade 
system would be ruined.254 256Given the discussion in this chapter, and the research 
conducted, it is this author’s view that ACP concerns are well-founded and the 
predicted impact is not exaggerated. Caribbean countries, in particular, are high- 
cost producers. Many of them do not have an infrastructure adapted to be 
competitive on the market level. The post-colonial preferences favoured by the EU, 
which discriminated against lower-cost Latin American producers, were an 
effective protection against this lack of competitiveness. Caribbean countries will 
not be able to compete in the world economy without preferential protection.
Banana exports to the EU have played a major role in the economy of Caribbean 
countries. This is particularly true for Jamaica, which has long benefited from the 
BP, and was considered “a major producer and exporter of bananas.” Jamaican 
bananas were, until 2008, one of the most important crops within its agricultural 
sector. They made a significant contribution to the Jamaican economy, and 
provided “significant employment in rural areas.”257 The Jamaican authorities 
immediately expressed concerns over the resolution of the WTO banana dispute, 
discussed earlier in this chapter. In their view its finding will undermine the ability 
for Jamaica to compete in the EU banana market, thereby reducing the margin of 
preference on Jamaican bananas, when compared with “the more efficient Latin
254 The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states, “ACP opposes new WTO 
proposal on bananas”, Brussels, 17 July 2008, [Online] Available from: 
http://www.acpsec.org/en/press releases/bananas 17-7-08 e.html (Accessed 23/11/2011).
255 McMahon, J.A., ‘“ The longstanding banana saga’ -  towards an acceptable solution: Part 2”, 
In ternational Trade Law  & R egulation, 2006, 12(1), pp. 14-20, p 19.
256 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Impact of changes in the 
European Union import regimes for sugar, banana and rice on selected CARICOM countries,” 
ECLAC, 2008, p 3.
257 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Jamaica,” Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/242, 7 December 
2010, p 61, para. 8.
395
American producers.”258 259601Today, the impact of natural disasters coupled with the 
conditions for accessing the EU banana market, mean that Jamaican bananas are no 
longer an important export crop. In contrast, Guyana does not export bananas to 
the EU.
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Since the disagreement over the MFN banana tariffs has only been resolved 
recently, it is difficult to fully evaluate the real consequences, going forward, for 
Caribbean countries. What is certain is that, for the reasons previously explained, 
Guyana and Jamaica will not be affected by the future banana market conditions. 
However, the situation will be different for other banana-producing Caribbean 
countries, and particularly for the most vulnerable producers in the Windwards 
Islands. This group comprises the four independent islands of Dominica, Grenada, 
St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Windwards Islands are 
generally considered to be “inefficient” banana producers. This is because they 
have higher production costs than others due to their climate, a limited area of 
agricultural land on which to grow the bananas and a labour market which 
demands better working conditions, such as high wages. The 2006 tariff-only 
regime, which sets an MFN tariff of EUR 176 per tonne of bananas, has enabled 
Latin American countries to increase their exports by about 11 percent. Given 
that the EU already imports more from Latin America countries than from the 
Caribbean, there is no doubt that further reductions in MFN tariffs will allow Latin
9^ 9America to further increase their share of banana exports to the EU market.
258 Ibid., p 18, para 31.
259 Mlachila, M, Cashin, P. and Haines, C., “Caribbean Bananas: The Macroeconomic Impact of 
trade preference Erosion,” IMF Working Paper, WP/10/59,2010, p 9.
260 Ibid., p 9.
261 Op. cit. footnote no 256.
262 Op. cit. footnote no 24, p 8.
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Consequently, such a competition with cheaper dollar bananas could either 
displace the exports of most Caribbean countries, or lead to further closure of 
Caribbean banana factories.
Bananas remain one of the main crops produced by the Jamaican agricultural 
sector. In 2009 bananas were ranked 7th among the 20 most important food and 
agricultural commodities produced in Jamaica, with a quantity level estimated at 
89, 312 tonnes.263 However, since 2008, the Jamaican government policy has been 
focused on developing a strategy for Jamaica’s banana industry and “to chart a 
sustainable future based on the domestic market and targeted export markets.”264 
Accordingly, banana production now supplies the local market for direct 
consumption, and the regional snack operations for processing higher value banana 
products in banana chips and other snacks under the “St. Mary’s” brand.265 In light 
of the current EU market access conditions for fresh bananas, there is no doubt that 
Jamaica has had to explore other export opportunities. Diversifying towards 
processed food products will help Jamaica to continue its banana production and to 
provide jobs. This will also promote economic growth and enhance the 
competitiveness of the Jamaican banana industry.
The Jamaican Producer Group company believes that since natural snack products 
have “mass market appeal,” they will be able to offer very competitive pricing for 
these products, and intend to use “Caribbean based tropical snack business” as an 
important platform for growth.266 This will however require appropriate financial
263 Op. cit. footnote no 250.
264 Op. cit. footnote no 235, p 8.
265 Ibid., p 8.
266 Op. cit. footnote no 233.
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support to assist the banana factories to improve their current food processing 
technology. This will be particularly crucial for Jamaica if it seeks to promote 
exports of its processed products to the EU market and world wide. Therefore, the 
EU support which is to be given to Jamaica will be essential. It must be noted that 
although Jamaica is no longer an export-oriented banana producer, it will still 
benefit from support under the BAM programme to help its strategic plans for 
Jamaica’s banana sector. The island is expected to receive USD 51.94 million in 
grants for support from the EU.
7. Conclusion
The EU post-colonial histories have influenced the rules operated by the EU for the 
import of bananas, the rules themselves being selective and discriminatory among 
DCs. However these rules as well as the operation of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) have also in turn been affected by the legal trade rules 
established by the WTO. Since 1993, the EU’s banana import regime has been 
challenged several times under the WTO international trading rules. This has led to 
a long running dispute between the two sides of the Atlantic over the banana trade, 
thereby showing that the world banana market is highly distorted, and leaving DCs 
in a weak position. In order to comply with the WTO trade rules, the EU ended its 
complex combination of quotas and tariffs for banana imports. In its place since 
2006, a tariff-only banana import regime has been implemented, forcing all banana 
suppliers, protected and non-protected, to compete “solely on the basis of tariff 
differences.”267 68
267 Op. cit. footnote no 257, p 102.
268 Op. cit. footnote no 38, p 125.
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The EU banana import regime, as it stands today, is consistent with the EU’s 
GATT 1994 and WTO obligations. This is further confirmed by the Geneva 
Agreement on Trade in Bananas, between the EU and the Latin America banana 
suppliers, and the Agreement signed between the EU and the US, which ended the 
long-standing conflict over bananas. These agreements now meet the claims of the 
Latin America countries and the US regarding the level of MFN banana tariffs, and 
both parties have agreed to end the dispute. In addition to this, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, since 1 January 2007 EU banana producers have received direct 
decoupled payments under the SPtS, thereby shifting support payments under the 
CAP, from the product to the producer. In light of these elements, and given that 
the EU continues to comply with its commitments, the EU banana import regime 
should now be free from future challenges.
There is no doubt that the EU has maintained market access for ACP Caribbean 
bananas under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which was concluded 
in 2008 between the EU and the CARIFORUM. As was discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis, Caribbean countries are given duty and quota free access 
to the EU banana market under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. However, the new 
banana import regime has also altered market access conditions for Caribbean 
bananas, and marginalised the position of traditional Caribbean banana suppliers 
on the EU banana market because they must now compete with both ACP and non- 
ACP banana suppliers. In the case of ACP countries, the duty and quota free status 
offered to bananas under EPAs since 2008 will particularly benefit African banana 
suppliers. This is largely because these have had, and continue to have, a high 269
269 Op. cit. footnote no 202 at Article 2.
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share in the EU market.270 In 2009 Cameroon and the Ivory Coast ranked 13th and 
12th respectively, among the top 20 banana exporting countries in the world, 
whereas the Dominican Republic was the only CARIFORUM country ranked in 
that scale, holding 14th place.271 It is also important to note that the EU also 
extended duty and quota free bananas access to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
under the “Everything But Arms” arrangement, which was discussed in Chapter 5 
of this thesis.272 2734From January 2006, as a result, all LDCs banana suppliers, 
irrespective of origin, entered the EU banana market duty and quota free. There is 
no doubt that current and future reductions in MFN tariffs will allow Latin 
American countries, which are the most efficient banana exporters in the world 
market, to increase their banana exports to the EU market. It should perhaps be 
noted at this point that in 2010, the EU finalised the negotiations for an EU-Central 
America Association Agreement, which includes dollar banana suppliers. At the 
time of writing, the agreement needs to be signed by the Council and ratified by 
the European Parliament in order to come into force. Also at the time of writing, 
the EU is still negotiating for an EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, which 
includes large agricultural countries in Latin America.275 Consequently, it is to be 
assumed that the end of the banana dispute will increase further competition in the 
EU banana market and thereby undermine the value of the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA. This may place the banana industry in the Caribbean under threat. Given the 
dependence of some Caribbean countries on the banana sector, this will lead to
270 See Op. cit. footnote no 1 at Graphs 1 and 2.
271 Op. cit. footnote no 250.
272 Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2820/98 applying a multiannual scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 
July 1999 to 31 December 2001 so as to extend duty-free access without any quantitative 
restrictions to products originating in the least developed countries, OJ L 60/43, 1.3.2001.
273 Op. cit. footnote no 223, p 13.
274 The countries of the Central American region are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
275 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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serious social and economic dislocation, as is currently experienced by Jamaica. 
Accordingly, it is clear that the EU-CARIFORUM EPA has failed to secure, or 
improve, market access conditions for Caribbean bananas, and hence it has failed 
to protect the CARIFORUM position in the banana sector.276 278 Traditional 
Caribbean banana exporters could use funding under the BAM program for export 
diversification, or for the export of more high-value products derived from 
bananas. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there will be less bananas coming 
onto the international market from the Caribbean countries.
Against this background, the treatment of bananas in the WTO Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) negotiations will be significant. In the context of the ongoing 
negotiations at the WTO, and in parallel with the Geneva Agreement on Trade in 
Bananas, the EU, the ACP countries and the Latin American countries agreed on 
DDA treatment for Tropical Products and for Preference Erosion. They 
proposed to include within the text of the Doha Round agriculture modalities 
several changes. With regard to tropical products, they proposed deep tariff cuts. 
Tariffs will be reduced to zero for tariff lines with an ad valorem or ad valorem 
equivalent less than or equal to 20 percent. With regard to tariff lines with an ad 
valorem or ad valorem equivalent higher than 20 percent, they proposed to reduce 
duties by 80 percent.279 Tariffs for “preference erosion” products will be slowly 
reduced because of their significance for ACP countries. The EU and ACP
276 These aims were provided in the preamble, Article 42 and the joint declaration on bananas of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L  289, 30.10.2008.
277 These are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru
278 Letter, from the European Union, the ACP countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru conveying the text of a proposed DDA modality for the 
treatment of Tropical Products and for Preference Erosion, 15 December 2009.
279 Ibid, at Annex I (b) of “Tropical Product Modality” proposal for new paragraphs 147 and 148 of 
TN/AG/W /4/Rev.4.
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countries still need to present the tariff cuts plan to the WTO. Nevertheless, no 
reductions will be made following the first two years of the conclusion of the Doha 
Round. The proposals on tariff cuts will also need to take into account products 
designated as “sensitive,” but the Doha round of negotiations is still ongoing. 
The issue of the future of the EU and the WTO agricultural regime, of relevance to 
the Caribbean -  EU trade in bananas, will be analysed further in the final chapter 
to this thesis.
280 Ibid, at Annex II of “Preference Erosion Modality” proposal for a new paragraph 149 of 
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
1. Introduction
This thesis has analysed the legal framework for trade in sugar and bananas from 
the Caribbean region of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States 
to the European Union (EU), a subject area which had not been studied previously 
and therefore the work completed herein makes an original contribution to 
knowledge. While the EU has long been criticised for being a “fortress” in the area 
of agriculture, it has offered better market access to developing countries (DCs) 
through preferential trade arrangements. Such discrimination is in line with the so- 
called “special and differential treatment” provisions (SDT) developed by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and further expanded by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), to account for the difficulties DCs’ face when 
attempting to participate in international trade. Consequently, EU agricultural 
protectionism does not have the same effect on every developing country.
During the course of this research it became apparent that the European post­
colonial ties have been an important factor in the choice to discriminate between 
DCs. These ties have particularly been a decisive element in the trade relationship 
between the EU and the Caribbean region. All countries in the Caribbean region of 
the ACP Group have experienced colonial rule by a European country. Former 
colonisers include France, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). 
Flowever, as stated at the outset, this thesis does not take an anti-colonial approach. 
Therefore the position of the EU in Caribbean countries and the extent to which 
these countries have experienced or continue to experience EU political and
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economic, as well as social and cultural, oppression have not been addressed in this 
thesis. The term “post-colonial” has been used in this thesis as an indicator in the 
chronology of the process of decolonisation.
Caribbean countries do not have an infrastructure which permits them to be 
competitive at a market level but, because of these post-colonial ties, they have 
been favoured over other DCs which are low cost producers. In this thesis, the 
comparative analysis of the three main EU preferential trade arrangements with 
DCs, namely, the Generalised System of Preferences scheme (GSP), which is the 
most important non-reciprocal preference arrangement, the Cotonou Agreement 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has demonstrated the way in which 
the EU has developed its relationship with DCs. The terms of these preferential 
schemes set them apart from each other specifically in relation to product 
coverage, their aim and the depth of tariff cuts they offer. The EU has secured its 
trade relationship with ACP countries through the Cotonou Agreement which is 
more favourable than the EU GSP scheme and the EMP.
The thesis has focused on the international dimension of the legal framework of the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the past the CAP, which was directed 
at supporting production, has created conflict with other exporting countries. It has 
also created unfair competition for some DCs in several ways. While most tropical 
agricultural products produced in DCs are not “threatened by competition” from 
developed countries “nor do they face trade barriers in those countries,”1 sugar and
1 Mohan, S., “Reforming agricultural trade among developing countries”, W orld T rade R ev iew , 
2007, 6(3), pp 397-41 l,p  397.
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bananas have been considered as “important exceptions.”2 These products have 
faced high trade barriers from the EU and thus merited particular attention. 
Caribbean countries have received special privileges for sugar and banana exports, 
and obtained refuge in the fortress EU agricultural market.
It was highlighted in this thesis that bananas, a simple tropical fruit, have become a 
global issue and a source of dispute in international trade. The 1993 EU banana 
regime introduced a system of quotas and high tariffs in order to restrict market 
access for all non ACP bananas. The history of the banana dispute has been 
particularly long and complex. In light of the length of the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body reports examined in Chapter 9 of this thesis, the number of 
participants and the length of the procedure, it can be assumed that the banana 
dispute has been an important issue at the GATT/WTO. The high profile dispute 
concerning aspects of the EU sugar regime challenged by Brazil, Australia and 
Thailand has also been examined in this thesis.
The EU sugar and banana policies were developed in light of the EU Lome 
commitments together with the agricultural commodity protocols attached to it. 
The EU sugar and banana market were highly protected by import restrictions, 
quotas and tariffs, except for countries importing under preferential trade 
arrangements. Therefore countries not benefitting from preferential tariff access 
have faced important difficulties in exporting these products to the EU. However, 
the future of EU preferential treatment given to Caribbean countries, in particular 
the Sugar Protocol (SP) and Banana Protocol (BP), have been determined by
2 Ibid., p 397.
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demands of the WTO, of which the EU is now a member. Consequently, the 
operation of the EU’s CAP has had to be restructured to meet the requirements of 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Equally the rules of the WTO AoA, 
together with its interaction with its associated agreements, have affected and 
continue to affect the EU’s rules for importing and exporting agricultural food 
products. The EU had reformed its sugar and bananas policies and thereby 
increased the level of access to its market for such products. The CAP is now a 
more market-oriented policy. However, the WTO rules have undermined the 
position of Caribbean countries within the EU agricultural market, particularly for 
sugar and bananas. The WTO has thus jeopardised the EU-Caribbean trade 
relationship, a relationship which is now derelict, and the EU has been unable to 
protect Caribbean countries from the erosion of their preferences.
Caribbean countries are small economies and they have been affected by the EU 
trade liberalisation in sugar and bananas. This has been demonstrated specifically 
by analysing the experience of two important traditional exporters to the EU, 
Guyana and Jamaica. They will experience a significant degree of export 
competition. This thesis has focused on the Caribbean region of the ACP Group 
and the findings may not be transferable to other ACP regions. Therefore further 
research ought to be undertaken in respect of the EU trade relationship with the 
African and Pacific regions of the ACP Group.
Due to constraints of time and space, this thesis has focused on select issues and 
some pertinent, yet peripheral, issues have been excluded. Further issues such as 
environmental law and intellectual property law both have a role to play in
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completing the picture of the legal complexity of access to the EU market for 
agricultural food products. The subject of EU market access conditions is a 
complicated issue, but in order to view the full picture the possible legal challenges 
for DCs’ exports of agricultural food products to the United States (US) should 
also be analysed in the same context. Further to this, the issues of climate change 
and food availability are also adding to the anxiety of DCs and therefore represent 
part of the bigger picture. These issues should be analysed by environmental 
experts rather than from the perspective of trade.
2. Recommendations
As outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, this research has examined the relevant 
rules of both the EU legal order and those of the WTO relevant to trade in 
agricultural products with a particular focus on the situation of developing 
countries. Hence, in light of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 of this thesis 
and which have been investigated in this thesis, the author makes the following 
proposals with regard to the law and policy relating to international trade in 
agricultural products.
•  The EU’s legal obligations under the WTO have had a clear impact on the 
EU’s trade relationship with the Caribbean region of the ACP Group. 
Agricultural trade relations between the EU and Caribbean countries were 
originally formalised in a series of conventions and agreements beginning 
with the first Lome Convention in 1975. The Sugar and Banana Protocols 
have been of particular importance for Caribbean countries. They have 
allowed the UK to continue its colonial and post-colonial trading
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relationships with these countries after its accession to the EU. These 
commodity protocols both provided for legally binding commitments on 
the part of the EU which have been integrated into EU common banana and 
sugar policies. Beneficiary countries were given duty-free access for 
specific quantities of sugar and bananas.
•  The arrangements of the Lome Conventions have led to criticism from 
other non-ACP DCs left outside the scheme. The “Banana dispute” at the 
WTO, which has been examined in detail in Chapter 9 of this thesis, has 
confirmed that these non-reciprocal trade preferences could not be justified 
under GATT Article XXIV, which governs free trade areas and customs 
unions. The EU trade preferences were thus incompatible with the WTO 
rules. As a result, the EU was left with no other choice but to change its 
preferential access agreements with its former Caribbean colonies, in order 
to meet its legal obligations under the WTO. As examined in this thesis, the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are now key elements of the 
Cotonou Agreement. They have been designed as free trade agreements and 
thus provide for the first time for reciprocal duty and quota free access 
between the EU and ACP countries.
•  It must be noted that reciprocity, as a core element of the EPA, is however 
an important issue for Caribbean countries. They will experience loss of 
fiscal revenues resulting from the elimination of tariffs on EU imports, 
which has the potential to significantly affect their economy. Nevertheless, 
as highlighted in this thesis, agriculture has once again been treated as an
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exception. Under the EPA signed between the EU and the Caribbean 
Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM), the most vital agricultural products 
for Caribbean countries, including sugar and bananas, continue to receive 
non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market. As examined in this 
thesis, this exception is in line with GATT Article XXIV. Caribbean 
countries exporting bananas and sugar receive duty and quota free access to 
the EU market, albeit the EPA does not offer any treatment equivalent to 
that afforded under the sugar and banana protocols, as highlighted in this 
thesis.
•  In light of the new EU-CARIFORUM EPA arrangements, it is clear that 
the EU and the Caribbean countries have managed to legally protect the 
duty-free preferences for agricultural commodities under GATT Article 
XXIV. So there is no doubt that the EU EPAs have to some extent 
maintained benefits equivalent to those granted under the previous Lome 
Conventions, thereby continuing to discriminate legally against other DCs 
outside these arrangements such as Latin American countries.
•  As examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA goes 
beyond conventional free-trade agreements. It focuses on Caribbean 
countries’ development, takes into account their socio-economic 
circumstances, and includes co-operation and assistance to help countries 
implement the Agreement. In light of this and the aforementioned elements, 
it can be said that EU-CARIFORUM EPA has been an overall success in
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maintaining preferential access for Caribbean countries to the EU 
agricultural market.
•  The EU had to regulate the banana and sugar trade in a way which was 
consistent with its obligations under GATT and WTO rules. The most 
significant change to the 1993 Common Market Organisation for Bananas 
(CMOB) was made in 2001 with the introduction of a transitional tariff- 
only regime, which came into full effect from 2006. In parallel, the EU 
committed to reduce the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs as a result of 
the Agreements signed between the EU and the US on one side, and 
between the EU and Latin American countries on the other. These 
agreements have resolved the banana dispute as they now meet the claims 
of the Latin American countries and the US regarding the level of MFN 
banana tariffs. Both Latin American countries and the US have agreed to 
end the dispute. On the other hand, the BP of the four Lome Conventions 
has been replaced by a second protocol attached to the Cotonou Agreement. 
As highlighted in Chapter 9 of this thesis, the Cotonou Agreement has 
clearly weakened the wordings of the second BP when compared to the 
Lome Conventions. There are now no provisions dealing with market 
access to the EU. Accordingly the EU is not legally committed to continue 
to provide preferential market access to ACP countries. In light of these 
developments no further changes to the EU and WTO legal order for trade 
in bananas are required.
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•  The EU sugar sector which has been excluded in the past from the CAP 
reforms has affected the development of the less-competitive exporting 
countries. The radical EU sugar reforms of 2006 have, in particular, 
addressed the internal protective measures. The EU common organisation 
of the market (CMO) in sugar provides now for simple quota arrangements 
for EU producers and support prices were reduced within the EU market. 
EU sugar producers, as well as bananas producers, receive an income 
support under the Single Payment Scheme (SPtS), which is decoupled from 
production. There is no doubt that the EU sugar reform will prevent the 
dumping of sugar, thereby giving more trade opportunities for DCs 
exporting cane sugar. However, these internal reforms remain incomplete, 
and the EU still needs to address the high import tariffs for countries 
exporting sugar outside preferential trade agreements.3 Thus, lowering the 
EU import prices for sugar should thus be made in order to accelerate trade 
in this product.
•  Moreover, in order to be in line with the reformed EU sugar market, the EU 
invoked its right under the Cotonou Agreement to denounce the SP, which 
ceased to apply with effect from 1st October 2009, thereby extending duty­
free access to non-Protocol countries. All ACP sugar exporting countries 
are granted duty and quota free access to the EU market, subject to a 
transitional volume-safeguard mechanism. The EU has also decided to 
increase imports from non SP and BP countries. It has extended duty and
3 The EU’s import duties are maintained at EUR 419 per tonne for white sugar and EUR 339 per 
tonne for raw beet and cane sugar. See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1006/2011 of 27 
September 2011 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and 
statistical and nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, OJ L  282, 28.10.11, p 141.
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quota free access to all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as recognised 
by the United Nations, for bananas from 1st January 2006 and for sugar 
from 1st October 2009 under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) 
arrangement of the GSP scheme.4 Under the EBA, LDCs export products 
duty and quota free except for arms and armaments.5 As already mentioned 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis, LDCs are outwith the scope of this thesis. 
However it would be interesting for future research to examine the extent to 
which Caribbean countries will be affected by competition from LDCs.
•  As stated at the outset, this thesis has adopted a doctrinal legal approach. 
However, there is also a clear way for an interdisciplinary approach to 
similar research. Hence, it would be interesting to conduct comparable 
research that would combine different disciplines and involve 
considerations across international relations, politics and economics 
studies. Political aspects of international trade which influence the work of 
the states and international actors, for instance, are necessarily central to the 
study of decision-making processes. Consequently, combining law and 
politics would allow the gaining of deeper insights into the issues being 
investigated.
3. Consequences for Caribbean countries and future research
There is no doubt that the preferential access to the EU under EPAs is less 
restrictive than under Lome Conventions given that now all ACP countries have
4 See Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of 
generalized system of preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and 
amending Regulations (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 110/2006 and 
(EC) No 964/2007, OJ L  211.
5 Ibid., at Article 11(1).
412
Chapter 10 -  Conclusion
tariff and quota free access to the EU for almost all products. EU trade 
liberalisation in sugar and bananas has created and will create very interesting 
dynamics. Competition between Caribbean countries and other African and Pacific 
regions of the ACP Group will increase, and this will require further examination. 
Competition with African countries, particularly Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, 
which are important banana producers, may be fierce given that their production 
costs are low in comparison to those of Caribbean countries.6
ACP countries that exported under the SP and the BP in the past are expected to be 
the countries which will experience the most significant effects as a result of the 
new EU market access conditions. Competition will also increase between 
Caribbean countries which benefited from the commodity protocols and non­
commodity protocol countries. This research has demonstrated that the EU sugar 
reforms and the end of the SP will affect sugar revenues of Caribbean countries 
which benefited from the SP. However, the consequences will differ from one 
country to another. Guyana and Jamaica, the countries examined in this thesis, will 
face the highest revenue losses as they held the highest quotas previously. Both 
Jamaica and Guyana’s economies and societies will be affected.
As a result of the latest sugar reforms, EU sugar production has reduced and the 
world market price might increase. The EU will probably shift from being a net 
exporter to a net importer of sugar. This situation will, without any doubt, provide 
new opportunities for efficient producers, such as Brazil, India and Thailand. 
Among DCs, Brazil is a key player in global sugar markets and the greatest
6 McMahon, J.A., ‘“The longstanding banana saga’ -  towards an acceptable solution: Part 2,” 
International Trade Law  & R egulation, 2006, 12(1), pp 14-20, p 16.
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exporter of low-cost sugar. Accordingly, its sugar policy could have a major 
impact on world markets in the future. Brazil is also the world’s largest producer of 
ethanol produced from sugarcane. It is clear that its sugar and ethanol production 
will have an impact on world prices. Indeed, if Brazil’s production focuses on 
ethanol then the price of sugar will increase worldwide. If however it focuses on 
sugar production, prices will fall. Further research ought to be undertaken in this 
area.
In addition, the tariff-only import regime for bananas, applicable since 2006, as 
well as the conclusion in 2009 of the Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, 
between the EU and the Latin America banana suppliers, and the Agreement 
between the US and the EU on the future EU trading regime for bananas, will 
result in an erosion of the level of Caribbean trade preferences. The reduced MFN
n
tariffs for banana imports will allow low-cost Latin American producers, such as 
Colombia and Guatemala, to capture a larger share of the world market. In line 
with this, the recently concluded (and future) Association Agreements with free 
trade area components, as well as Free Trade Agreements between the EU and the 
Latin American region, which include dollar-bananas suppliers, will need to be 
examined. The collective effect of these agreements will probably lead to an 
increase of agricultural commodities being imported into the EU market. The EU- 
Latin American countries agricultural trade relationship and their possible impact 
on global trade will need to be examined. In light of Caribbean countries’ 
dependence on banana exports, there is no doubt that the openness of the EU
7 Ibid., p 16.
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banana market will increase competition from Latin America, with Caribbean 
countries therefore losing their market position.
Caribbean countries which are high-cost producers and do not have an 
infrastructure adapted to be competitive on the market level will not be able to 
survive in these competitive world market conditions without preferential 
protection. They would have to compete with other countries, and most 
importantly with the most efficient producers of sugar and bananas. Consequently, 
inefficient banana and sugar producers in the Caribbean may be forced out of 
business. Countries will probably cease sugar and banana production and stop 
exporting to the EU.
In light of all the aforementioned issues, it is clear that while the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA has maintained trade preferences for Caribbean countries, it 
does not create additional market access for agricultural food commodities from 
Caribbean countries. Traditional suppliers of sugar and bananas are now more 
exposed to market forces. Consequently, the EU through the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA has failed to secure market access for Caribbean bananas and sugar. An in- 
depth analysis of the EU-CARIFORUM negotiations, and of the views of 
Caribbean countries on the conclusion of the EPA, is outwith the scope of this 
thesis as this is a political issue. However, there is no doubt that these issues need 
to be analysed further as they could provide important indications for the future of 
Caribbean trade.
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4. Solutions and future research
With the alteration of certain trade preferences, Caribbean countries of the ACP 
Group will face significant disruptions to their economy, challenges in adjusting to 
the new situation, but also key opportunities to make their economies more 
dynamic. Caribbean countries could, for instance, diversify out of traditional sugar 
and bananas industries and focus on non-traditional products suited to their climate 
such as tropical fruits. However, as highlighted in this thesis, such an option would 
need to take into consideration food safety standards and other Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) standards imposed by EU legislation and the private sector. 
This is particularly important with regard to strict pesticides residues level, which 
is becoming an increasingly significant issue for DCs exporting fruit and 
vegetables.8 Caribbean countries would need both institutional and technical 
support from their governments, and from the EU, to meet EU SPS standards.
Another possible development for Caribbean countries would be the re-orientation 
towards high-value added banana and sugar products, thereby creating jobs, 
including high skilled jobs and providing economic opportunities for rural areas. 
With regard to bananas, the Caribbean could, for instance, diversify into exporting 
processed food products made from bananas, such as chips. Jamaica has recently 
opted for this course of action, producing chips for export to other Caribbean 
countries, and the EU market. In light of this, issues with regard to exporting 
processed food to the EU market, which were outwith the scope of this thesis, will 
need to be examined. For example, there are issues surrounding labelling, 
ingredients and packaging, as well as the rules of origin.
8 Roberts, D. and Unnevehr, L., “Resolving trade disputes arising from trends in food safety 
regulation: the role of the multilateral governance framework,” W orld  T.R., 2 0 05 , 4(3), 469-497, p 
470.
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On the other hand, Caribbean countries can engage in trade in more highly 
processed products. They could continue growing sugar and bananas in order to 
produce and export ethanol,9 which is currently subject to high demand. An in- 
depth examination of this issue was outwith the scope of this thesis. Therefore, 
legal rules with regard to exporting ethanol to the EU would have to be examined. 
The industries of the Caribbean countries will need support from their government 
to deal with production costs. The necessary investment would have to be made in 
a timely way in order to ease the transition from the SP trading regime to the 
proposed bio-fuel focused economies. There is no doubt that such an option will 
help address climate change and energy problems. However despite having 
positive aspects, a shift to biofuels should also take into consideration current 
concerns raised about the socio-economic and environmental impacts of its 
production. These issues will prove problematic in the future and ought to be 
examined further, particularly from an environmental viewpoint. What is beyond 
doubt is that whichever option Caribbean countries choose, there will either be less 
raw sugar and bananas coming onto the global market from the Caribbean 
countries, or the Caribbean countries will still produce these products, gaining less 
foreign exchange earnings, and suffering severe economic and social shocks, 
which will have consequences for neighbouring countries.
In light of changing market access conditions, the importance of EU development
support provisions, which assist Caribbean countries to diversify and/or reorient
their exports as well as helping them implementing the EPA, will increase. As
highlighted in this thesis, the EU continues to assist Caribbean countries through a
9 Both bananas and sugar can be used for ethanol production. For further discussion see for 
instance: Dhabekar, A. and Chandak, A., “Utilization of banana peels and beet waste for alcohol 
production,” A sia tic  Journal o f  B iotechnology R esou rces, 2010, 01(1), pp. 8-13.
417
Chapter 10 -  Conclusion
range of financial measures. These include inter alia the European Development 
Fund, which is to be included within the EU budget from 2020,10 and the MS 
contributions to the EU Aid for Trade Strategy program. Further research on the 
EU financial assistance and aid support to Caribbean countries will need to be 
undertaken.
This thesis has shown that the EU agricultural market has clearly moved from a 
post-colonial to a globalised approach. In accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) post-Lisbon, the EU seeks to develop international 
trade relations and build trade partnerships with third countries.11 12While doing so, 
the EU promises to “encourage the integration of all countries into the world 
economy, and to improve their market access to the EU, through the progressive 
abolition of trade restrictions.” It can therefore be expected that the EU will be 
concluding more preferential trade agreements with DCs. As a result of the EPAs, 
the ACP Group of States has been divided into different regions. The EU-ACP 
relationship has been changed over time, and the ACP Group is no longer the main 
development partner of the EU. This is confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty which no 
longer makes reference to the EU’s special trade relationship with ACP 
countries.13
In light of this, it is perhaps a missed opportunity for Caribbean countries to ‘cut’ 
this post-colonial link with the EU and to start exploring new opportunities in other
10 European Commission, “Preparation of the multiannual financial framework regarding the 
financing of EU cooperation for African, Caribbean and Pacific States and Overseas Countries and 
Territories for the 2014-2020 period (11th European Development Fund)”, Brussels, 7.12.2011 
COM (2011)837 final.
11 Article 21 TEU, consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 83, 30.3.2010.
12 Ibid, at Article 21(2)(e).
13 This was referred in Article 179(3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ C 
321E, 29.12.2006.
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markets. They could develop their import/export activities within the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), which has evolved, since 2006, into a customs union 
similar to the EU. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) currently 
provides for the free movement of goods, services and persons. Now it comprises 
thirteen participating members of CARICOM.14 This process remains incomplete 
and requires the implementation of a Single Economy. In light of this, it will be 
important for future research to examine the ongoing implementation of the CSME 
and the opportunities of further economic integration within the Caribbean region.
Moreover, there is no doubt that given the presence of the EU within the Caribbean 
region through the French Departements d ’Outre Mer (DOMs), Caribbean countries 
could develop agricultural trade relationship with these French Caribbean regions. 
While being part of the EU, the French DOMs share the same culture and colonial 
experience as independent Caribbean countries. Moreover, Caribbean countries 
could also build/or reinforce trade paths with countries outside the Caribbean 
region and develop trade with Latin and Central American countries, including 
Brazil. It would be interesting to gain an in-depth analysis of such an intra- 
Caribbean trade and Caribbean-Latin American countries trade relationship, and 
further research should be undertaken in this area.
EU regulations on agriculture have had a clear impact on what Caribbean countries 
produce. However in order to promote economic growth, Caribbean countries 
could diversify out of the traditional industries and focus exclusively on exporting
14 The Bahamas and Haiti are currently remaining outside the CSME process. See 
http://vvwvv.csmeonline.org/ (20/7/2011).
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services, currently the main source of income in the Caribbean region.15 As 
highlighted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, Caribbean countries have a comparative 
advantage in the service sector, particularly in tourism. The EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA provides for trade liberalisation in goods as well as services, thereby giving 
Caribbean countries privileged access to the EU services market. Therefore it 
would be worthwhile to examine the commitments of Caribbean countries in 
liberalisation of trade in services.
This research is necessarily limited in scope. The Caribbean region of the ACP 
Group, which is the focus of this thesis, is not a homogenous group. In light of the 
difference in levels of economic development within the region further studies will 
need to be done with regard to other Caribbean countries. For instance, the 
Dominican Republic has not in the past benefited from the SP and BP, but is an 
important agri-food exporter within the Caribbean region.
Moreover, the issue of the terminology of DCs was not covered in this thesis but 
can be examined in further studies from a socio-economic perspective. This term 
will also be a problem for lawyers because it is not clear and precise enough. It will 
thus be important for lawyers and legislation to undertake further research on the 
definition of “developing countries.”
15 World Bank, “Accelerating Trade and Integration in the Caribbean: Policy Options for sustained 
growth, Growth, and Poverty Reduction.”, Herndon, VA, USA: World Bank, 2009, p 8.
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5. Issues with the CAP
5.1 The CAP post-Lisbon
In 2008, the Caribbean countries were required to liberalise their tariffs with 
respect to all goods imported from the EU for the first time. As such it was 
important to analyse the changes brought by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) to the 
EU CAP, and the implications of these changes for the EU-Caribbean trade 
relationship. There is no doubt that the LT has given the European Parliament (EP) 
and EU Member States (MS) important room to manoeuvre in respect of EU 
agricultural policy making. However, in light of the provisions of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA, there is little doubt that these internal changes will affect the 
EU’s external trade relations with Caribbean countries in agricultural commodities. 
The EU and the Caribbean region are bound by a partnership agreement providing 
firm commitments on agriculture and trade related areas, which must be honoured 
by each party. The agreement further requires that any policy changes, particularly 
if these are likely to impact on Caribbean countries’ export capacity, must be 
discussed and agreed upon by all partners within the established joint institutions. 
It is therefore important for Caribbean countries to maintain a constant dialogue 
with the EU on important issues, in order to ensure that their interests are properly 
taken into account.
Given that any future legislation in agriculture cannot be adopted without the prior 
consent of the EP, the Caribbean region would have to cooperate closely with the 
EP through the joint EU-CARIFORUM Parliamentary Committee, whose first 
meeting took place on 15-16 June 2011 in Brussels. It would be then for the EP to 
find a balance between EU citizens’ interests and those of Caribbean countries.
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How well this will be achieved remains to be seen. However, there is a risk that 
such an effective discussion could be undermined by the institutional aspect of the 
Caribbean region. Unlike the EU, the Caribbean region does not have a joint 
elected parliament. It was for the parliaments of each of the CARIFORUM states 
to designate one representative to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. This could 
lead to longer discussions in order to take into account the challenges at both 
regional and national level. It would also be necessary, in order to make such 
dialogue effective, for each Caribbean country to provide clear information about 
their economic, development and political situation.
It seems unlikely that the EP would impede the development of the EU post­
colonial ties with the Caribbean region, particularly since it gave its assent to the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA on 25 March 2009. It stressed that the agreement “should 
be used to build a long-term relationship whereby trade supports development.”16 
Caribbean countries, and any countries bound by such a contractual trade 
agreement with the EU, are thus protected from the possible effects of the LT. The 
changes instigated by the LT, associated with the CAP’s promotion of the 
safeguarding of farm incomes, a high level of protection for the environment and 
consumer health, could be detrimental for any DCs left outside such a formal 
agreement. These issues had, and continue to have, considerable implications for 
DCs.
16 EC-Cariforum States Economic Partnership Agreement, European Parliament resolution of 25 
March 2009 on the Economic Partnership Agreement between the Cariforum States, of the one part, 
and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ C 117E, 6.5.2010.
422
Chapter 10 -  Conclusion
5.2 Future CAP reforms
As referred to in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the EU’s commitments made under the 
2003 CAP reforms and the EU agricultural financial perspectives were set to last 
until 2013. In order to meet the Europe 2020 vision strategy,17 and against the 
background of the current Doha Round negotiations, there was a need for the EU 
to further simplify the CAP while maintaining the current CAP instruments. Faced 
with this situation, the EU Commission published its first proposals on the 
orientation of the “CAP towards 2020”18 in November 2010. In its 
Communication, the Commission stressed the importance of agriculture to the 
European economy and to society in general. Agriculture is thus tasked with 
ensuring food supply, contributing to the rural economy with the creation of local 
employment, and providing for environmental benefits.19 The Commission has 
proposed that the three objectives for the future CAP should be viable food 
production (objective 1), sustainable management of natural resources and climate 
action (objective 2) and balanced territorial development (objective 3). As such, 
the Commission does not intend to change the current two complementary pillar 
structure of the CAP. It proposes instead “a greener and more equitably distributed 
first pillar” and a second pillar that contributes to the competitiveness and 
innovation of agriculture, the environment and climate change.20 21The Commission 
proposes to redistribute, redesign and improve the objectives of current support in
91order to “add value and quality in spending.”
17 This strategy provides for three priorities: a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy growth in 
the EU. See European Communication, “Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”, Brussels, COM(2010) 2020 final, 3.3.2010, p 6.
18 European Commission, “The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and 
territorial challenges of the future,” Brussels, 18.11.2010, COM(2010) 672 final.
19 Ibid., p 4.
20 Ibid., p 3.
21 Ibid., p 8.
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However, it must be noted that the future paths proposed by the Commission are 
articulated in very broad terms. The planned changes in the design of direct 
payments and market measures are unclear, and seem to be merely a continuation 
of the previous systems. Since the Commission does not provide any figures, it is 
difficult to have a clear view of the future framework of the post-2013 CAP. On 
12th October 2011, the Commission presented a set of detailed legislative proposals 
on the post-2013 CAP.22 These proposals, and the potential future trajectory of the 
EU CAP, will need to be examined in future research in order to provide 
clarification with regard to the future development of the CAP.
The extent to which the future CAP reforms will further alter market distortions is 
not yet clear but this will be important, particularly in the context of the current 
Doha Round negotiations. Given the reforms made by the CAP “Health Check,” 
and the anticipated CAP reforms post-2013, it is unlikely that the EU could be 
challenged by DCs alone. However it is crucial for the EU to be more specific in
22 - European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO 
Regulation)” Brussels, 19.10.2011, COM(2011) 626 final/2. This document replaces the proposal 
COM(2011) 626 final, 12.10.2011.
- “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards the regime of the single payment scheme and support to 
vine-growers” Brussels, 12.10.2011, COM(2011) 631 final.
- “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 79/2009 as regards the application of direct payments to farmers in respect of 
the year 2013”, Brussels, 12.10.2011, COM(2011) 630 final.
-“Proposal for a Council Regulation determining measures on fixing certain aids and refunds 
related to the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products,” Brussels, 12.10.2011, 
COM(2011) 629 final.
- “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, 
management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy”, Brussels, 19.10.2011, 
COM(2011) 628 final/2, replacing COM (2011) 628 final, 12.10.2011.
- “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD),” Brussels, 
19.10.2011, COM(2011) 627 final/2, replacing COM (2011) 627 final, 12.10.2011.
- “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for 
direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common 
agricultural policy” Brussels, 19.10.2011, COM(2011) 625 final/2, replacing COM (2011) 625 
final, 12.10.2011.
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relation to domestic support in order to increase the chances of concluding the on­
going Doha trade negotiations.
6. The WTO situation
The Doha Round negotiations which started in 2001 under Article 20 of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, have still not been concluded. At the time of writing, 
the future of the Doha Round remains uncertain. The Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee reported that “the most realistic and practical way forward 
was to take small steps, gradually moving forward the parts of the Doha Round 
which were mature, and re-thinking those where greater differences remained.” It 
is currently difficult to assess the future direction of the WTO in the area of 
agriculture. What can be anticipated, however, is the further trade liberalisation in 
respect of tropical products. The EU, the ACP countries and the Latin American 
countries23 4 reached, in 2009, an agreement with regard to the treatment of tropical 
products to be included in the Doha Development Agenda for further 
negotiations.25 Tropical products will be subject to deep tariff cuts although tariffs 
for “preference erosion” products will slowly be reduced because of their 
significance for ACP countries. The tariff cuts plan needs to presented to the WTO 
by the EU and the ACP countries. There is no doubt that this will lead to further 
erosion of preferences, with the extent and impact of these cuts needing to take into 
account products, such as bananas, which represent a sensitive area of trade for 
Caribbean countries.
23 WTO News, General Council, “Lamy: Members continue to explore opportunities for Doha 
progress”, 1-2 May 2012 [Online] Available from:
http://www.wto.ore/english/news e/news!2 e/gc rpt 01mavl2 e.htm (Accessed 1/07/2012).
24 These are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru
25 Letter from the European Union, the ACP countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru conveying the text of a proposed DDA modality for the 
treatment of Tropical Products and for Preference Erosion, 15 December 2009.
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Moreover, trade and development provisions have been core elements in the WTO 
round of trade negotiations. While GATT has failed to address the needs of DCs, 
the WTO rules, particularly those provided under the Agreement on Agriculture, 
have however increased market access for products of interest to DCs. Of 
particular interests, the SDT provisions afford special rights to DCs, and allow 
them to receive favourable treatment from developed countries. When SDT are 
enforced by developed WTO members, they are supposed to help DCs grow and 
become competitive in the agricultural sector. It is therefore clear that the WTO 
has strengthened the multilateral trading system. In line with the mandate of 
paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the WTO members have 
continued to strengthen and make the SDT “more precise, effective and 
operational.”26 However, discussions on the proposals put forward by DCs have 
not yet concluded as WTO members cannot agree on the elements of these 
proposals.
Concluding the Doha Round negotiations is now crucial. In June 2012, the WTO 
Director-General Pascal Lamy raised concerns about the “alarming” rise in trade 
restrictions as a reaction to the global financial crisis in 2008. Indeed, in order to 
combat the global crisis, some G-20 governments, and particularly those facing 
“difficult economic conditions domestically,” have been imposing restrictive 
import measures in order to protect their domestic industries. There are 124 new
26 Paragraph 44 of WTO, “Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001”, Doha, 09-14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
27 WTO News, “Rise in trade restrictions now ‘alarming’, Lamy tells WTO ambassadors”, 7 June 
2012 [Online] Available from: http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sppl e/spp!234 e.htm 
(Accessed 3/07/2012).
28 WTO, “Report on G-20 Trade Measures (Mid-October 2011 to Mid-May 2012” 31 May 2012, p 
1. [Online] Available from:
http://www.wto.org/englisb/news e/newsl 2 e/g20 wto report may 12 e.doc (Accessed 
3/07/2012).
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trade restrictive measures which have been recorded since mid-October 2011. 
These barriers include procedural or administrative actions, such as customs 
controls and import licences, which slow down the clearing of goods at borders, as 
well as tariff increases. The trade coverage of the restrictive measures put in 
place since October 2008, excluding those that were terminated, is estimated to be
i a
almost 3 percent of world merchandise trade, and almost 4 percent of G-20 trade. 
The products of the industrial sector have been the most affected by the G-20 trade 
import restrictive measures. From mid-October 2011 to mid-May 2012, these 
restrictions cover 92.3 percent of the industrial products, and this compares with a 
share of 7.7 percent of agricultural products. Most products affected within the 
agricultural sector are meat products. The share of G-20 restrictive import 
measures in the sugar sector is low, and represents 0.9 percent of the total of 
agricultural products affected. In light of this, the binding dispute settlement 
system of the WTO, which enforces the WTO agreements and commitments made 
by the WTO members, will be of particular importance for countries affected by 
these measures and seeking further access to the G-20 markets. It should be noted 
that the EU has not introduced any restrictive measures during this period. It has, 
instead, implemented measures to facilitate trade, for instance, through the 
reduction of import tariffs albeit on a temporary basis. With regard to sugar, the 
EU has opened a standing invitation to tender for the 2011/2012 marketing year for 
the import of certain quantities of raw sugar at reduced import tariffs in order to 
increase the supply to the internal market. The future with regard to trade in
29 Ibid., p 1-2.
30 Ibid., p 2.
31 Ibid., p 6.
32 Ibid., p 6.
33 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1239/2011 of 30 November 2011 opening a 
standing invitation to tender for the 2011/2012 marketing year for imports of sugar of CN code
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agricultural food products and particularly in sugar and bananas is as yet unclear. 
There are still many uncertainties surrounding the future trajectory of the EU CAP, 
the EU’s external trade in agriculture, the future of EU sugar and banana imports 
from ACP countries and also the future development of the regulation of trade in 
agricultural commodities at the WTO level.
1701 at a reduced customs duty, OJ L  318/4, 1.12.2011 as amended by Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 356/2012 of 24 April 2012, OJ L  113/4, 25.4.2012.
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Annex I: Map of the Caribbean region
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